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9Abstract
Evidence from the consumer behaviour literature show that people like private costs
to either precede or occur at the same time as the benefits. No one wants to pay for a
vacation after it has become a memory, or a dishwasher after it has gone to the tip.
Likewise, no one wants to work for a salary that has already been spent. It is likely
that similar preferences exist for communal expenditures.
With this in mind, this thesis presents a series of studies into how ordinary citizens
make (or want to make) communal financial decisions (i.e. cost-benefit trade-offs).
The aim is to learn if people’s communal preferences are similar to their personal
preferences; and if the prospective double-entry mental accounting model (Prelec &
Loewenstein, 1998) – a well-supported theory of individual preferences – can explain
these communal preferences.
Eight studies (six communal and two personal) confirmed that people use similar
mental rules to the ones prescribed by the double-entry model to make financial
choices on a communal (and personal) level. That is, people prefer to have the
communal costs to either precede or occur at the same time as the benefits; and when
either is not possible, to minimise the temporal distance between the two. These
preferences are observed for monetary gains and losses; for decisions that have a direct
impact on the decision maker, or no impact at all; and for choices made between and
within participants.
These findings provide valuable insights for policy makers who are keen to design
public finance policies that are efficient and have public support.
10
1 CHAPTER ONE
Even the strongest opponents of public engagement in policy-making agree that public
opinion matters. Especially in areas of great significance to citizens and households
such as their taxes and government benefits (McCaffery & Baron, 2006). In fact,
policy makers consistently respond to shifts in public opinion (e.g. Burstein, 2003;
Stimson, MacKuen & Erikson, 1995; Wlezien, 2004), and in recent times have been
trying to engage ordinary citizens in areas of policy making, through consultation and
active participation (e.g. popular referenda, participatory budgeting, citizen
representation on government commissions and panels). For instance, the Canadian
Department of Finance has an online pre-budget consultation forum in which ordinary
citizens share their opinions about various spending programmes before setting the
country’s annual budget1. Likewise, many UK cities and counties arrange annual
budget consultations to get the opinions of residents on different spending
programmes.
Particularly interesting is the rising popularity of participatory budgeting, a process in
which ordinary citizens decide how to allocate part of their municipal or public budget
across spending programmes (Shah, 2007; Tanaka, 2007). Participatory budgeting
originated in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, and has since spread to more than 100
European cities (Sintomer, Herzberg & Rocke, 2008) and1,500 localities around the
world (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). Most recently the city of New York2. Therefore,
now more than ever, ordinary citizens in different parts of the world are taking active
roles in deciding how and (possibly when) their taxes are spent, and government
benefits distributed.
There are numerous benefits for engaging ordinary citizens in the process of setting
municipal and public budgets, and more generally in deciding public finance policies.
It improves accountability and transparency (Boulding and Wampler, 2010), increases
trust in public institutions (Novy & Leubolt, 2005; Goldfrank, 2007), promotes better
allocation of resources (Baiocchi 2003; Schneider & Goldfrank, 2002), and reduces
tax evasion (Feld & Frey, 2007; Lamberton, 2013; Torgler & Schneider, 2009).
1 http://www.fin.gc.ca/n16/16-002-eng.asp
2 http://pbnetwork.org.uk/67000-people-vote-in-pb-new-york-2016/
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However, there are also risks. People regularly make decisions and choices (financial
and otherwise) that deviate systematically from the ideal principles of rationality
(Simon, 1955; Kahneman, 2003). Decades of experimental research in psychology,
economics, cognitive and behavioural science have provided a long list of evidence
showing that people are vulnerable to a wide range of biases (e.g. framing effect,
anchoring, endowment effect, present-bias, projection bias), and often use heuristics
(mental shortcuts) that lead to inconsistent judgements, decisions and choices (e.g.
Bernatzi & Thaler, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). This has prompted many to question the
consistency of people’s preferences on policy issues, especially those concerning
public budgeting and public finance (e.g. Berinsky, 1999; Citrin, 1979; Jones, 1994).
In fact, McCaffery and Baron (2006) documented several instances in which
individuals revealed inconsistent judgments and evaluations of public finance systems
(also Hill, 2010; McCaffery & Slemrod, 2006). For example, participants were more
likely to prefer progressive tax rates (as opposed to flat or regressive ones) when the
choices were framed as percentages rather than amounts  (McCaffery & Baron, 2003);
were more likely to prefer tax policies that were stated using a “bonus” frame as
opposed to a “penalty” frame, even when the final outcome was the same (McCaffery
& Baron, 2004a; analogous to the framing effect demonstrated by the “Asian disease
problem” in Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); and revealed different preferences for
levies labelled as “taxes” as opposed to “payments” across different spending
programs – for some programs they revealed a preference for the tax label, for others
the payment label (McCaffery & Baron, 2004b).
Biases and heuristics can be costly, especially now that ordinary citizens are becoming
more involved in public finance decisions. But, they also present an opportunity for
policy makers to design policies that are efficient and have public support. To that end,
it is imperative for policy makers to understand people’s preferences over public
finance. In particular, preferences concerning the use of taxes or debt to pay for
communal expenditure; and the distribution of shared benefits over time. For instance,
would people support an increase in taxes or debt to pay for additional expenditure?
And would the households of a community that is going to be affected by an adverse
event prefer to receive compensation sooner or later? To illustrate the latter, the UK
government has recently announced plans to create a shale wealth fund that will set
12
aside 10% of the tax proceeds from shale gas production to compensate communities
where the gas wells are hosted. A consultation with affected individuals and local
communities has been initiated to determine (among other things) the purpose of the
fund, the amount of financial benefits received by households, and the distribution of
these benefits over the lifetime of the project3.
To learn about these preferences, one could use observational data such as surveys,
polls, etc. (e.g. Hanson, 1998; Mueller, 1963; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005), or develop a
normative model to predict them. However, both these approaches have limitations.
Observational studies tend to be inconsistent, and are incapable of providing insights
about the psychology of choice; while normative models assume that people are self-
interested and rational.
In light of these limitations, and the absence of a descriptive public finance model to
answer these questions, the alternative is to examine the existing psychological models
of choice for similar decisions in the personal finance domain. In particular, decisions
involving trade-offs between costs and benefits that will take place at different points
in time. Such decisions have typically been discussed using a mental accounting
framework, a set of cognitive operations used by individuals to organise, evaluate, and
keep track of financial activities (Thaler, 1999).
Two psychological models related to mental accounting have been proposed to
evaluate, explain and predict cost-benefit trade-offs of personal financial decisions:
the hedonic editing hypothesis (Thaler, 1985, 1999), and the prospective double-entry
mental accounting (henceforth “double-entry”) model (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998).
Thaler’s (1985) hedonic editing hypothesis builds on the value function from prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to explain and predict how people mentally
integrate or segregate (i.e. edit) two or more financial outcomes, in order to optimise
their hedonic wellbeing. The model suggests that people a) segregate multiple gains,
b) integrate multiple losses, c) integrate small losses with lager gains, or large losses
with slightly smaller gains (the “cancellation effect”), and d) segregate very small
gains from large losses (the “silver lining” principle). It is not clear to what extent
3
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544241/shale_wealth_f
und_final_pdf-a.pdf
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people engage in hedonic editing (i.e. reframing of events) when making financial
decisions. For instance, if gaining £100 then loosing £80 feels worse than gaining £20
(as the model predicts and empirically verified by Thaler, 1985), then individuals
should theoretically be able to mentally reframe the former to look like the latter. This
limitation has led Thaler (1999) to conclude that hedonic editing is theoretically
appealing but descriptively cannot be correct (further limitations are discussed in
Chapter 2).
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) proposed a more elaborate model to analyse cost-
benefit trade-offs. According to this model, the decision to make a purchase is a two-
way hedonic interaction between the pain of paying and the pleasure of consumption.
That is, thinking about the cost of a purchase invokes painful thoughts that can
undermine the pleasure derived from consumption, while thinking about the benefits
can buffer the pain incurred by the payments. As a result, the model predicts a strong
debt-aversion defined as a preference to prepay for consumption, and to receive
payments for work that has been performed. These predictions are built around three
mental accounting rules: a) prospective accounting which describes how a sequence
of consumption and payment episodes interact to determine a person’s hedonic
experience; b) coupling, which refers to the degree to which the payments bring to
mind thoughts about the benefits of consumption, and vice versa; and c) prorating
which assigns residual payments to residual consumption, and vice versa.
While mainly discussed in terms of purchase behaviour, Prelec and Loewenstein
posited that the theory also applies to situations involving labour effort in exchange
for earnings4. Studies exploring preferences for financing personal consumption have
in general supported the predictions of the double-entry model (e.g. Ariely & Silva,
2002; Auh & Shih, 2006; Auh, Shih & Yoon, 2008; Hirst, Joyce, & Schadewald, 1994;
Knutson et al., 2007; Patrick & Park, 2006; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998; Soman &
Gourville, 2001).
With this in mind, this thesis, presents a series of studies into how ordinary citizens
make (or want to make) communal financial decisions. The aim is to learn whether
their communal preferences are similar to the ones they would have if deciding for
4 Such that negative payments refer to earnings, and negative consumption refers to work
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themselves as individuals, and specifically ask if the double-entry model – a well-
supported theory of individual preferences – can explain these communal preferences.
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews evidence from the consumer behaviour literature concerning
preferences for financing personal consumption, then formally presents the two mental
accounting models discussed above.
Chapter 3 presents three studies that explore preferences for financing nonrecurring
communal expenditure, using taxes or public debt. Specifically, these studies explore
preferences for the timing of payments (losses) when the benefits from communal
expenditure are either short-lived or long lasting; and when the long lasting benefits
either accrue in the near or distant future.
Chapter 4, presents two studies that examine preferences for the timing of monetary
gains and losses in exchange for communal services (i.e. cost-benefit trade-off) that
could either take place in the near or distant future. The studies also compare trade-
offs that have a direct impact on the decision maker, or no impact at all (i.e. decisions
made on behalf of the decision maker’s community, or other communities).
Chapter 5 presents three studies (two personal and one communal) designed to test
preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes, for all possible combinations of cost-
benefit sequences.. In addition, the chapter explores how people with different
attitudes towards debt (elicited using a novel diagnostic tool developed by Scholten
and colleagues) evaluate these cost-benefit trade-offs.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides direction for future research.
Taken together, these studies suggest that people prefer communal costs to either
precede or occur at the same time as the benefits; and when either is not possible, to
minimise the temporal distance between the two. These preferences are observed for
monetary gains and losses; for decisions that have a direct impact on the decision
maker, or no impact at all. These findings suggest that communal financial decisions
are motivated by the same mental accounting rules that people use to make personal
ones. In particular, the rules prescribed by the double-entry model (e.g. prospective
15
accounting / coupling). Therefore, providing a descriptive theory for policy makers to
adhere to when designing public finance policies.
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2 CHAPTER TWO
2.1 Preferences for financing private consumption
Studies exploring preferences for financing prospective consumption reveal a strong
tendency among consumers to prepay for nondurable goods, and to temporally align
the timing of payments with the benefits of durable ones (e.g. Auh & Shih, 2006; Auh,
Shih & Yoon, 2008; Hirst, Joyce, & Schadewald, 1994; Patrick & Park, 2006; Prelec
& Loewenstein, 1998).
For example, most of the participants (82%) in Hirst et al. (1994) were willing to
borrow to pay for some furniture, but not for a two-week vacation. They were also
more likely to accelerate the payment of an existing loan if the financed goods no
longer provided any utility (e.g. a broken TV that can’t be repaired), and more likely
to incur additional costs to ensure that the duration of a loan does not exceed the useful
life of a durable good.
Building on these findings, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) investigated the interaction
between preferences for the timing of payments and duration of consumption. They
asked participants whether they prefer to prepay or delay the payments for: i) a one-
week vacation, ii) some miscellaneous living expenses during a brief and fully
anticipated period of unemployment, and iii) a washer-dryer. The majority said they
would prefer to prepay for the nondurables, with 63% choosing so for the vacation,
and 70% for the miscellaneous living expenses. In contrast, 76% chose to delay the
payments for the durable washer-dryer.
Patrick and Park (2006) pointed out that only brief but highly enjoyable goods such as
a vacation (i.e. nondurable hedonic good) would elicit a strong preference for
prepayment. This hypothesis was tested in two studies. The first evaluated the separate
effects of type (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and durability (durable vs. nondurable) of
different products on the timing of payments5, while the second evaluated the effects
of consumption goal (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and durability (single-use vs. multiple-
5 A one-week vacation (nondurable hedonic), a washer-dryer (durable utilitarian), pest-control services
(nondurable utilitarian) and a home entertainment system (durable hedonic).
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use) of a single product6. In both studies, participants revealed a higher tendency to
prepay for the short-lived (nondurable or single-use) hedonic goods compared to the
other type-durability combinations.
Finally, Auh and Shih (2006) and Auh, Shih and Yoon (2008) found that the pattern
of payments and consumption episodes are also relevant in determining individual
preferences for financing consumption. Both studies show that participants preferred
constant payment streams to pay for goods that provide an ongoing constant stream of
benefit, like furniture, but to accelerate the payments of highly depreciating goods like
high-tech products even when the two streams of payments had the same net present
value.
Taken all together, these studies reveal three stylised facts: a) people are strongly
averse to the idea of using debt to pay for nondurable goods; b) they dislike paying for
durable goods that no longer provide any benefits; and c) they prefer to match the
pattern of payment and benefit streams of durable goods.
All three facts violate the predictions of the standard economic theory that decisions
concerning the timing of payments should be independent of the type and durability
of consumption, and that individuals should be making these decisions to minimise
the net present value of costs. However, these facts can be accounted for by the
hedonic editing hypothesis (as suggested by Hirst et al., 1994), and the double-entry
model (as proposed by Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998).
2.2 The hedonic editing hypothesis
According to Thaler (1985), people evaluate the utility experienced from multiple
monetary outcomes in a way that is consistent with the value function from prospect
theory7 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); and as a consequence, engage in what is
referred to as hedonic editing – the act of integrating or segregating two or more
financial outcomes to improve one’s overall wellbeing. For instance, mentally
6 Participants were told that they will be going on a one-week trip to Paris either for business or pleasure,
and that they would be making the trip either once or three times.
7 The value function has three distinctive features. One, reference dependence – prospects are assessed
in terms of gains and losses relative to a reference point. Two, diminishing sensitivity – it is concave
for gains and convex for losses producing an S-shaped curve. Three, loss aversion – it is steeper for
losses than for gains.
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integrating a £100 tax rebate with a £75 speeding ticket “as if” it was only a £25 tax
rebate feels better since losses loom larger than gains (i.e. for any concave function of
utility, (100) + (−75) < (25)).
Specifically, the model makes predictions about preferences to integrate or segregate
sequences of monetary outcomes x and y when: a) x and y > 0 (multiple gains); b) x
and y < 0 (multiple losses); c) x > 0 and y < 0 such that x + y > 0 (mixed gain); and
d) x > 0 and y < 0 such that x + y < 0 (mixed loss).
Therefore, given the shape of the value function, the model predicts a preference to:
a) segregate multiple gains because of the concavity of the gains function; b) integrate
multiple losses because of the convexity of the loss function; c) integrate large gains
with smaller losses to offset loss aversion; and d) integrate large losses with slightly
smaller gains (the “cancellation effect”), and to segregate large losses from very small
gains (the “silver lining” principle).
These predictions are based on the assumptions that: a) outcomes are evaluated using
the prospect theory value function; b) individuals are value maximisers who actively
integrate and segregate outcomes to enhance their overall hedonic experience; c)
mental integration is enabled by temporal contiguity, the association formed between
two outcomes when these outcomes occur within a short period of time (Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1986); and d) mental segregation is facilitated by temporal separation, the
spacing of outcomes over time.
Assumptions c and d are particularly important for testing the predictions of the
hedonic editing hypothesis as these are presumed to be the means by which individuals
can reveal their preferences to integrate or segregate multiple outcomes (Thaler &
Johnson, 1990; Linville & Fischer, 1991). Therefore, when segregation is preferred
the decision maker will actively choose to temporally separate the financial outcomes,
but when integration is preferred he or she will choose to experience these outcomes
concurrently or within a short period of time.
Empirical tests by Thaler and Johnson (1990) supported the predictions of the model
concerning a) the segregation of multiple gains, b) the integration of larger gains with
smaller losses, c) the cancellation effect, and d) the silver lining principle. However,
the tests also revealed a preference for the segregation of multiple losses. As a result,
Thaler and Johnson proposed a quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis which takes into
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account people’s sensitivity to multiple losses experienced within a short period of
time. In other words, the model assumes that individuals need some time to desensitise
the pain of a loss before experiencing a subsequent one. This is consistent with the
renewable resource model that Linville and Fischer (1991) proposed as an alternative
to analyse similar decisions. According to the model, people have limited gain-
savouring and loss-buffering resources that are depleted when someone experiences
positive or negative events in close temporal proximity. However, these resources are
naturally regenerated over time. As a result, the model predicts a preference to
temporally separate outcomes consisting of multiple gains or multiple losses to
replenish the depleted resources; and to integrate mixed outcomes because gains
replenish the available loss-buffering resources.
So how can the hedonic editing hypothesis explain the financing preferences observed
in the experimental studies mentioned above? Hirst et al. (1994), who used the model
as a framework to make predictions about consumer borrowing decisions, assumed
that payments for consumption purchased on credit are coded by consumers as losses,
while benefits derived from consumption are coded as gains. Furthermore, they
assumed that the experienced consumption utility from a voluntary purchase exceeds
the disutility from the payments. Accordingly, Hirst el al. (1994) argued that any
purchase made on credit resembled a mixed gain outcome. Consequently, they
proposed, following the predictions of the HE hypotheses, that consumers favour
financial choices that allow them to integrate the repayments with the consumption
benefits.
Specifically, Hirst el al. (1994) predicted that consumers prefer to use credit to
purchase durable goods since the disutility associated with the payments will be offset
by the consumption utility; and savings to pay for nondurable ones because purchasing
nondurables on credit implies that payments will be experienced in the absence of any
benefits. They also predicted a preference to accelerate payments of highly
depreciating goods since the larger earlier payments are offset by the high upfront
consumption utility. Lastly, they predicted a preference to fully repay loans of goods
that no longer provided any utility in order to mentally close that account.
While Hirst et al.’s intuition concerning people’s financial preferences was sound,
their utilisation of the hedonic editing hypothesis as model to predict these preferences
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has three major shortcomings. One, there is some question as to whether payments
given up in exchange for consumption are perceived as losses, since money is typically
held to achieve that purpose (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). Novemsky and
Kahneman (2005) used Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler’s (1990) endowment
paradigm8 to show that the willingness of buyers to pay (WTP) for a given good is
equivalent to the minimum amount of money choosers prefer in lieu of receiving that
good, but significantly less than the amount of money that sellers were willing to
accept (WTA) to give it up (i.e. Buyers’ WTP  = Choosers’ Choice Equivalence <
Sellers’ WTA).
In addition, their study revealed that the willingness of risky buyers’ to pay for a
gamble that gives them an opportunity to keep their money and receive the good was
significantly lower than that of riskless buyers. That is, in contrast to riskless buyers,
risky buyers experienced loss aversion for the money they were giving up. Conversely,
risky sellers’ prices - those who agreed to enter a gamble for an opportunity to retain
the good and gain an amount of money - did not differ from riskless ones (i.e. both
groups experienced similar magnitudes of loss aversion).
Two, the hedonic editing hypothesis does not take into account preferences for
sequences of outcomes. In fact, the model predicts that someone who prefers to receive
£20 instead of receiving £100 then loosing £80, will also prefer £20 to loosing £80
then receiving £100. However, Ross and Simonson (1991) who studied these types of
choices found a preference for integration when the gain preceded the loss, but a
preference for segregation when the loss preceded the gain – an outcome they referred
to as a “preference for happy endings”. More recently, Hoelzl, Kamleitner and
Kirchler (2011) investigated whether the sequence of a loan repayment plan (falling,
constant or rising) mattered when financing products with an ongoing utility stream
(e.g. a car). There findings revealed a stronger preference for the falling and constant
profiles even when the rising profile was financially superior. In other words,
participants preferred the improving sequence to the declining one – a preference that
8 The original endowment effect study had three conditions: seller, buyers and choosers. The sellers
were endowed with a good (e.g. a mug) then were asked how much money they were willing to accept
to give up that good. The buyers were asked how much they were willing to pay to receive the same
good. Finally, the choosers were given the opportunity to select between receiving a sum of money and
the good.
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has been widely documented in the intertemporal choice literature (e.g. Ariely, 1998;
Chapman, 1996, 2000; Haisley & Loewenstein, 2011; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991,
1993; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; Read and Powell, 2002; Read & Scholten,
2012; Varey & Kahneman, 1992), and possibly explains why consumers strongly
prefer to prepay for nondurable consumption.
Such preferences are motivated by several psychological mechanisms including the
recency effect (Miller and Campbell, 1959), savouring and dread (Loewenstein, 1987),
adaptation and loss aversion (Helson, 1964; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and the
closely related contrast effects (Tversky & Griffin, 1991).
For instance, the recency effect theory posits that individuals are more likely to
overweight the final outcome when forming an overall evaluation of an experience.
Therefore, an experience ending with the most favourable outcome will often be
judged more positively than one in which the favourable outcome takes place earlier
in time.
Savouring and dread offers an alternative explanation for the preference of improving
outcomes. According to this theory, individuals derive utility from anticipating
pleasurable experiences (savouring), and disutility from anticipating painful ones
(dread). As a result, individuals will expedite painful experiences to minimise (or
avoid) dread, and delay the pleasurable experiences to savour the moment.
The adaptation-level and loss aversion theory suggests that people adapt to the most
recent level of stimuli they experience, and evaluate new stimuli relative to their
adaptation level. Therefore, improving sequences are comprised of  positive
departures from one’s adaptation level (gains), while declining sequences consist of
negative departures (losses). Given that losses loom larger than equivalent gains,
positive departures should be preferred to negative ones, thereby favouring improving
sequences of outcomes over time.
Finally, the contrast theory postulates that the attractiveness of an outcome is often
determined in comparison with a former one, in which the latter serves as a reference
point. Therefore, having an inferior outcome prior to a superior one, enhances the
attractiveness of the latter. Hence the preference for improving sequences.
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Three, the model does not factor in temporal discounting, the effect of time delay on
the subjective value attributed to an outcome that will take place in the future. The
latter is a key component in any financial decision.
All these issues and others, have been addressed by Prelec and Loewenstein’s (1998)
double-entry model; which is why this thesis is mainly based on testing the predictions
of the double-entry model.
2.3 The prospective double-entry mental accounting model
According to Prelec and Loewenstein (1998), people experience a pain of paying when
making a purchase. This pain constitutes an additional cost to the price of a purchase,
and weakens the pleasure derived from consumption. It also plays a vital role in self-
regulating consumption behaviour to prevent a person from spending compulsively
(Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998; Kivetz, 1999). Evidence of this “pain” has recently been
documented in studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging.. For instance,
Knutson et al. (2007) found that activation in the insula, a region associated with the
imagination of pain, was significantly greater with products that participants refused
to purchase.
To account for the pain of paying, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) proposed a double-
entry model as an alternative to the standard economic model. According to this
model, the decision to make a purchase is a two-way hedonic interaction between the
pain of paying and the pleasure of consumption. That is, thinking about the costs of a
purchase invokes painful thoughts that attenuate the pleasure of consumption, while
thinking about the benefits alleviates the pain of paying. This idea was formally
presented using two equations that reflect the anticipated utility from consumption (1),
and disutility from the associated payments (2):
Consumption experience: ∑ (1 ± ) ( − ̂ ) (1)
whereby, is the experienced utility when consumption is free, ̂ is the imputed
cost attenuating the pleasure of consumption, is a parameter reflecting the marginal
utility of money based on an individual’s financial situation, is a loss aversion
parameter and is a discount factor.
Payment experience: ∑ (1 ± ) ( − ) (2)
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whereby is the experienced disutility from the payments if there were no
associated benefits, is the imputed benefit that buffers the pain of paying and is
a discount factor.
Accordingly, the model predicts a preference to prepay for consumption since the pain
experienced from prepaid consumption is moderated by the anticipated pleasure of
consumption, while consumption is enjoyed as if it were free ( ̂ = 0). In contrast,
postpaying for consumption is hedonically unpleasant since the pain from the
anticipated payments diminishes the experienced pleasure of consumption, while the
deferred payments feel as a pure loss ( = 0).
These predictions are built around three mental accounting rules: a) prospective
accounting, b) coupling, and c) prorating.
Prospective accounting - is a rule that recognises future payments and writes-off past
ones. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the timing of payments and the
imputed cost of consumption. Past payments have lower imputed costs than future
payments, and more so when consumption is paid for far in advance (point “A”). The
imputed costs are highest when payments are due straight after consumption (point
“C”), but decline gradually as the payments are deferred into the distant future because
of temporal discounting (point “D”). For analytical convenience Prelec and
Loewenstein (1998) approximated the relationship in Figure 2.1 using a step function
(dotted line in the figure). Therefore from a modelling perspective, past payments have
zero impact on prospective consumption (i.e. deleted from the mental accounting
system); while future payments have the same impact irrespective of their time.
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Figure 2.1 – The impact of payment timing on the imputed cost of consumption (as depicted in
PL)
Gourville and Soman (1998) provided evidence supporting the payment depreciation
observed for points “A” and “B” in Figure 2.1. In one of their studies, participants who
paid for a basketball game tickets six month in advance were significantly less likely
to drive 60 miles in a snowstorm to attend the game compared to those who paid one
day in advance, but were as likely to do so compared to those who obtained the tickets
for free. Likewise, participants in Henderson and Peterson (1992) who lost a $10
theatre ticket several days in advance were more likely to purchase a new ticket
compared to those who lost it shortly before attending the play. Finally, a significant
portion of seasoned wine drinkers [students] in Shafir and Thaler (2006) indicated that
a prepaid case of wine [concert ticket] would feel “as if” it costs nothing when
consumed in the distant future.
Coupling - refers to the mental association between payments and consumption. It is
the degree to which consumption triggers thoughts about the payments, and vice versa.
It is characterised in the model by two coefficients α and β which signify the strength
(from 0 to 1) and the direction of mental association (α: from consumption to
payments; β: from payments to consumption) – see functional form in equations (3)
and (4) below. Specifically, refers to the degree to which the pleasure of
consumption is attenuated by thinking about the associated payments, while refers
to the degree to which the pain of paying is buffered by thinking about the
consumption.
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The strength and direction of this mental association varies depending on the timing
of payments and consumption. For instance, prepaying for consumption weakens
(attenuation) and strengthens (buffering) since paying in advance strongly couples
the payments to the benefits, but decouples the benefits from the payments at the time
of consumption. In contrast, postpaying for consumption strengthens and weakens
. Therefore, a prepaid taxi service, for instance, should be preferable to a metered
one because it has a low cost to benefit association (i.e. low , high ), while a service
that is paid far in the future should be the least preferred since it has a low benefit to
cost association (i.e. high , low ).
In addition to temporal proximity, the strength of payment-consumption association is
also influenced by the complexity of a transaction (e.g. bundled vs. unbundled
products; Soman & Gourville, 2001), the payment method (e.g. cash vs. credit card;
Ariely & Silva, 2002; Prelec & Simester, 2001) and by individual differences
(‘tightwads’ vs. ‘spendthrifts’; Rick, Cryder & Loewenstein, 2008). For instance,
bundling several items into one package weakens the association between the
payments and any specific consumption episode (e.g. annual gym memberships vs.
single-entry payments, all-inclusive holidays vs. pay-as-you-consume holidays).
Likewise, paying for purchases with a credit card as opposed to cash weakens the
association between consumption and payments, most likely because the outflow of
money is less salient at the time of purchase (Soman 2001; Thaler, 1999).
Prorating – is a rule that assigns residual payments to residual consumption, and vice
versa. Therefore, given a sequence of future payments {p1 = £10, p2 = £20, p3 = £30
and p4 = £40, at t = 1, 2, 3 and 4 periods, respectively} and five prospective
consumption episodes bestowing 1 utility each, then the prorated imputed cost for each
consumption episode at t0 is (£10 + £20 + £30 + £40) / 5 = £20, and the prorated
imputed benefit of say, payment “p3”, is (1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1) * £30 / (£10 + £20 + £30
+ £40) = 1.5 units of utility.
These imputations will change as the residual consumption and payments decline over
time (i.e. as the consumption and payment episodes are dropped from the mental
accounting system).
In formal terms, combining the three mental accounting rules results in an:
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Imputed cost: ̂ = (∑ )∑ (3)
whereby ∑ is the total outstanding payments at time b prorated over the residual
consumption utility (∑ ) and adjusted downwards by the coupling coefficient ,
such that 0 < ≤ 1.
Imputed benefit: = (∑ )∑ (4)
whereby ∑ is the total consumption utility remaining at time c prorated over the
outstanding payments (∑ ) and adjusted downwards by the coupling coefficient ,
such that 0 < ≤ 1
Substituting (3) in (1) and (4) in (2):
Consumption experience: ∑ (1 ± ) ( − (∑ )∑ ) (5)
Payment experience: ∑ (1 ± ) ( ∑ ∑ − ) (6)
Figure 2.2 plots the consumption and payment experiences of a durable good when
the payments slightly precede the benefits9. The upper left panel plots the consumption
utility when the durable good is acquired for free, while the one below it plots the
disutility from eight instalments to be paid for the durable. The upper and lower panels
to the right plot the imputed costs and benefits, respectively. Merging the panels on
the left with the ones on right provides the overall consumption and payment
experiences.
During the initial phase of ownership, the mental burden of carrying so much debt
reduces some of the enjoyment from the consumption experience. However, as the
payments are settled, the experienced utility from consumption gradually increases
and eventually reaches its peak when the debt is paid off. Meanwhile, the disutility
from the payments starts high, but diminishes over time as the remaining payments
9 The figure has been reproduced from Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) by applying equations (5) and
(6) using the following assumptions: = = 1 (i.e. no discounting), = 0 (i.e. no loss aversion),= 1, and = = 0.4
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are offset by the residual consumption utility. So much so, that the final payment
generates a positive emotion reflecting the joy of having the debt finally paid off.
Figure 2.2 – Experienced consumption and payments
2.3.1 The effects of duration and period of consumption
While Prelec and Loewenstein’s (1998) hypothesise that there will always be hedonic
benefits derived from prepayment (as shown in Figure 2.2), the magnitude of these
benefits will vary depending on the duration consumption (i.e. short-lived vs. long-
lived goods).
That is, long-lived (durable) goods are less likely to elicit a preference for prepayment
compared to nondurable ones, because a) the disutility from deferred payments will
be offset by the residual consumption utility, and b) the hedonic benefits from
prepayment are unlikely to be large enough to offset motives that favour deferring the
+
+
=
Actual costs
Utility of free consumption Imputed costs
Imputed  benefits
Consumption experience
Payments experience
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payments (e.g. temporal discounting, insurance against negative product experiences
- see section 2.3.2 for more details). In contrast, short-lived goods are more likely to
elicit a preference for prepayment since there is no residual consumption utility to
offset the deferred payments10.
In fact, evidence from several studies exploring preferences for the timing of
payments, along with observations from real-life settings, show that individuals often
prefer to defer the payments of durable goods like a washer-dryer (e.g. Hirst et al.,
1994; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Patrick & Park, 2006). However, as soon as the
durable goods cease to provide any utility, the individual will choose to close that
account by paying back any outstanding amount. For example, participants in one of
the studies conducted by Hirst el al. (1994) were less likely to carry a loan for a broken
item compared to a fully functional one.
This suggests that the period of consumption plays a key role when deciding how long
to defer the payments of durable goods. Figure 2.3 simulates the consumption and
payment experiences for a durable good using three financing strategies11: a) prepaid
durable (savings); b) leased durable, and c) postpaid durable (credit). Accordingly, of
the three financing strategies, prepayment provides the optimal hedonic experience,
followed by leasing, then consumption on credit.
Figure 2.3 – Payment-consumption experience for three financing strategies
10 The evidence suggests that most people will prefer to prepay for short-lived hedonic goods (e.g. a
vacation) because they want to enjoy these goods debt-free. However, this preference is not as robust
for short-lived utilitarian goods. For instance, while Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) reported a stronger
preference to prepay for miscellaneous living expenses during a short period of anticipated
unemployment, Patrick and Park (2006) found a higher tendency to defer the payments of a business
trip to Paris, and for a pest-control service.
11 The figures were produced applying equations (5) and (6) using the following assumption: = =1 (i.e. no discounting), = 0 (i.e. no loss aversion), = 1, and = = 0.4. Strategies (a) and (c)
also apply in the context of nondurable consumption.
Leased durable
Consumption experience Payment experience
Postpaid durable
Consumption experience Payment experience
Prepaid durable
Consumption experience Payment experience
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Prepaid durable – The disutility experienced from the payments in the prepaid durable
good scenario (refer to the left panel of Figure 2.3) is initially high, however, this
disutility gradually diminishes and eventually turns positive as the payments recede
into the past. Furthermore, since there are no payments to worry once the durable has
been paid off, consumption can be enjoyed as if it were free. Therefore, providing the
highest consumption utility possible.
Postpaid durable – In contrast, the utility experienced from consumption in the
postpaid durable scenario (refer to right panel of Figure 2.3) starts off relatively high,
but rapidly declines before turning negative as the looming reality of having to repay
the debt becomes inevitable. Besides, the disutility from the payments is experienced
in full as it cannot be buffered by benefits that have already been consumed.
Leased durable – The leasing strategy provides a middle ground between a prepaid
and postpaid durable. While the utility from consumption is not as high as the one
experienced in the prepaid durable scenario, it remains positive throughout the
consumption period. Meanwhile, the disutility from the payments is offset by the
residual consumption utility, thus resulting in payments that feel less onerous in
comparison with the postpaid durable scenario.
2.3.2 Motives for deferring the payments of durables
There are several reasons for people to defer the payments of durable consumption.
One, the lack of immediate financial resources (i.e. liquidity constraint), especially
when a large upfront payment is required. Two, resource slack (Zauberman & Lynch,
2005), the belief that one will be in a better financial position in the future to pay off
their debts. Three, opportunity cost, whereby money available today can be invested
to earn more money in the future, which can ultimately be used to cover the payments
of the leased durable.
Four, reassurance against negative consumption experiences. Deferring the payments
of durables gives people the feeling that they have some leverage over the seller in
case they need to negotiate an exchange or a refund if the purchased item is defective
or unsatisfactory. A sort of insurance policy against negative product-related
experiences (Patrick & Park, 2006).
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Five, to simplify financial decisions. Heath and Fennema (1996) argue that making
financial decisions is easier when people can align the timing of payments to the period
of consumption, since it allows them to explicitly compare the marginal costs and
benefits of that consumption. They even argue that people will actively attempt to
mentally depreciate the costs over the period of consumption even when physical
integration is not possible (e.g. large upfront payments). For instance, an individual
who is deciding whether to replace a durable item might use mental depreciation to
determine if they “got their money’s worth”. Furthermore, aligning the costs and
benefits makes it easier for individuals to track their expenses for budgeting purposes
(Heath & Soll, 1996).
2.3.3 Temporal discounting
In addition to the type, durability and period of consumption, the preference to prepay
for consumption is often diminished by temporal discounting. Discounting means that
lower weights are assigned to future payments, making these payments seem less
onerous. The degree of discounting varies from one person to the other depending on
how impatient that person is, such that more impatience implies higher discounting.
Accordingly, when impatience is high and the hedonic benefit from prepayment is
low, the preference to prepay for consumption will reverse into a preference to pay
later.
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3 CHAPTER THREE
3.1 Introduction
Policy makers often have to decide between borrowing or increasing taxes to pay for
additional expenditure. Ideally, these decisions should follow the guidelines of rational
financial principles to achieve fiscal efficiency - the optimal allocation of resources
over time and projects. However, they also have to consider the preferences of citizens
if they wish to maintain credibility (and popularity), even if these preferences are not
in line with the ideal practices. It is vital, therefore, that these policy makers know
about these preferences, so they can either accommodate them or communicate to the
public the need to do things differently.
Consequently, this chapter examines the preferences of UK residents for using taxes
or debt to pay for nonrecurring communal expenditure – whereby debt is construed as
a preference to defer taxes. In particular, it examines preferences for the timing of tax
payments for different types of communal projects. To illustrate, imagine that you live
in a city which is about to celebrate its bicentennial. Two major celebrations are being
considered:
 Celebration 1: A fireworks display on the bicentennial weekend that will last
approximately 30 minutes.
 Celebration 2:  A monument in the city square that will be uncovered on the
bicentennial weekend, and will last another 200 years.
Regardless of the chosen celebration, each household in the city will have to pay a
one-time surcharge of £5. Should the £5 surcharge be paid before or after the
bicentennial weekend? From a normative perspective, the nature and duration of the
celebration does not matter. The decision maker should choose the financing strategy
that minimises the present value of payments, which in this case means deferring the
£5 surcharge. However, in many cases people dislike paying for communal benefits
that have already been consumed. For instance, the residents of Montreal, Canada
complained for 30 years about paying a “special Olympic tax” to service $1.5 billion
of debt used to pay for the 1976 summer Olympic Games12. Likewise, the residents of
12 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/19/world/canada-montreal-olympic-legacy/index.html
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Sheffield, UK, continue to express their discontent at having to pay £25 million a year
until 2024, to service the debt used for financing the 1991 World Student Games13.
To my knowledge, no descriptive model has been proposed yet to deal specifically
with people’s preferences for financing nonrecurring public expenditure. Therefore, I
propose that the model developed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) to think about
similar decisions made on a personal level is appropriate for this context. This is
because the characteristics of private and communal consumption can be very similar.
For instance, the duration of communal consumption, like the private one, can be
short-lived or long-lived, with benefits that can be hedonic or utilitarian. A public
fireworks display, for example, offers a short-lived hedonic experience; while a
recycling centre provides long lasting utilitarian benefits. In addition, both private and
communal consumption may provide immediate or deferred benefits.
Recall that, according to the double-entry model, individuals will always derive
hedonic benefits from prepaying for consumption, but the magnitude of these benefits
vary according to the type and duration of consumption. As a result, the preference for
prepayment will vary accordingly.
Figure 3.1 – Prepaid versus postpaid nondurable consumption
Figure 3.1 compares the consumption and payment experiences of prepaid and
postpaid nondurable consumption by applying equations (5) and (6) from section 3 in
Chapter 2. It is evident that the overall hedonic experience is far better when the
nondurable good is prepaid since a) the disutility associated with the payments is
buffered by positive thoughts about the prospective consumption benefits, and b)
consumption is unencumbered by negative thoughts about these payments. As a result,
13 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-14134973
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people generally prefer to prepay for nondurable consumption, especially when it is
hedonic (refer to section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 for details).
Figure 3.2 – Prepaid versus leased durable consumption
Figure 3.2, on the other hand, compares the consumption and payment experiences of
prepaid and leased durable consumption. It shows that deferring the payments does
not have a strong adverse effect on the overall experience. This is because the disutility
from the later payments is offset by the residual consumption utility. In addition, even
though prepaying for the durable enhances the consumption experience, this added
benefit is not large enough to offset the opposing effect of discounting, or other factors
(e.g. opportunity costs – refer to section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2). Accordingly, people in
general are more inclined to defer the payments of durable consumption, regardless of
whether these benefits are hedonic or utilitarian.
Evidence from studies exploring preferences for the timing of payments in the context
of private consumption revealed a stronger preference to prepay for nondurable goods
(especially hedonic ones, e.g. Patrick & Park, 2006), and to defer the payments of
durable ones. The studies in this chapter extend the analysis to the domain of
communal consumption.
Study 1 utilised an experimental design similar to the one used by Patrick & Park
(2006), but in the context of communal consumption. That is, the study explored
preferences for the timing of payments for public projects that varied by duration
(short-lived vs. long-lived) and type of benefits (hedonic vs. utilitarian). The
communal domain differs from the private one in two key aspects: a) the benefits are
shared between the members of a community, therefore are not experienced the same
way as private ones; and b) the payments made in exchange for communal benefits
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are involuntary, therefore are generally more painful than voluntary ones (Sussman &
Olivola, 2011) and are associated with lower levels of satisfaction (Lamberton, 2013).
Study 2 explored preferences for the timing of payments by manipulating the
durability of benefits derived from a short-lived communal project. Therefore, in some
cases the benefits from the project were framed as having a long term impact on the
affected community, while in other cases the benefits were not mentioned at all.
Specifically, this study aimed to test whether having long term benefits can moderate
the preference to prepay for short-lived projects. Especially since there is conflicting
evidence in the private consumption literature as to whether people prefer to prepay
or postpay for nondurable goods that offer long term benefits (e.g. a one-week
seminar).
Finally, Study 3 explored these preferences by manipulating the consumption period
of a long-lasting project. Consumption period refers to intervals of equal consumption
durations taking place at different points in time. Therefore, in some cases the long-
lasting project was implemented in the near future, while in other cases it was
implemented in a more distant one. Studies exploring preferences for the timing of
payments of durable goods, typically manipulated the consumption duration (e.g. Hirst
et al., 1994) or the pattern of utility streams (e.g. Hoelzl et al., 2011), but not the period
of consumption. The latter is key aspect for public expenditure since many investments
have deferred rather than instantaneous benefits.
In addition to the above, all three studies employed a unique elicitation method
consisting of multiple binary choices with sooner and later payments, such that the
later payments were either smaller than, equal to, or larger than the sooner ones. In
contrast, previous studies either used a one-choice equal payments method (Prelec &
Loewenstein, 1998), or a Likert scale method (Patrick & Park, 2006).
The multiple binary choice method has several advantages. One, it elicits preferences
at different levels of interest rates. Two, it allows for testing the consistency of
responses at the individual level. Three, it facilitates the examination of different
patterns of individual preferences. Therefore, providing a robust measure of
preferences.
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3.2 Study 1
Study 1 explores preferences for the timing of payments of four communal projects
that vary by duration (short-lived vs. long-lived) and type (hedonic vs. utilitarian).
Accordingly, some projects have a short life lasting for a few days, while others have
a long life lasting for years. In addition, some projects have stronger hedonic attributes,
while others have stronger utilitarian ones.
Following the predictions of the double-entry model, it is hypothesised that:
H1: short-lived projects will elicit a stronger preference for prepayment than
long-lived ones
Furthermore, following Patrick and Park’s (2006) proposition that only emotionally
charged nondurable goods, like vacations, would elicit a strong preference to pay in
advance, it is hypothesised that:
H2: there will be a stronger preference to prepay for the short-lived hedonic
projects than short-lived utilitarian ones
While Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) implicitly suggested that people are more likely
to prepay for nondurable hedonic goods, their model does not support prediction H2
as it is oblivious to the source of utility (i.e. whether it is derived from hedonic or
utilitarian consumption).
Participants
A sample of 327 UK residents recruited using Bilendi14 completed the online survey.
The data from 19 participants were excluded because of careless responding
determined by the following criteria: switching back and forth between options two
standard deviations more than the average, or completing the study two standard
deviations faster than the average natural log of completion time. Participants were on
average 47 years old, with 40% holding a university degree, 57% in full-time or part-
time employment and 53% being females. The median completion time of the survey
14 A market research company based in the UK – http://www.bilendi.co.uk
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was 6 minutes. Participants who successfully completed the survey were rewarded
with loyalty points that could be exchanged for products of their liking.
Design and procedure
Participants were presented with a scenario about a UK city that was planning to
increase temporary spending to help promote the wellbeing of young residents. The
idea being that spending public funds to improve the wellbeing of young residents
should be perceived favourably by most participants. The introduction to the scenario
read as follows: “In the following questions you will be asked to state your preference
for choices a city council can take when funding spending plans. In every case, the
options involve funding the plan by temporarily increasing costs to the taxpayer in the
form of a "surcharge." This surcharge can come earlier or later. The surcharge will
be specified in terms of average cost per household per quarter. The actual cost any
household will pay will depend on their circumstances, such as their ability to pay.”
Following the introduction, each participant was then randomly assigned to one of the
2 (project duration: short-lived vs. long-lived) x 2 (type of benefits: hedonic vs.
utilitarian) conditions. The projects were selected based on the following criteria. One,
to satisfy Dhar and Wertenbroch’s (2000) definition of a hedonic and utilitarian
experience15. As a result, two themes were used: sporting activities (hedonic) and
academic ones (utilitarian). Two, ensure that the durability of benefits derived from
the projects overlap as much as possible with duration, such that the short-lived
projects have nondurable benefits, while the long-lived projects have durable ones.
This is a key point since duration and durability can sometimes be confounded.
Especially for nondurable utilitarian goods. For instance, a one-week seminar is a
short-lived good with potential long term benefits. The four projects are listed in Table
3.1.
15 Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) defined hedonic goods as “ones whose consumption is primarily
characterized by an affective and sensory experience of aesthetic or sensual pleasure, fantasy, and fun”
(e.g. vacation, sports car, luxury watch). In contrast, utilitarian goods are defined as “ones whose
consumption is more cognitively driven, instrumental and goal oriented and accomplishes a functional
or practical task” (e.g. furniture, a seminar, laptop for work)
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Table 3.1 – Between-participants design for Study 1
Duration
Short-lived Long-lived
Type of
benefits
Hedonic hosting a 3-day national sportscompetition for the youth
a sports and leisure centre for the
youth
Utilitarian hosting a 3-day national sciencefair for the youth a learning facility for the youth
Once assigned to a condition, participants were then directed to a new page with
additional information particular to that condition. An example of the short-lived
utilitarian project condition is provided in Figure 3.3 below. The other conditions are
reproduced in Appendix A.
Figure 3.3 – Short-lived utilitarian project condition
To emphasise the communal nature of the decision, participants were asked to imagine
that they were local spokespeople who can influence the outcome of a citywide
referendum initiated to vote for the two options presented in Figure 3.3, and
accordingly to choose the option they would recommend the households of the city to
vote for.
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Preferences for the timing of payments were elicited using 10 binary choices with a
fixed time delay (t = 1 year). Each choice consisted of an earlier surcharge paid
quarterly from January to December 2014, and a later surcharge from January to
December 2015. Four of these surcharges were smaller later payments ( ( , ) >( , )), one had similar payments ( ( , ) = ( , )), and the remaining five were
larger later payments ( ( , ) < ( , )). This elicitation method differs from the one-
choice equal payments procedure (e.g. £200 sooner or later) used by Hirst et al. (1994)
and Prelec and Loewenstein (1998), and the Likert scale method used by Patrick and
Park (2006); and was particularly designed to test the robustness of the hypothesised
effects at different levels of interest rates. For instance, a stronger preference to prepay
for the short-lived projects when the interest rates are negative would indicate that
people are willing to pay more taxes today to avoid public debt.
The amounts of the earlier surcharges ranged from £2 to £6, and increased in
increments of £0.5. The later surcharges were computed using interest rates that
ranged between -28.7% and 22.3%. The amounts and discount rates were chosen to
ensure that the later surcharge does not exceed £10. The choices were presented in
random order and on separate screens to minimise carryover effects.
Table 3.2 presents the amounts and discount rates used. Note that the items labelled -
4 to +5 represent the levels of interest rates used in ascending order. Therefore, items
-4 to -1 refer to the smaller later payments, item 0 refers to the equal earlier and later
payment, and items 1 to 5 refer to the larger later payments. Henceforth, these labels
are used to refer to the corresponding interest rate.
Table 3.2 – Price list for Study 1
Levels of interest rates Earlier Implied interest rates Later
-4 £6.00 -28.8% 4.50
-3 £3.50 -15.4% 3.00
-2 £2.00 -13.4% 1.75
-1 £4.00 -6.5% 3.75
0 £4.50 0.0% 4.50
1 £5.50 4.4% 5.75
2 £3.00 8.0% 3.25
3 £6.50 14.3% 7.50
4 £2.50 18.2% 3.00
5 £5.00 22.3% 6.25
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Results
Manipulation check
To assess the perceived durability of benefits from the four projects, participants
indicated how strongly they agreed with the following statement: “City A's spending
plans will create long term benefits for the city and its residents”. Responses were
given on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The
long-lived projects were expected to elicit a higher rating on the 5-point scale, and
indeed they did. Participants assigned to the long-lived projects conditions were more
likely to agree with the statement than those assigned to the short-lived ones (MLL =
3.31 vs. MSL = 3.05, t(306) = 2.54, p = .012).
Main analysis
Preferences for the timing of payments were measured using repeated binary
outcomes. Consequently, a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model (Liang &
Zeger, 1986; Hardin, 2005) with a logit link function was used to analyse the data.
GEEs are generalised linear models (GLM) that take into account the correlation of
residual errors within-participants in repeated measures designs. These models do not
make any assumptions about the normality and independence of residual errors, and
as such can accommodate different types of distributions (e.g. Gaussian, Binomial,
Poisson, etc.). As a result, they are well suited for analysing repeated measures data
with binary, ordinal or count outcomes16. In contrast, a GLM such as a logistic
regression is preconditioned by the assumption that the observed residual errors are
independent, while a marginal model such as a repeated measures ANOVA is
preconditioned by the assumption that these errors are normally distributed.
One of the main features of GEE models is that they do not require the specification
of a distribution, but only of the first two moments: i) the relationship between the
outcome variable and predictors, through a link function17, and ii) between the mean
16 GEE models can also be used to analyse continuous outcomes
17 A link function describes the linear relationship between the response variable and the model
predictors. For instance, a logit link function provides an estimate of the odds ratio of a binary outcome.
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and variance, through a correlation structure18. Though, the consistency of the model
estimates relies on the accuracy of the first moment only. That is, if the specified link
function accurately describes the relation between the outcome and predictors, then
the estimated parameters will be consistent even if the correlation structure is
misspecified (Agresti, 2013). This is a significant advantage for GEE models over
generalised linear mixed models (GLMM) which are sensitive to the specification of
correlation structures. In addition, GEEs are computationally less demanding than
GLMMs (i.e. they are usually much faster to run).
Just like any other statistical model, GEEs have some limitations. First, standard errors
may underestimate the true ones if the sample size is small. Two, the lack of a
likelihood function means that GEEs cannot be used to compare models or test a
model’s goodness-of-fit.
Accordingly, the following reported statistical results were carried out using a GEE
model with the level of interest rates, duration and type of benefits as predictors;
gender, age, education, employment, household income and having children as
covariates; and the timing of payments (earlier or later) as the outcome. The data were
analysed by computing the mean proportion of participants choosing the later
payments.
Figure 3.4 summarises the main results. The panel on the left displays the breakdown
of the duration and interest rates factors, while the one on the right displays the
breakdown of the duration and type of benefits factors.
Figure 3.4 –Duration & Interest rates (left panel) / Duration & Type of benefits (right panel)
18 Correct specification of a correlation structure allows the model to be computationally more efficient.
Common correlation structures include: a) Independent, b) exchangeable, c) Autoregressive and d)
unstructured.
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As shown in Figure 3.4, two factors influenced preferences for the timing of payments.
One, participants were highly sensitive to the changes in interest rates, choosing the
later payments when the interest rates were negative (M = .85) and the earlier ones
when these rates were positive (M = .19). In other words, they were strongly inclined
to choose the smaller payments. Interestingly, a large proportion (~ 45%) preferred
the earlier payments when the interest rate was zero, revealing an aversion to the
deferred losses when the earlier and later payments were equal (e.g. Yates & Watts,
1975).
Two, as predicted, there was a significant project duration effect (χ2 (1, 308) = 20.2, p
< .001). Participants were more likely to choose the later payments for the long-lived
projects than the short-lived ones (MLL = .55 vs MSL = .44). In fact, on average, they
were more likely to prepay for the short-lived projects, and to pay later for the long-
lived ones.
Interestingly, the duration effect persisted across all levels of interest rates, even when
these rates were negative (all the observed differences, with the exception of level -4,
were significant at the 5% level). That is, more participants preferred to pay the larger
sooner surcharge when the projects were short-lived. In addition, Figure 3.4 shows
that the duration effect strengthened as the interest rates increased. However, this
increase was not substantial enough. There was no evidence of a duration by levels of
interest rates interaction (χ2 (9, 308) = 10.1, p = .335).
Finally, there was no evidence that the type of benefits derived from the projects had
any impact on the timing of payments (χ2 (1, 308) = .328, p = .567). Participants were
equally likely to choose the later payments for the hedonic and utilitarian projects (MH
= .48 vs MU = .50). Furthermore, there was no evidence of a duration by type of
benefits interaction (χ2 (1, 308) = .004, p = .953). That is, participants were equally
likely to prepay for the short-lived projects (MH = .43 vs. MU = .45), and to pay later
for the long-lived ones (MH = .54 vs. MU = .56) regardless of the type of benefit derived
from these projects. Therefore, contrary to hypothesis H2, there was no evidence that
participants treated the short-lived hedonic and utilitarian projects differently.
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Other factors
In addition to the above, the GEE analysis revealed a significant effect for having
children (χ2 (1, 308) = 5.47, p = .019). Participants who reported having children were
in general more likely to choose the earlier payments than those who did not (MC =
.47 vs MNC = .54). This was true for both the short-lived (Mc = .42 vs MNC = .47) and
long-lived (MC = .52 vs MNC= .61) projects. It is likely that participants with children
had a stronger motive to prepay for the projects, because they wanted to ensure that
the projects are funded and/or wanted to enjoy the consumption debt-free. After all, it
is their children who were going to benefit from these projects.
Discussion
As expected, there was a robust project duration effect on the timing of payments. This
was evidenced by a stronger preference to prepay for the short-lived projects, and to
pay later for the long lived ones. In fact, this preference persisted even when it was
financially more expensive to prepay for the short-lived project (i.e. when the interest
rates were negative), or to pay later for the long-lived ones (i.e. when the rates were
positive).
However, contrary to the evidence from the private goods literature (e.g. Patrick &
Park, 2006), preferences for the timing of payments were not influenced by the type
of benefits derived from the projects19. There are two likely explanations for this result.
One, it is possible that participants did not distinguish between the hedonic and
utilitarian projects as there was no measure to control for the perceived ratings of these
projects on the hedonic / utilitarian dimensions. Two, the benefits from communal
consumption are shared between members of a community, therefore, are unlikely to
trigger the same level of pleasurable anticipation (Loewenstein, 1987) that some types
of private goods do (e.g. vacation). As a result, the distinction between hedonic and
utilitarian benefits becomes weaker. Interestingly, this implies that the observed
preferences to prepay for short-lived communal projects were more likely to have been
motivated by the desire to minimise the pain (disutility) associated with the
prospective tax payments as opposed to enhancing the pleasure of consumption.
19 Results are consistent with the predictions of the double-entry model since the model does not
distinguish between hedonic and utilitarian benefits
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Especially, since the decision maker will probably be making these tax payments, but
not necessarily enjoying the benefits.
With this in mind, the following study explores whether having a short-lived
communal project with potential long-term benefits to the entire community would
moderate the preference to prepay for the project.
3.3 Study 2
People are more likely to defer the payments of consumption if this consumption has
long term benefits that offsets the pain of paying. This is clearly evidenced by their
preference to lease durable goods, and to postpay for some types of nondurable
utilitarian goods. For instance, most participants in Patrick and Park (2006) preferred
to pay later for a business trip to Paris, but sooner for a vacation; arguably because the
business trip is consumed to achieve a functional purpose with potential long term
benefits. It is therefore possible that thinking about these prospective long-term
benefits moderated the disutility associated with the deferred payments. In contrast,
the vacation is typically consumed to be enjoyed, and most likely triggered anticipal
thoughts of enjoyment.
Accordingly, this study explores the preference to prepay for a short-lived communal
project by manipulating the durability of benefits derived from this project. Therefore,
in some cases the benefits from the project were framed as having a long term impact
on the affected community, while in other cases the benefits were not mentioned at
all.
H3: short-lived projects which trigger thoughts about the prospective long-term
benefits are likely to elicit a stronger preference for the later payments
In addition, the study explores whether raising awareness about the city’s need to
borrow if the residents decide to defer the payments has any impact on the decision to
pay sooner or later for the project. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that
labelling or framing a contract as a “loan” triggers a stronger aversion to debt in
comparison with financially similar contracts (Caetano et al., 2011). Accordingly,
making the debt salient should elicit a stronger preference for the earlier payments.
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Participants
A sample of 326 UK residents recruited through Bilendi completed the online survey.
The data from 21 participants were excluded because of careless responding, using the
same criteria from Study 1. Participants were on average 47 years old, with 50%
holding a university degree, 58% in fulltime or part-time employment, and 55% being
females. The median completion time was 8 minutes. Participants who successfully
completed the survey were rewarded with loyalty points that could be exchanged for
products of their liking.
Design and procedure
Following a brief introduction to the survey, participants were randomly assigned to
one of the 2 (durability of benefits: no frame vs. long-term frame) x 2 (salience of
debt: salient vs. non-salient) conditions. Table 3.3 summarises the four conditions.
Table 3.3 – Between-participants design for Study 2
Salience of debt
Non-salient Salient
Durability
of benefits
frame
No frame Short-lived project with nobenefits or debt framing
Short-lived project with no
benefits frame but the government
must borrow to defer the
implementation of the surcharge
Long-term
frame
Short-lived project with long-
term benefits frame
Short-lived project with long-term
benefits frame and the government
must borrow to defer the
implementation of the surcharge
Half the participants were asked to imagine that a UK city will be hosting a major
international sporting event for student athletes from 1 to 14 July 2019, and that the
event is expected to attract more than 5,000 athletes from 100 countries. As a result,
hosting the games would require significant investment on infrastructure, sporting
facilities, venues, housing and security (the “no frame” condition). The other half
were presented with the same information, but were additionally told that “the event
will generate long term benefits for the city by creating jobs, enhancing economic
activity, promoting business and tourism, and developing sporting facilities that can
be used by upcoming local athletes” (the “long-term benefits” frame condition).
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Following the scenario introduction, participants were directed to a new page with
additional information particular to the condition they were assigned to. Figure 3.5
provides an example. Note that the framing of Option 2 was manipulated between
participants to reflect the salience of debt. Therefore, half the participants were told
the city will borrow to pay for the expenditure before levying the surcharge (the
“salient debt” condition), while the other half were only told about the surcharge (the
“non-salient debt” condition). An example of the non-salient debt condition is
reproduced in Appendix B.
Figure 3.5 – Salient debt condition
As in Study 1, to emphasise the communal nature of the decision, participants were
asked to imagine that they were local spokespeople who can influence the outcome of
a citywide referendum initiated to vote for the two options. As a result, they should
choose the option that they would recommend the households to vote for.
Preferences for the timing of payments were elicited using the same method from
Study 1. Accordingly, each participant was presented with 10 pairs of possible
surcharges. Each pair consisted of an earlier surcharge paid annually from July 2014
to June 2019, and a later surcharge paid from July 2019 to June 2024.  Four of these
consisted of smaller later payments, one had similar payments, and the remaining 5
consisted of larger later payments. The earlier surcharges ranged between £10 and £14
per year. The later surcharges were computed by compounding the earlier surcharges
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over a period of 5 years, using interest rates that ranged between ~ -5.5% and 5.1%20.
Note that these rates were significantly lower than the ones used in Study 1 because
the amounts were larger and the time delay longer. All the choice options were
presented in random order and on separate screens to minimise carryover effects. A
list of the amounts and discount rates used in the study is shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 – Price list for Study 2
Levels of interest rates Earlier Implied interest rates Later
-4 13.5 -5.5% 10.25
-3 10.5 -4.2% 8.50
-2 14 -2.7% 12.25
-1 11.5 -1.3% 10.75
0 13 0.0% 13.00
1 12 1.2% 12.75
2 12.5 2.3% 14.00
3 10 3.2% 11.75
4 11 4.5% 13.75
5 14.5 5.1% 18.75
Results
Manipulation check
To assess the perceived durability of benefits, participants indicated how strongly they
agreed with the following statement: “hosting the World Student Games will create
long term benefits for the city and its residents”. Responses were given on a five-point
scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Participants assigned to the
long-term frame condition were marginally more likely to agree with the statement
than those assigned to the no frame condition (MLL = 3.18 vs. MSL = 2.94, t(305) =
1.96, p = .05). However, these results underestimate the difference between the short-
term and long-term conditions due to the non-normality of the data (a visual inspection
of the data revealed that the distribution of each condition was negatively skewed)21.
20 The initial rates ranged between -5% and 5%. However, these rates changed slightly after rounding
the later surcharge to the nearest £0.25.
21 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for both the short-term and long-term projects was highly
significant (p < .001). Therefore, the alternative hypothesis that the data is non-normal cannot be
rejected.
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Clustering participants according to their response to the statement revealed no
significant differences in the number of those who disagreed (N = 50), those who were
indifferent (N = 52) and those who agreed (N = 51) in the no frame condition (χ2 (2,
153) = .039, p = .981). In contrast, there were twice as many participants who agreed
(N = 70) than disagreed (N = 36), and 46 that claimed indifference in the long term
frame condition (χ2 (2, 152) = 12.0, p = .002). Therefore, indicating that the
manipulation was in fact successful.
Main analysis
All reported statistical results were carried out using a GEE model with a logit link
function, with the level of interest rates, durability of benefits frame, and salience of
debt as predictors; gender, age, education, employment, household income and having
children as covariates; and the timing of payments (earlier or later) as the outcome.
The data were analysed by computing the mean proportion of participants choosing
the later payments.
Figure 3.6 summarises the main results. The panel on the left shows the breakdown of
the durability of benefits and interest rates factors, while the one on the right shows
the durability of benefits by salience of debt interaction.
Figure 3.6 – Durability & Interest rates (left panel) / Durability & Debt salience (right panel)
As shown by Figure 3.6 (refer to the left panel), there was no evidence of any
difference between the no frame and long-term frame conditions. Participants were
overall equally inclined to prepay for the project regardless of how the benefits were
framed (MNF = .41 vs. MLTF = .42). They were also equally inclined to prepay for the
project when the debt was salient and non-salient (MS = .42 vs. MNS = .40).
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However, these results were qualified with a durability of benefits frame by salience
of debt interaction (χ2 (1, 305) = 4.42, p = .035). According to Figure 3.6 (refer to the
right panel), participants assigned to the no frame condition were slightly more likely
to prepay for the project when the debt was salient (Msalient = .40 vs Mnon-salient = .43).
In contrast, those assigned to the long-term frame were less likely to do so when the
debt was salient (Msalient = .47 vs. Mnon-salient = .38).
Discussion
There was no indication that having prospective long term benefits moderated the
preference to prepay for the short-lived project, indicating (as in Study 1) that the
duration of the project matters for the timing of payments.
In addition, raising awareness about the government’s need to borrow (if the surcharge
is deferred), did not trigger a stronger preference for prepayment in general. On the
contrary, it actually moderated the preference to prepay for the project when the long-
term benefits were highlighted. It is possible that some participants thought it would
be reasonable for the city to borrow if the project is going to generate long term
benefits.
3.4 Study 3
So far, Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that people have a stronger preference to
prepay for short-lived projects, and to pay later for long-lived ones. However, in many
instances, public investments in durable projects take a while before generating
tangible benefits. This study explores such instances. That is, it examines the
preferences of UK residents for the timing of payments when the benefits from a long
lasting communal project materialise in the near or distant future.
According to the double-entry model, consumers will delay the payments for a durable
good as long as the residual consumption utility offsets the disutility from these
payments. This implies that consumers will favour payment schemes that allow them
to align the timing of payments to the period of consumption (the “alignment effect”).
In fact, Hirst el al. (1994), who explored outcome contiguity in consumer borrowing
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decisions, found that participants were willing to pay a premium in order to match the
duration of a loan to the life of the underlying asset.
H4: deferring the consumption benefits of a long lasting project will elicit a
stronger preference for the later payments.
As in Study 2, this study also tests whether increasing awareness about the need to
borrow in order to defer the tax payments has any impact on the decision to pay sooner
or later for the expenditure.
Participants
A sample of 229 UK residents recruited through Bilendi completed the online survey.
The data from 15 participants were excluded because of careless responding, using the
same criteria from Study 1. Participants were on average 47 years old, with 40%
holding a university degree and 58% being females. The median completion time was
9 minutes. Participants who successfully completed the survey were rewarded with
loyalty points that could be exchanged for products of their liking.
Design and procedure
Participants were presented with a scenario about a new technology the government
is planning to introduce to reduce carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants. The
introduction to the scenario read as follows:
“Over the coming years, the UK will be investing in energy technology to ensure its
energy security and reduce the looming threat of global climate change. Coal-fired
power plants in the UK will be using a technology called Combined Heat and Power
(CHP). CHP integrates the production of usable heat and power (electricity) in a
single highly efficient process to reduce carbon emissions by 30%.
In the following questions, you will be asked to state your preference for options the
government can take to pay for CHP. The options involve temporarily increasing costs
to the taxpayer in the form of a surcharge. This surcharge can come earlier or later.
The surcharge will be specified in terms of average cost per person per year. The
actual cost any individual will pay will depend on their personal circumstances.”
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Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of the 2 (CHP implementation
period: early vs. delayed) x 2 (salience of debt: salient vs. non-salient) conditions.
Half the participants were told that the CHP technology will be implemented during
the years 2015 to 2030, while the other half were told that it would be implemented
during the years 2030 to 2045. Likewise, half were told that the government must
borrow to pay for implementing the CHP technology if the surcharge is delayed (the
“salient debt” condition), while the other half were told nothing.
Table 3.5 - Between-participants design for Study 3
Salience of debt
Non-salient Salient
CHP
implementation
period
Early Implementation period: 2015to 2030
Implementation period: 2015 to
2030 and the government must
borrow if the surcharge is delayed
Delayed Implementation period: 2030to 2045
Implementation period: 2030 to
2045 and the government must
borrow if the surcharge is delayed
Following that, participants were directed to a new page with additional information
particular to the condition they were assigned to. Figure 3.7 provides an example of
the delayed CHP implementation period when debt is salient. The remaining three
conditions are reproduced in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.7 – Delayed CHP period and debt is salient condition
Preferences for the timing of payments were elicited using the same method from
Study 1 and 2. Accordingly, each participant was presented with 14 pairs of possible
surcharges. Each pair consisted of an earlier surcharge paid annually between the years
2015 to 2030, and a later surcharge paid between the years 2030 and 2045.  Two of
these surcharges consisted of smaller later payments, one had similar payments, and
the remaining 11 consisted of larger later payments. The earlier surcharges ranged
between £40 and £60 per year. The later surcharges were computed by compounding
the earlier surcharges over a period of 15 years, using interest rates that ranged
between ~ -1% and 5%. As in Study 2, the rates were significantly lower than the ones
used in Study 1 since the amounts were larger and the time delay much longer. Given
the context of the scenario (i.e. taxation), we wanted to maintain a reasonable
surcharge below £100. All the choice options were presented in random order and on
separate screens to minimise carryover effects. A list of the amounts and discount rates
used in the study is presented in Table 3.6.
52
Table 3.6 – Price list for Study 3
Levels of interest rates Earlier Implied interest rates Later
-2 53 -0.94% 46
-1 42 -0.49% 39
0 57 0.00% 57
1 54 0.48% 58
2 45 0.96% 52
3 48 1.38% 59
4 56 1.77% 73
5 58 2.23% 81
6 55 2.66% 82
7 52 3.12% 83
8 43 3.53% 73
9 46 4.01% 84
10 44 4.47% 86
11 47 4.90% 98
Following the experimental task, participants completed an intertemporal choice task
that measured their preferences for small monetary gains. The task was adapted from
Kirby (2009), and consisted of 12 pairs of smaller sooner and larger later outcomes.
In addition, participants completed Frederick’s (2005) 3-item cognitive reflection test
(CRT), a measure designed to test an individual’s ability to carefully reflect on his or
her responses by inhibiting incorrect but seemingly accurate answers.
CRT scores have been shown to correlate positively with intertemporal preferences
for monetary gains, such that people who score higher on the CRT are also more likely
to wait longer for larger later monetary rewards (Frederick, 2005; Hardisty & Weber,
2009). In fact, participants who achieved a higher CRT score in this study were also
more likely to choose the larger later receipts in the intertemporal choice task (ρ = .28,
p < .001). Accordingly, the two measures were used as proxies to identify whether
impatience could explain some of the variability in preferences for the timing
payments. Specifically, whether impatience is likely to elicit a stronger preference for
the later payments.
Results
All reported statistical results were carried out using a GEE model with a logit link
function, with interest rates, period of CHP implementation and salience of debt as
53
predictors; gender, age, education, employment, intertemporal preferences and
cognitive reflection as covariates, and the timing of payments (earlier or later) as the
outcome. The data were analysed by computing the mean proportion of participants
choosing the later payments.
Figure 3.8 summarises the main results. The panel on the left displays the breakdown
of the period of CHP implementation and interest rates factors, while the one on the
right displays the period of CHP implementation by salience of debt interaction.
Figure 3.8 – Period & Interest rates (left panel) / Period & Debt salience (right panel)
Preferences for the timing of payments were highly influenced by the period of CHP
implementation (χ2 (1, 214) = 40.50, p < .001). Overall, participants were much more
likely to choose the later payments when the implementation period was delayed (ME
= .22 vs. MD = .50). This preference was most evident when the interest rate was zero
(ME = .40 vs. MD = .83), but also persisted when the rates were negative (ME = .59 vs.
MD = .91) or positive (ME = .13 vs. MD = .39) - all pairwise comparisons were
significant at the 1% level. In other words, there was a strong preference to align the
timing of payments with the period of CHP implementation, even when it was
financially more expensive to do so.
This preference for alignment was reinforced when the need for the government to
borrow was made salient. According to Figure 3.8 (refer to the right panel),
participants assigned to the early implementation period were less likely to choose the
later payments when the debt was salient (as opposed to non-salient). Conversely,
those assigned to the delayed period were more likely to choose the later payments
when the debt was salient. This was evidence with a significant interaction between
the period of CHP implementation and the salience of debt (χ2 (1, 214) = 7.84, p =
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.005). A pairwise comparisons test of the salience factor confirmed that the observed
difference between the salient and non-salient conditions was significant when the
implementation period was early (p = .027), but not when it was delayed (p = .348).
Other factors
In addition to above, the regression analysis revealed a significant effect of age (χ2 (1,
214) = 4.65, p = .031) and gender (χ2 (1, 214) = 4.36, p = .037). In general, the older
participants were more likely to choose the later payments than younger ones.
Similarly, men were more likely to choose the later payments than women (Mmen= .41
vs. Mwomen = .32). None of the other factors we tested reached levels of significance.
Interestingly, there was no evidence that impatience, measured using cognitive
reflection or the intertemporal choice task, was predictive of the timing of payments.
The former result is consistent with Hardisty and Weber (2009) who found no
relationship between CRT scores and discounting of losses in monetary and
nonmonetary domains.
Discussion
As predicted, there was a stronger preference for the earlier payments when the
communal project was implemented in the near future, and the later ones when
implementation was deferred (i.e. a preference for temporal alignment). This was true
even when temporal alignment resulted in additional costs. For instance, the early
implementation period elicited a stronger preference for the earlier payments even
when these payments were larger than the later ones (i.e. when the interest rates were
negative). Likewise, the delayed implementation period elicited a stronger preference
for the later payments even when these payments were larger than the earlier one (i.e.
when the interest rates were positive). Therefore, in line with Hirst et al. (1994), we
find that participants were willing to pay a significant premium to have the payments
aligned with the consumption period.
In addition to that, making participants aware that the government must borrow to
defer the tax payments induced a stronger preference for the earlier payments when
the period of implementation was early, but not when the period of implementation
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was delayed. In fact, it made no difference whether the debt was salient or non-salient
when the period of CHP implementation was delayed.
There are several reasons why people might want to temporally align their tax
payments to the period of project implementation even when it is more costly. For
instance, it could be lack of trust in the authorities, or feelings of uncertainty about
issues like cost overruns and on-time delivery of the project. Such reasons could
prompt members of the public to opt for a deferred payment scheme to insure
themselves against such uncertainties. However, if these were the primary or sole
motives of participants, then there should have been no significant differences
observed between the early and delayed implementation periods. After all, delaying
the payments in both scenarios would eliminate any uncertainty concerning the
projects. It is more likely that these preferences were motivated by an aversion to post-
consumption payments (as predicted by the double-entry model); and strengthened by
the desire to achieve fairness and intergenerational equity (Tobin, 1974; Kotlikoff,
2002). In the sense that those who are enjoying the benefits of communal expenditure
should be the ones paying for it. This would explain the strong aversion to debt
observed when borrowing was salient and the period of CHP implementation was
early.
3.5 General discussion
It is vital for policy makers to understand the financing preferences of ordinary citizens
when making decisions about funding different types of spending programmes, today
and in the future. It is equally important for policy makers to understand the
psychology behind these preferences. The research in this chapter provides insights
about such preferences in two cases, when funding: a) communal projects that differ
in their longevity (e.g. have a short life like the Olympic Games or a long lasting one
like public infrastructure), and b) long-lived projects with benefits accruing in the near
or distant future.
The evidence from three studies show that people in general dislike post-consumption
payments even when it is explicitly cheaper to pay later. Instead, they choose to
prefund short-lived projects by raising taxes (Studies 1 and 2), and to align their tax
payments with the consumption period of long-lived ones (Study 3). That is, they
prefer to tax-finance benefits accruing in the near future, and debt-finance the ones
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that are further deferred. The former preference is even more robust when people are
made aware that the government must borrow to defer the tax payments.
These findings suggest that decisions concerning the timing of payments for
communal consumption are motivated by the same mental accounting rules people use
to make personal financial decisions. In particular, the ones prescribed by the double-
entry model (e.g. prospective accounting / coupling). Therefore, providing a
descriptive theory for policy makers to adhere to when designing public finance
policies. The double-entry model, for instance, would strongly support an application
of the “golden rule”, a fiscal policy guideline which prescribes that government use
tax revenues to pay for current expenditure, and debt to finance capital investments
with deferred benefits (Bassetto & Sargent, 2006). One of the key advantages of the
golden rule is that it promotes intergenerational equity such that each generation pays
for its own public expenditure (which is precisely what ordinary UK citizens want -
refer to Study 3 for supporting evidence). Interestingly, this policy was adopted by the
UK government in 1998, but later abandoned in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis22.
In addition, the results of this chapter call for the temporal hypothecation (earmarking)
of taxes.  Hypothecation in general refers to the concept of earmarking tax revenues
from a single or multiple sources to a specific spending programme (Wilkinson, 1994).
For instance, the gasoline tax in the US is earmarked towards funding of transport
infrastructure. Likewise, the TV licence fee in the UK is used to pay for public
broadcasting. The proposed “temporal hypothecation” would work in a similar manner
to the normal hypothecation process, but in addition to earmarking across spending
programmes, taxes would also be earmarked over time. That is, if a municipality must
borrow to invest in a recycling facility that will start operating in five years’ time, then
this municipality should introduce a “green tax” in five years to pay back the debt.
Limitations
One, preferences were elicited using imaginary scenarios with hypothetical choices. It
is possible that different choice patterns would emerge if taxpayers were to make the
same decisions about real spending programs. For instance, they may reveal more
22 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3267763/Gordon-Brown-signals-that-golden-
rule-on-borrowing-is-to-be-scrapped
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tolerance towards using public debt (as some normative models would predict, e.g.
Alesina & Tabellini, 1990). Even so, previous research comparing temporal
discounting of real and hypothetical monetary outcomes found no systematic
differences between the two (Johnson & Bickel, 2002, Madden et al., 2004). In
addition, the evidence presented in this chapter is supported by real-life observations
(e.g. the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the 1991 World Student Games – refer to the
introduction of this chapter for more details).
Two, none of the studies controlled for the decision maker’s attitude towards the
particular spending program. However, preferences for the timing of tax payments are
likely to vary depending on the decision maker’s approval of the underlying spending
program. For instance, Study 1 revealed a stronger preference among participants with
children to prepay for projects that benefited the youth. Therefore, suggesting that
having a positive attitude towards a spending program might moderate tax aversion,
and the preference to pay sooner. In fact, this would be consistent with Lamberton, De
Neve and Norton (2016) who found that eliciting taxpayer preferences on government
spending increases tax compliance.
Prelude to Chapter 4
The double-entry model was developed as a theory to analyse payment-consumption
trade-offs, and has been applied mainly in that domain (e.g. Lambrecht & Skiera,
2006; Patrick & Park, 2006; Schulz et al., 2015; Soman, 2001). Despite that, Prelec
and Loewenstein (1998) implied to the possibility of applying their model to situations
involving paid work (refer to footnote 16 in the PL paper). With this in mind, Chapter
4 extends the current investigation to the domain of financial gains. That is, the chapter
explores whether preferences for timing of monetary gains, in a social context, are
influenced by the timing of nonmonetary costs in the same way that the timing of
monetary losses are influenced by nonmonetary benefits.
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3.6 Appendix A – Study 1
A. Long-lived utilitarian project condition
B. Long-lived hedonic project condition
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C. Short-lived hedonic project condition
3.7 Appendix B – Study 2
A. Debt non-salient condition
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3.8 Appendix C – Study 3
A. Early implementation – debt non-salient condition
B. Delayed implementation – debt non-salient condition
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C. Early implementation – debt salient condition
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4 CHAPTER FOUR
Chapter three investigated the preferences of UK residents for the timing of tax
payments in the context of communal spending. In general, there was a stronger
preference to prepay for the short-lived communal projects (a duration effect), and to
align the timing of payments with the consumption period of the long-lived ones (an
alignment effect). This chapter extends this investigation to the domain of financial
gains. Specifically, the chapter explores people’s preferences for the timing of
monetary benefits when making decisions on behalf of a community that is providing
a communal service to a neighbouring community, and vice versa for monetary losses.
This chapter extends the research investigating cost-benefit associations in the private
goods domain in three ways. One, preferences for both monetary gains and losses were
examined using the same context and framework. The one and only study that
examined preferences for both monetary gains and losses (Prelec & Loewenstein,
1998) did so using different contexts. Two, these preferences were elicited for social
(communal) rather than personal goods. Three, these preferences were tested for
decisions that people make for themselves versus others (i.e. decisions that have a
direct impact on the decision maker, or no impact at all).
4.1 Introduction
Even though Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) mainly discussed their double-entry
model in the context of payments in exchange for consumption, evidence from their
research suggests that the model is also applicable to situations involving earnings in
exchange for future work. For instance, most their participants declined the
opportunity to receive an advance payment, choosing to have their earnings once the
work has been completed. For example, in one scenario, 57% preferred to collect $200
per months for six months after an intensive weekend of work (brief task); while in
another scenario, 76% preferred the later earning in exchange for a few hours of work
each weekend for the next six months (long task).
From a hedonic perspective, getting paid in advance can be just as painful as deferring
the payments for consumption. This is because the experienced pleasure from the
advance earnings is likely to be attenuated by thoughts about the prospective work,
while the disutility from work is unlikely to be buffered by memories of earnings that
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have already been collected (and most likely consumed). In fact, Gourville and Soman
(1998) argue that the utility of benefits collected in advance (e.g. earnings) could
depreciate with the passage of time to the point that an upcoming payment (e.g. work)
will feel as a pure loss (a reverse process to payment depreciation which they referred
to as benefit depreciation). This, according to Gourville and Soman, is because people
adapt to the acquisition of a benefit and eventually incorporate it in their wealth - i.e.
their status quo financial state (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). This led
Kamleitner and Hoelzl (2009) to conclude that the association between earnings and
work is not stable over time, and is likely to be stronger when the two are temporally
close.
While the latter is not explicitly addressed by the double-entry model, it is likely that
the relation between the imputed benefit of earnings and the timing of work is similar
to the one between the imputed cost of consumption and timing of payments depicted
in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. That is, past earnings have lower imputed benefits than
future ones, and more so when these earnings are received far in advance (point “A”
in Figure 4.1). These benefits are highest when the earnings are collected immediately
after the work has been completed (point “C”), but decline gradually as the earnings
are deferred into the distant future because of temporal discounting (point “D”).
Figure 4.1 - The impact of timing of work on the imputed benefit of earnings
Siemens (2007) provided evidence supporting the benefit depreciation observed in
Figure 4.1, by manipulating the time-delay between the receipt of a show-up fee
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(benefit) and the completion of a tedious task (a long and boring survey). Participants
who got paid the show-up fee at t = three-days, one-week or two-weeks prior to the
task, perceived the task to be less satisfying and the show-up fee to be more unfair
than those who got paid on the day of the experiment. Participants also reported lower
intentions to complete the task.
4.2 Experimental framework
This chapter has three purposes. One, to investigate whether manipulating the timing
of a long lasting communal service would influence preferences for the timing of
monetary gains the same way it does for losses. That is, whether there will be a
preference to align the timing of monetary gains with the period of nonmonetary costs
(the alignment effect). Two, to test whether the alignment effect observed for monetary
losses in Study 3 of Chapter 3 is as robust for shorter durations. Three, to examine
whether people make similar financial decisions for themselves and others.
These preferences were examined in two studies whereby two neighbouring counties,
a Buyer County and a Seller County, enter into a binding contract that enables the
former to use the recycling facilities of the latter for a specific period. In return, the
Buyer County would pay the Seller County periodically for providing these services.
Therefore, one county was making payments in exchange for receiving temporary
recycling services (the “monetary losses” condition), while the other county was
receiving payments in exchange for providing these services (the “monetary gains”
condition).
The alignment effect was tested by manipulating the period in which the services were
being exchanged (early vs. delayed). Therefore, in one condition these services were
exchanged in the near future (t1, t2), while in the other condition they were exchanged
in a more distant one (t2, t3). Table 4.1 summarises the four conditions.
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Table 4.1 – Between-participants design
Period of services exchange
Early Delayed
Sign of the
outcomes
Monetary Gains
(Seller County)
Recycling services
provided between t1 and t2
Recycling services provided
between t2 and t3
Monetary Losses
(Buyer County)
Recycling services used
between t1 and t2
Recycling services used
between t2 and t3
Preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes are measured using a binary choice
task with a fixed time delay (t = 2 years). Accordingly, each choice consists of an
earlier amount and a later amount . As in Chapter 3, the amounts varied from
one choice to the other such that the earlier amounts are either larger than the later
amounts ( > – negative interest rates), equal to the later amounts ( =
– no interest rates), or smaller than the later amounts ( < – positive interest
rates).
The earlier amounts are always exchanged between t1 and t2, while the later ones are
exchanged between t2 and t3. Figure 4.2 provides a graphical representation of the task.
The upper panel illustrates the condition in which the services are exchanged in the
near future (t1, t2), while the bottom panel displays the condition in which the services
are exchanged in a more distant one (t2, t3).
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Figure 4.2 – Experimental task
4.3 Predictions
Monetary losses
From a financial (rational) perspective, preferences for the timing of losses should not
be influenced by the timing of services. Instead, the decision maker should choose the
outcome which minimise the present value of the losses. Therefore, he or she will
delay these losses unless the interest rates exceed the marginal cost of money (Fisher,
1930).
From a mental accounting perspective, however, the period of services (benefits) can
matter. Recall that, according to the double-entry model, people have a strong aversion
to post-consumption payments because they dislike being in debt for consumption that
has already been consumed. Consequently, the model predicts a preference to a)
prepay for short-lived consumption, and b) to align the timing of payments with the
period of durable consumption.
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Therefore, deferring the payments when the community is receiving the benefits
between t1 and t2, will be hedonically unpleasant for a person who makes financial
choices as stated by the model. In contrast, deferring these payments when the
community is using the facilities between t2 and t3 has very little hedonic cost since
the disutility of the payments will be offset by the consumption benefits.
H1a: exchanging the services between t2 and t3 will elicit a stronger preference
for the later losses compared to t1 and t2.
Monetary gains
Financial rationality prescribes that preferences for the timing of monetary gains
should not be influenced by the timing of services, and that a rational decision maker
should choose the outcomes that maximise the present value of the financial gains.
Accordingly, he or she will expedite these gains unless interest rates exceed the
marginal cost of money.
However, like monetary losses, from a mental accounting perspective the period of
services (nonmonetary costs) can also matter. In fact, Prelec and Loewesntein argue
that the implications of the double-entry model for situations involving nonmonetary
costs such as work are complementary to ones from the nonmonetary benefits domain.
As a result, the model predicts a strong aversion to the collection of earnings in
advance - for the reasons mentioned in section 4.1.
Therefore, from the perspectives of the decision maker who makes financial choices
as predicted by the model, the county providing the services between t2 and t3will not
want to collect the earlier gains because this would leave it indebted to the
neighbouring county (i.e. hedonically costly). In contrast, expediting the monetary
gains when the services are provided between t1 and t2 has very little hedonic costs (if
any) since the disutility from providing the services will be offset by the utility from
the earnings.
H1b: exchanging the services between t1 and t2 will elicit a stronger preference
for the earlier gains compared to t2 and t3.
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Gain-loss asymmetry
In addition to the period of services, preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes
– be it gains or losses – are also influenced by temporal discounting. Discounting
assigns lower weights to future outcomes, making the later losses seem less onerous,
and the later gains less appealing. As a result, discounting moderates the preference to
prepay for consumption, and in some cases reverses it to a preference for the later
payments (losses). Likewise, it moderates the preference to collect earnings in arrears,
and in some cases reverses it to a preference for the earlier receipts (gains).
Much of the past research on temporal preferences has shown that implied discount
rates are lower for losses than for gains (e.g. Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989;
Loewenstein, 1988; Mitchell & Wilson, 2010; Murphy, Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001;
Myerson, Baumann & Green, 2016) – an anomaly that has been referred to as the sign
effect (Thaler, 1981) or gain-loss asymmetry (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).
For instance, Thaler (1981) asked participants to specify the amount of money they
were willing to accept [pay] if a $15 or $250 reward [fine] was delayed by a period of
3 months, 1 year or 3 years. In all six cases, participants demanded a larger amount of
money to delay the reward compared to what they were willing to pay to delay the
fine, thereby revealing a lower implied discount rate for losses than for gains. In one
case, for example, participants demanded $60 to delay the $15 reward by one year (an
implied discount rate equivalent to 300%), but were only willing to pay $20 to delay
the $15 fine for the same amount of time (an implied discount rate equivalent to
33.3%). Using a similar but more controlled setup, Benzion et al. (1989) asked
participants to specify the amount $y that they were willing to accept [pay] to postpone
the receipt [payment] of $x = 40, 200, 1000 and 5000 for a period t = 0.5, 1, 2 and 4
years. On average, participants discounted the monetary gains more than the losses
irrespective of the magnitude or outcomes and time delay. Similar findings were also
reported by Murphy et al. (2001) using a binary choice titration method. Accordingly,
participants made repetitive choices between monotonically increasing smaller sooner
amounts and a fixed larger later amount ($500 for gains, -$500 for losses), delayed by
a period t = 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, and 1, 3, 5, 10 and 25 years. Overall, the
implied rates were significantly higher for gains than losses, especially for longer time
delays.
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Neural and behavioural evidence from Tanaka el al. (2014) suggests that the gain-loss
asymmetry is caused by differential treatment of the losses triggered by loss aversion
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Scholten & Read, 2010); and debt aversion
(Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989) 23,24. Loss aversion refers to the
sensitivity that people exhibit for losses compared to equivalent gains. In money terms,
the pain of paying £10 exceeds the joy of receiving £10. Accordingly, the experienced
pain (disutility) from an increase in the magnitude of a payment exceeds the joy
(utility) of a similar increase from an equivalent receipt (i.e. the disutility from paying
£110 in on year instead of £100 today exceeds the utility of receiving £110 in on year
instead of £100 today). As a result, people are more sensitive to changes for losses
than gains (i.e. discount gains more than losses).
On the other hand, debt aversion refers to the tendency to resolve aversive outcomes
(losses) sooner rather than later. For instance, half the participants in Yates & Watts
(1975) preferred to pay $1 or $2 sooner rather than later when the payment was
delayed by t = 15, 35 or 75 days. Similar results were reported Hardisty et al. (2013)
and Mitchell and Wilson (2010) using larger (but hypothetical) payments (e.g. $10
and $100), and Harris (2012) using nonmonetary aversive outcomes (e.g. a bee sting).
This preference – especially for nonmonetary outcomes -- is the result of an additional
source of disutility caused by dread from the anticipation of the aversive outcomes
(Loewenstein, 1987).
H2: all else being equal, there should be a stronger preference for the earlier gains
than later losses, especially when the interest rates are positive.
23 The authors found no evidence of differences in discount rates between participants who exhibited
the gain-loss asymmetry and those who did not when choosing between an earlier or later monetary
gains.
24 On a neural level, there were significant group differences in brain activity in both the striatum and
insula for losses, but not for gains. Participants who displayed the gain-loss asymmetry revealed
positive delay correlation in the striatum (i.e. due to deferral aversion) and positive magnitude
correlation in the insula (i.e. due to loss aversion) when choosing between an earlier or later monetary
loss.
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4.4 Study 1
Participants
A sample of 345 UK residents recruited through Bilendi completed the online survey.
The data from 21 participants were excluded because of careless responding,
determined by the following criteria: switching back and forth between options two
standard deviations more than the average, or completing the study two standard
deviations faster than the average natural log of completion time. Participants were on
average 34 years old, with 47% holding a university degree, 70% in full-time or part-
time employment and 62% being females. The study was part of a larger survey
including other unrelated studies. The median completion time of the survey was 10
minutes. Participants who successfully completed the survey were rewarded with
loyalty points that could be exchanged for products of their liking.
Design and procedure
Participants were presented with a scenario about two counties that were about to enter
a binding contract to exchange recycling services. They were asked to identify with
one of these counties. This county was either making payments in exchange for
temporarily having a portion of their household waste recycled by the other county
(the “monetary losses” condition), or receiving payments for temporarily recycling a
portion of the household waste of the other county (the “monetary gains” condition).
Participants were told that they were hired by this county to recommend a suitable
payment plan to emphasise the communal nature of the decision, and to motivate
thoughts about the financial rather than the hedonic aspects of the decision. For
instance, Kray (2000) found that participants were more likely to recommend a high
paying but unfulfilling job to a stranger (financial), even when they prefer the low
paying but self-fulfilling job themselves (hedonic).
The introduction to the scenario read as follows: “With the country running out of
landfill sites to dispose of household waste, every county in the UK will be required to
reduce the amount of waste it sends to landfill by 30% before 2015 [2017]. To help
achieve this goal, the government is initiating a nationwide recycling programme that
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involves building additional household recycling centres in every county in the UK.
Meanwhile, counties that don't have enough recycling facilities to meet the
government’s target by 2015 [2017], will need to buy additional recycling capacity
from counties that can sell it”.
Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of the 2 (sign of the monetary
outcome: gains vs. losses) x 2 (period of recycling services: early vs. delayed)
conditions. Therefore, half the participants were allocated to a buying county, the other
half to a selling county. Likewise, half the participants were told that the services will
be exchanged between January 2015 and December 2016, while the other half were
told that the exchange will take place between January 2017 and December 2018.
Table 4.2 – Between-participants design for Study 1
Period of recycling services
Early Delayed
Sign
Gains County selling recycling servicesbetween Jan 2015 and Dec 2016
County selling recycling services
between Jan 2017 and Dec 2018
Losses County buying recycling servicesbetween Jan 2015 and Dec 2016
County buying recycling services
between Jan 2017 and Dec 2018
Once assigned to a condition, participants were directed to a new page with additional
information particular to that condition. Figure 4.3 shows an example of a county that
is buying recycling services between January 2015 and December 2016.
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Figure 4.3 - Example of a county buying recycling services in the early period
Each participant was presented with seven pairs of possible payment plans using the
general procedure already established in this thesis. Three of these plans had smaller
later amounts, one plan had equal amounts, and three had larger later amounts. The
earlier amounts ranged between £3 and £6 per month. Later amounts were computed
by compounding the earlier amounts over a period of two years using interest rates
that ranged from -12.7% to 12.5%. All pairs of payment plans were presented
randomly and on separate screens to minimise carryover effects. Table 4.3 presents
the amounts and interest rates used.
Table 4.3 – Price list for Study 1
Interest rate levels xt Implied interest rates xt+2
-3 5.25 -12.7% 4.00
-2 3.00 -8.7% 2.50
-1 3.75 -3.4% 3.50
0 6.00 0.0% 6.00
1 4.25 2.9% 4.50
2 5.00 7.2% 5.75
3 3.75 12.5% 4.75
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Results
All reported statistical results were carried out using a GEE model with a logit link
function, with interest rates, sign of the outcomes and period of recycling services as
predictors of the timing of monetary outcomes (earlier or later). The results were
analysed by calculating the proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains and
later losses.
A. The alignment effect
Figure 4.4 displays the observed mean proportions choosing the earlier gains (refer to
the left panel) and later losses (refer to the right panel) when the period of recycling
services was either early or delayed.
Figure 4.4 – Period x Interest rates interaction
On average, participants were more likely to choose the earlier outcomes (gains and
losses) when the services were early, and the later ones when these services were
delayed (proportion choosing the earlier gains: ME = .61 vs. MD = .42; proportion
choosing the later losses: ME = .45 vs. MD = .60). Therefore, were strongly inclined to
align the timing of monetary outcomes with the period of recycling services (i.e. an
alignment effect).
The strength of this effect, however, varied depending on the sign of these outcomes
and the level of interest rates. For gains, it was highly evident when the interest rate
was zero (ME = .66 vs. MD = .36, p < .001, d = .31) but less so when the rates were
negative (ME = .58 vs. MD = .39, p < .005, d = .19) or positive (ME = .62 vs. MD = .46,
p < .005, d = .15). For losses, this preference was highly evident when the interest rate
was zero (ME = .40 vs. MD = .77, diff = .36, p < .001), less so when the rates were
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positive (ME = .13 vs. MD = .31, diff = .18; p < .005), and inevident when these rates
were negative (ME = .77 vs. MD = .82, diff = .05, p > .05). In other words, the
preference for alignment was stronger when it was financially less costly to do so.
Especially for monetary losses. These results were confirmed with a significant
interaction between the sign of the outcomes, the period of recycling services and the
level of interest rates (χ2 (6, 320) = 14.9, p = .021).
B. Gain-loss asymmetry
Table 4.4 presents the mean proportion of participants choosing the later losses and
earlier gains for each level of interest rates. The table also shows the pairwise
comparisons tests across the seven levels.
Table 4.4 – Gain-loss asymmetry results – Study 1
Interest rates levels -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Losses .85a .79b .75b .60c .31d .19e .13f
Gains .47a .47a .49a .50a .53a .56a .51a
Note: Values not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05.
For losses, the proportion of participants choosing the later outcomes declined steadily
as the interest rates increased, thereby revealing a standard positive time preference
(Fishburn & Rubinstein, 1982; Olsen & Bailey, 1981). In contrast, for gains,
participants revealed very little variation across the seven levels of interest rates (as
evidenced by the pairwise comparisons). These results seem peculiar for two reasons.
One, half the participants in the gains condition preferred the later outcomes when the
interest rates were negative and zero. Negative and zero discounting using binary
choice tasks have been recently documented for monetary losses (e.g. Hardisty et al.,
2013; Mitchell & Wilson, 2010), but has rarely been documented for monetary gains25.
Two, contrary to the gain-loss asymmetry (and hypothesis H2), participants revealed
25 Negative time preference has been documented for sequences of monetary gains (e.g. Chapman,
1996, Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991) and for nonmonetary experiences (e.g. Loewenstein, 1987;
Harris, 2012)
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a stronger preference for the later losses than earlier gains when the interest rates were
negative and zero.
To make sense of these findings a k-means clustering algorithm (Hartigan, 1975) was
undertaken to group individuals in the gains condition according to the choices they
made (refer to Appendix A for details). Four groups of participants emerged: a) the
positive discounters,who switched from the earlier to the later outcomes as the interest
rates increased; b) the high negative discounters, who were mainly choosing the later
outcomes; c) the high positive discounters, who were predominantly choosing the
earlier outcomes; and d) the contrarians, who switched from the later to the earlier
outcomes as the interest rates increased. I refer to the latter group as the contrarians
since they were systematically making choices that are contrary to the norm
exemplified by the positive discounters. Figure 4.5 illustrates the choices made by the
four groups across the seven levels of interest rates.26
Figure 4.5 – Clustering analysis
Table 4.5 shows the number of participants assigned to each group. Interestingly, the
contrarians were the most frequent.
26 A similar analysis of participants assigned to the losses condition also revealed four groups: the
positive discounters, who switched to the earlier outcomes when the interest rates were positive; the
negative discounters, who switched to the earlier outcomes when the interest rate was zero; the high
positive discounters, who were predominantly choosing the later outcomes irrespective of the level of
interest rates; and the high negative discounters, who were predominantly choosing the earlier outcomes
irrespective of the level of interest rates (refer to Appendix A for details).
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Table 4.5 – Distribution of participants across groups – Study 1
Groups Contrarians Positivediscounters
High positive
discounters
High negative
discounters
Frequency 51 39 36 35
Percentage 32% 24% 22% 22%
Discussion
Overall, the results of Study 1 were consistent with the predictions of the double-entry
model, for both gains and losses. This was evidenced by a robust preference to align
the timing of monetary outcomes with the period of recycling services. However, this
preference diminished as the financial cost of alignment increased, especially for
losses. In fact, most participants in the monetary losses condition opted for the later
outcomes when the interest rates were negative irrespective of whether the services
were early or delayed (i.e. the financially sensible but hedonically costly choice).
These results suggest that people are less likely to opt for a hedonically favourable
financial arrangement if the financial costs of achieving such an arrangement are high.
In addition to the alignment effect, preferences for the timing of losses (as expected)
were also influenced by the interest rates, such that the likelihood of choosing the later
losses declined steadily as these rates increased. In contrast, for gains, preferences did
not vary at all. In fact, on average, half the participants preferred the smaller later
outcomes to the larger sooner ones – a clear violation of intertemporal choice
dominance. As a consequence of these choices, participants were less likely to choose
the earlier gains than later losses when the interest rates were negative and zero (i.e.
an inverse gain-loss asymmetry).
Clustering participants assigned to the gains condition according to the choices they
made, revealed a group that was less likely to choose the later outcomes as the interest
rates increased (the “contrarians”). Even though the contrarians violated the principles
of intertemporal choice dominance, their choices can be “rationalised”. Recall that in
the instructions of the experimental task I specifically asked participants to imagine
themselves as hired advisors who were making choices on behalf of a county that was
selling recycling services to a neighbouring county. It is therefore possible that these
contrarians are in fact altruists who were acting to achieve what they perceived to be
a fair outcome for both the county selling the services (their employer) and the one
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buying these services. After all, if their employer was happy to receive the earlier or
the later sums of money, then why not choose the outcome that proves to be the least
onerous to the county buying these services. Alternatively, perhaps less plausibly, it
could be that the contrarians presumed it was their county which was on the opposite
side of the transaction (i.e. the county buying the recycling services), and therefore
made a precautionary decision by choosing the least amount of money. It could also
be that these participants did not process the information in the instructions carefully.
These alternative possibilities are investigated in the following study.
4.5 Study 2
Study 2 uses the same general framework as Study 1. However, the framework was
modified to test whether the contrarians were a) altruists who considered the wellbeing
of both the residents of the county selling the services and the county buying these
services, b) precautionary decision makers who were worried that their county could
be the one buying these services, or c) misguided participants who did not process the
instructions properly.
Therefore, in addition to manipulating the period of recycling services and the sign of
the outcomes, the study also manipulated the level of association between the decision
maker (i.e. the participant) and the county in question. As a result, participants were
either asked to make decisions on behalf of their own county, a UK county (which is
not theirs), or a Welsh county. There should be a strong association when participants
are making decisions on behalf of their own county, a moderate association when
making decisions on behalf of a UK county, and a weak association when making
decisions on behalf of a Welsh county (the sample excluded participants from
Wales)27.
In general, it is expected that participants making decisions on behalf of their own
county to be less altruistic than those making decisions on behalf of others. Therefore,
if the contrarians are in fact altruists, then there should be less of them among
participants making decisions on behalf of their own county compared to the other
27 The sample consisted of participants from the following countries: 86% from England, 10% from
Scotland and 4% from North Ireland.
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counties. If they are precautionary decision makers, then there should be more of them
in the UK county condition compared to the Welsh county condition since the
counterparty to a UK county (i.e. the buyer county) could be theirs28. Finally, if they
are misguided participants, then they should be equally distributed across the three
conditions.
In addition to the above, the instructions were simplified, and the choice options were
presented using text and figures to minimise any confusion.
As in Study 1, this study tests for both, the alignment effect – i.e. the preference to
align the timing of monetary outcomes with the period of recycling services; and the
gain-loss asymmetry – the tendency to discount gains more than equivalent losses.
Participants
A sample of 1,199 UK residents recruited through Bilendi completed the online
survey. The data from 83 participants were excluded because of careless responding,
determined by the following criteria: switching back and forth between options two
standard deviations more than the average, or completing the study two standard
deviations faster than the average natural log of completion time. Participants
averaged 49 years of age with 39% holding a university degree, 58% in full-time or
part-time employment and 59% being females. The median completion time of the
survey was 12 minutes. Participants who successfully completed the survey were
rewarded with loyalty points that could be exchanged for products of their liking.
Design and procedure
The introduction to the scenario was identical to the one used in Study 1 with one
minor change to the years the contract between the two counties becomes effective
(2016 – 2018 instead of 2015 – 2017). The duration of the contract remained the same.
28 Even though the instructions to the UK county condition clearly stated that neither the buyer nor
seller counties were the participant’s, precautionary decision makers might still opt for the decision that
would protect them in the long run. That is, they might presume that their county could also be buying
these services under similar circumstances in the future.
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Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 2 (sign of the monetary
outcomes: gains vs. losses) x 2 (period of recycling services: early vs. delayed) x 3
(affected community: own county vs. UK county vs. Welsh county) conditions. Once
assigned to a condition, each participant was directed to a new page with additional
information particular to that condition. Figure 4.6 provides an example of a county
selling recycling services between 2016 and 2018. The participant in this case was
making decisions on behalf of a Welsh county. A monetary losses scenario is
reproduced in Appendix B.
Figure 4.6 - Example a county selling recycling services in the early period
To ensure that the participants processed the information correctly, each condition was
followed with a set of additional instructions on a separate page. For instance,
participants assigned to the Welsh county in Figure 4.6 saw the following instruction:
“In the following questions, you will be asked to make a number of choices between
possible pairs of payment plans. In each pair, one plan always involves the Welsh
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county receiving payments over the years 2016 to 2018, while the other always
involves the Welsh county receiving payments over the years 2018 to 2020. These
payment plans represent the average amount of money the Welsh county would
receive per household per year in exchange for the recycling capacity provided.”
After which, they were directed to the page that contained the actual questions. An
example is provided in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 – Example of the choice tasks instructions
Each participant was presented with 10 pairs of possible payment plans using the
general procedure already established in this thesis. The earlier amounts ranged
between £20 and £30 per year. The later amounts were computed by compounding the
earlier amounts over a period of two years using interest rates that ranged from -7% to
13%. All pairs of payment plans were presented randomly and on separate screens to
minimise carryover effects. In addition, I manipulated the presentation order of the
choices (i.e. which option is on top or bottom of the screen). Table 4.6 displays the
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amounts and interest rates used. In contrast to Study 1, three choice tasks were used
to measure preferences when the earlier and later amounts are equal.
Table 4.6 – Price list for Study 2
Interest rate levels xt Implied interest rates xt+2
-3 23 -7.0% 20
-2 29 -5.5% 26
-1 25 -2.0% 24
0 26 0.0% 26
0 22 0.0% 22
0 28 0.0% 28
1 21 4.5% 23
2 30 6.3% 34
3 24 9.5% 29
4 20 13.1% 26
Results
I first analyse the choices across the three affected communities factor (own county,
UK county and Welsh county). Then, the impact of the period of recycling services
on the timing of outcomes, and finally the gain-loss asymmetry.
All reported statistical results were carried out using a GEE model with a logit link
function, with the level of interest rates, sign of the outcome, period of recycling
services and affected community as predictors of the timing of monetary outcomes
(earlier or later). The results were analysed by computing the proportion of participants
choosing the earlier gains and later losses.
A. Affected community
Figure 4.8 presents the observed mean proportions for gains (left panel) and losses
(right panel) across the three affected communities.
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Figure 4.8 – Affected community x Interest rates interaction
On average, participants assigned to the losses condition were more likely to choose
the later outcomes when making decisions on behalf of their own county (M = .52) as
opposed to a UK county (M = .44) or a Welsh county (M = .47). However, these
differences were not statistically significant (χ2 (2, 550) = 5.21, p = .074). Apart from
that, all three affected community groups revealed the same pattern of choices. That
is, they were increasingly less likely to choose the later losses as the interest rates
increased.
In contrast, for gains, Figure 4.8 reveals two different patterns of choices. Participants
making decisions on behalf of their own county were less likely to choose the earlier
gains as the interest rates increased (i.e. a positive time preference). Conversely, those
making decision on behalf of a UK or Welsh county were slightly more likely to
choose the earlier gains as the interest rates increased (i.e. a negative time preference).
Interestingly, the pattern revealed by participants assigned to the UK or Welsh county
was similar to the one observed in Study 1 (see Table 4.4 above). Therefore,
suggesting that there is a strong presence of contrarians within the UK and Welsh
county conditions.
To confirm, a k-means clustering analysis was conducted to group participants
according to the choices they made (refer to Appendix B for details). Like Study 1,
four groups in the gains condition emerged: the positive discounters, the high positive
discounters, the high negative discounters and the contrarians. Table 4.7 presents the
number of participants in each group. Interestingly, the proportion of contrarians
observed in this study was lower than the one observed in Study 1, dropping from 32%
to 15%.  Therefore, implying that some confusion may have been eliminated by the
simplified instructions. As in Study 1, the contrarians revealed a strong preference for
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the outcomes with least amount of money (i.e. the later gains when the interest rates
were negative, and the earlier ones when the rates were positive).
Table 4.7 – Distribution of participants across groups – Study 2
Groups High positivediscounters
High negative
discounters
Positive
discounters Contrarians
Frequency 204 167 111 84
Percentage 36% 30% 20% 15%
As predicted, there was a significant difference in the distribution of contrarians across
the three affected communities (χ2 (2, 84) = 137.14, p < .001). Only 14% (N = 12)
were making decisions on behalf of their own county, while the remaining 86% were
equally divided between those who were making decisions on behalf of the UK county
(N = 36) and the Welsh county (N = 36). In contrast, none of the other groups revealed
significant differences in their distributions across the three communities (high
positive discounters: χ2 (2, 204) = 1.13, p = .567; high negative discounters: χ2 (2, 167)
= .048, p = .976; positive discounters: χ2 (2, 111) = 1.41, p = .494).
These observations provide evidence supporting the proposition that the contrarians
are most likely altruists who were making decisions they perceived to be fair for both
the buying and selling counties. That is, there was no evidence supporting the
“precautionary participants” explanation (since the number of contrarians was
identical for the UK and Welsh counties), and no evidence supporting the “misguided
participants” explanation (since the number of contrarians across the three affected
communities was different).
In addition, an analysis of the survey completion times ruled out the possibility that
participants making decisions on behalf of their own county were more attentive to
the survey. In fact, participants making decisions on behalf of other counties took more
time to complete the survey. The median completion time was ~12 minutes for
participants assigned to the Welsh county, ~11 minutes and 30 seconds for those
assigned to the UK county, and ~11 minutes for those assigned to their own county.
Furthermore, an analysis of participants’ responses to Frederick’s (2005) 3-item
cognitive reflection test ruled out potential differences in cognitive ability (F(2, 564)
= .037, p = .964).
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B. Period of recycling services
Figure 4.9 compares the proportions of participants choosing the earlier gains (left
panel) and later losses (right panel) when the period of recycling services was either
early or delayed.
Figure 4.9 – Period x interest rates interaction for gains (left panel) and losses (right panel)
As in Study 1, there was a robust temporal alignment effect evidenced by a stronger
preference for the earlier outcomes when the services were early, and the later ones
when these services were delayed. This was true for both gains and losses (proportion
choosing the earlier gains: ME = .67 vs. MD = .45; proportion choose the later losses:
ME = .37 vs. MD = .56). However, the strength of this effect varied depending on the
level of interest rates. According to Figure 4.9, this effect was strongly evident when
the interest rates were zero (for gains: ME = .74 vs. MD = .47, d = .29; for losses: ME
= .38 vs. MD = .67, d = .26), but less so when the interest rates were negative (for
gains: ME = .68 vs. MD = .49, d = .19; for losses: ME = .63 vs. MD = .78, d = .16) or
positive (for gains: ME = .62 vs. MD = .40, d = .22; for losses: ME = .16 vs. MD = .35,
d = .19). In other words, participants were less likely to align the monetary outcomes
to the period of recycling services as the cost of alignment increased. These results
were confirmed with a significant interaction between the levels of interest rates, sign
of the outcomes and period of recycling services (χ2 (9, 1116) = 30.0, p < .001).
C. Period of recycling services by affected community
Figure 4.10 displays the proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains (left
panel) and later losses (right panel) for the three affected communities when the
recycling services were either early or delayed.
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Figure 4.10 – Period x affected community interaction
In general, participants were more likely to align the timing of outcomes to the period
of recycling services when making decisions on behalf of the Welsh county (diff
between the early and delayed conditions for gains: d = .29, for losses: d = .24),
followed by the UK county (for gains: d = .20; for losses: d = .20), and finally by those
who were making decisions on behalf of their own county (for gains: d = .18; for
losses: d = .18). However, these differences were not statistically significant. That is,
there was no evidence of a significant interaction between the sign of the outcomes,
affected community and period of recycling services (χ2 (2, 1116) = 2.89, p = .235).
There was also no evidence of an interaction between the sign, affected community,
period of recycling services and interest rates (χ2 (18, 1116) = 21.0, p = .278).
D. Gain-loss asymmetry
Table 4.8 presents the proportion of participants choosing the later losses and earlier
gains across the 10 levels of interest rates.
Table 4.8 – Gain-loss asymmetry results – Study 2
Interest rates
levels -3 -2 -1 0 0 0 1 2 3 4
Losses .71a .72a .70a .55b .52b .53b .30c .26c .24c .24c
Gains .58a .59a .59a .60a .61a .60a .56a .53b .47c .47c
Note: Values not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05.
Overall, participants preferred the earlier gains more than the later losses when the
interest rates were positive or zero, thereby revealing a typical gain-loss asymmetry.
However, because of the choices made by the contrarians, this preference was reversed
when these rates were negative.
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In fact, a comparison of the choices made by participants who were making decisions
on behalf of their own county (the group that had the fewest contrarians) shows that
they were equally inclined to choose the later losses and earlier gains when the interest
rates were negative (avg. across the 3 choices: MLosses = .76 vs. MGains = 68, p = .452)
and zero (avg. across the 3 choices: MLosses = .59 vs. MGains = .65, p = .723), but more
likely to choose the earlier gains than later losses when these rates were positive (avg.
across the 4 choices: MLosses = .29 vs MGains = 45, p < .001). In other words, these
participants revealed a stronger preference to prepay for consumption than to collect
earnings in arrears.
Discussion
As in Study 1, deferring the consumption period of services elicited a stronger
preference for the later losses, while expediting the provision period of these services
elicited a stronger preference for the earlier gains. Therefore, revealing a robust
preference to align the timing of monetary outcomes (gains and losses) to the period
of recycling services. This was true regardless of the level of interest rates (but more
so when the interest rates were zero). Interestingly, the evidence for losses concerning
the negative rates is inconsistent with Study 1, but consistent with the results of Study
3 in Chapter 3.
There was no evidence that participants assigned to the losses condition were making
different choices on behalf of their own county compared to the other counties. One,
they revealed the same pattern of choices across all the levels of interest rates. That is,
they were less likely to choose the later outcomes as the interest rates increased
(positive time preference). Two, they revealed a similar tendency to align the timing
of outcomes to the period of recycling services. In contrast, those assigned to the gains
condition revealed two different patterns of choices across the levels of interest rates.
Participants making decisions on behalf of their own county were less likely to choose
the earlier gains as the interest rates increased (i.e. revealing a positive time
preference). Conversely, those making decisions on behalf of the UK or Welsh county
were equally inclined to choose the earlier gains regardless of the level of interest rates
(i.e. a neutral time preference). In fact, the pattern of choices revealed by participants
making decision on behalf of a UK or Welsh county was similar to the one observed
for the gains condition in Study 1.
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A k-means clustering analysis confirmed that there were more contrarians making
decisions on behalf of other counties as opposed to their own county, thereby
supporting the proposition that the contrarians observed in Study 1 were
predominantly altruists who were making choices they perceived to be fair to both the
buying and selling counties. This evidence suggests that individuals care about equity
and the wellbeing of the society when making social decisions on behalf of others.
These results are consistent with De Dreu et al. (1994) that individuals in social
contexts care about the fair and equitable distribution of resources between negotiating
parties, and with De Vries (1991) who showed that gain-framed individuals are more
likely to help minimise other’s losses than maximise other’s gains. These results are
also consistent with the evidence from experiments using a modified version of the
dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986) whereby third-parties frequently
punished dictators and/or compensated recipients in the event of an inequitable
distribution of money (e.g. Almenberg et al., 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Lotz et
al., 2010).
4.6 General discussion
This chapter examined the temporal preferences of UK citizens for monetary gains
and losses in exchange for a communal service that was either exchanged in the near
or distant future.
Overall, the results revealed a robust temporal alignment effect for both gains and
losses – i.e. a preference to align the timing of costs with the benefits. This effect was
observed when the participants assumed the role of an external advisor (Study 1), and
when they were making decisions on behalf of their own county or another county
(Study 2). Therefore, suggesting that people use similar mental accounting rules when
making financial decisions for themselves and others. Although, one particular group,
the contrarians, proved to be an exception to this observation. Instead, these
contrarians were making choices that minimise the costs to the county buying the
communal services, but maintain an acceptable payoff to the county selling these
services. Therefore promoting what they perceived to be an equitable distribution of
resources.
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These findings are consistent with the predictions of the double-entry model, that
people dislike postpaying for consumption, and collecting earnings in advance. In fact,
Study 2 shows that many preferred to pay more sooner than less later when the
communal services were early, and to receive less later than more sooner when these
services were delayed. In their paper, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) argue that the
imputed cost to consuming now and paying later is a “real cost” in the sense that it
actually reduces the pleasure of consumption. These results support this claim. These
results also support the proposition that temporally aligning the costs and benefits of
communal services strengthens the mental association between the two. Thereby,
offsetting the disutility from these costs.
On a policy level, these findings suggest that government can improve tax collection
(and even justify an increase in taxes) by clearly highlighting the benefits these taxes
are financing to the taxpayers. One way to do so is by means of temporal
hypothecation that was discussed in Chapter 3. These findings also suggest that
government can intervene to moderate the public’s impatience for monetary and
nonmonetary communal benefits by drawing attention to the costs of these benefits.
For instance, in relation to the proposed shale wealth fund29 that was mentioned in
Chapter 1, the UK government may want to highlight the costs of developing and
extracting the shale gas in way that persuades the public to support an appropriate
distribution of benefits over time.
Prelude to Chapter 5
The two-period framework used in this chapter (i.e. early versus delayed services)
raises two concerns. One, some might argue that the observed pattern of choices may
have been caused by an inertia to stick with the default option of alignment as opposed
to nonalignment – i.e. a status quo bias (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991; Korobkin, 1998;
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). That is, people expect the monetary outcomes to be
aligned with period of services, and as a consequence any deviation from alignment
29https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544241/shale_wealth
_fund_final_pdf-a.pdf
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needs to be justified. Two, the costs and benefits of spending / revenue sharing
communal programmes rarely have such perfect temporal alignment.
Consequently, the following chapter, extends the investigation using a framework that
consists of five-periods, such that the exchange of goods or services: precedes the
earlier and later monetary outcomes, b) is aligned with the earlier outcome, c) is in-
between the earlier and later outcomes, d) is aligned with the later outcome, and e)
follows the earlier and later outcomes.
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4.7 Appendix A – Study 1
Scenarios
Figure 4.11 – Example of a county selling delayed recycling services
Clustering analysis
We use a k-means clustering algorithm (Hartigan, 1975; Hartigan & Wong, 1978) to
group participants according to the choices they made. The k-means algorithm works
by partitioning the input data into k clusters by moving it around to minimize the
variability within clusters and to maximize it between them. Accordingly, the
algorithm will group participants with similar choice patterns into the same cluster.
To determine the optimal number of clusters k, we calculated the sum of squared
distance between each observation of a cluster and its centroid (also referred to as sum
of square error - SSE) for k = 2 to k = 15. After which, we plotted the within cluster
SSE against the number of clusters k (see Figure 4.12). The optimal number of clusters
is determined by the point where the within cluster SSE becomes stable, which in this
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case is k = 5 for both gains and losses (also known as the elbow criterion method,
Ketchen & Shook, 1996).
Figure 4.12 – Optimal number of clusters using elbow criterion method
A. Monetary gains
Table 4.9 displays the proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains at each
level of interest rates for the five clusters, along with the number of participants in
each cluster.
Table 4.9 – Clustering analysis – Study 1 (Gains)
Interest rates Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
High negative
discounters
High positive
discounters
Positive
discounters Contrarians Contrarians
-3 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.0
-2 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.1
-1 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.1
0 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.1
1 0.1 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.0
2 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.9
3 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.9 1.0
Number of
participants 35 36 39 36 15
Percentage 22% 22% 24% 22% 10%
Mean implied
discount rate 11.9% -12.4% 1.52% n/a n/a
Participants in Cluster 1 were predominantly choosing the later outcomes, irrespective
of the level of interest rates. The group has an average implied discount rate equivalent
to -12.4%. Therefore, we refer to them as the high negative discounters. Conversely,
participants in Cluster 2 were predominantly choosing the earlier outcomes,
irrespective of the level of interest rates. The group has an average implied discount
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rate equivalent to 11.9%. Accordingly, we refer to them as the high positive
discounters. Participants in Cluster 3 are standard discounters who switched to the
later outcomes as the interest rates increased. The cluster is a mix between those who
switched to the later outcomes when the interest rate was zero (~ 30%) or positive (~
60%). The group has an average implied discount rate equivalent to 1.52%. We refer
to them as the positive discounters. Finally, clusters 4 and 5 consisted of participants
who switched from the later to the earlier outcomes as the interest rates increased.
That is, they were making choices that is contrary to the expected norm. As a result,
we refer to them as the contrarians.
B. Monetary losses
Table 4.10 shows the proportion of participants choosing the later losses at each level
of interest rates for the five clusters, along with the number of participants in each
cluster.
Table 4.10 – Clustering analysis - Study 1 (Losses)
Interest rates Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
High negative
discounters
High positive
discounters
Negative
discounters
Positive
discounters Others
-3 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
-2 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.0
-1 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.2
0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
2 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
3 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3
Number of
participants 23 28 43 63 6
Percentage 14% 17% 26% 39% 4%
Mean implied
discount rate -12.2% 11.7% -2.71% 2.60% n/a
Participants in Cluster 1 were predominantly choosing the earlier outcomes,
irrespective of the level of interest rates. The group has an average implied discount
rate equivalent to -12.2%. As a result, we refer to them as the high negative
discounters. Conversely, participants in Cluster 2 were predominantly choosing the
later outcomes, irrespective of the level of interest rates. The group has an average
implied discount rate equivalent to 11.7%. Therefore, we refer to them as the high
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positive discounters. Participants in Cluster 3 predominantly switched to the earlier
outcomes when the interest rate was zero. The group has an average implied discount
rate equivalent to -2.71%. Therefore, we refer to them as the negative discounters. In
contrast, participants in Cluster 4 switched to the earlier outcomes when the interest
rates were positive. They have an average implied discount rate equivalent to 2.60%.
Accordingly, we refer to them as the positive discounters. Finally, Cluster 5 consists
of 6 participants who were predominantly choosing the earlier outcomes but switched
to later outcomes when the interest rate was zero.
C. Distribution of groups
Figure 4.13 compares the frequency of participants within each group when the
services were either early or delayed.
Figure 4.13 – Distribution of groups across conditions – Study 1
For gains (refer to the left panel), there were more high negative discounters in the
delayed services condition compared to the early one (NE = 9 vs ND = 26; χ2 (1, 35) =
8.25, p = .004). Conversely, there were more high positive discounters in the early
services condition compared to the delayed one (NE = 25 vs ND = 11; χ2 (1, 36) = 5.44,
p = .020). Interestingly, there were more positive discounters in the delayed condition
than the early one (NE = 17 vs ND = 22; χ2 (1, 39) = .641, p = .423). However, this
difference was not significant. There were also more contrarians in the delayed
condition than the early one (NE = 23 vs ND = 28; χ2 (1, 51) = .490, p = .484). However,
this difference was also not significant.
For losses (refer to the right panel), there were more high negative discounters and
negative discounters in the early services condition compared to the delayed one (for
the high negative discounters: NE = 14 vs ND = 9, χ2 (1, 23) = 1.08, p = .297; for the
negative discounters: NE = 32 vs ND = 11, χ2 (1, 43) = 10.25, p = .001). However, the
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difference for the former was not significant. In contrast, there were more high positive
discounter and positive discounters in the delayed services condition compared to the
early one (for the high positive discounters: NE = 7 vs ND = 21; χ2 (1, 28) = 7.00, p =
.008); for the positive discounters: NE = 22 vs ND = 41; χ2 (1, 63) = 5.73, p = .017).
4.8 Appendix B – Study 2
Scenarios
Figure 4.14 – Example a county buying recycling services in the delayed period
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Figure 4.15 – Example of the choice tasks instructions
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Clustering analysis
Using the elbow criteria, the optimal k = 4 for both gains and losses.
A. Monetary gains
Table 4.11 shows the proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains at each level
of interest rates for the five clusters, along with the number of participants in each
cluster.
Table 4.11 – Clustering analysis – Study 2 (Gains)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
High negative
discounters
High positive
discounter
Positive
discounters Contrarians
-3 0.2 0.9 1.0 0.0
-2 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.0
-1 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.1
0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.3
0 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.4
0 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.4
1 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.9
2 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.9
3 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.9
4 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.9
Number of participants 167 204 111 84
Percentage 20% 15% 36% 30%
Mean implied discount rate -5.60% 11.17% 2.85% n/a
Participants in Cluster 1 were predominantly choosing the later outcomes irrespective
of the level of interest rates. The group has an average implied discount rate equivalent
to -5.60%. Therefore, we refer to them as the high negative discounters. Conversely,
participants in Cluster 2 were predominantly choosing the earlier outcomes
irrespective of the level of interest rates. The group has an average implied discount
rate equivalent to 11.17%. Accordingly, we refer to them as the high positive
discounters. Participants in Cluster 3 are standard discounters who switched to the
later outcomes as the interest rates increased. The group has an average implied
discount rate equivalent to 2.85%. We refer to them as the positive discounters.
Finally, Clusters 4 consisted of the contrarians who switched from the later to the
earlier outcomes as the interest rates increased.
97
B. Monetary losses
Table 4.12 shows the proportion of participants choosing the later losses at each level
of interest rates for the five clusters, along with the number of participants in each
cluster.
Table 4.12 – Clustering analysis – Study 2 (Losses)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
High negative
discounters
High positive
discounter
Negative
discounters
Positive
discounters
-3 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.0
-2 0.1 0.8 1.0 1.0
-1 0.1 0.9 0.8 1.0
0 0.1 0.9 0.1 1.0
0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9
0 0.0 0.9 0.1 1.0
1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.3
2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.1
3 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0
4 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1
Number of participants 146 121 107 176
Percentage 27% 22% 19% 32%
Mean implied discount rate -6.26% 11.20% -1.37% 2.92%
Participants in Cluster 1 were predominantly choosing the earlier outcomes,
irrespective of the level of interest rates. The group has an average implied discount
rate equivalent to -6.26%. As a result, we refer to them as the high negative
discounters. Conversely, participants in Cluster 2 were predominantly choosing the
later outcomes, irrespective of the level of interest rates. The group has an average
implied discount rate equivalent to 11.2%. Therefore, we refer to them as the high
positive discounters. Participants in Cluster 3 predominantly switched to the earlier
outcomes when the interest rate was zero. The group has an average implied discount
rate equivalent to -1.37%. Therefore, we refer to them as the negative discounters. In
contrast, participants in Cluster 4 switched to the earlier outcomes when the interest
rates were positive. They have an average implied discount rate equivalent to 2.92%.
Accordingly, we refer to them as the positive discounters.
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C. Distribution of groups
Figure 4.16 compares the frequency of participants within each group when the
services were either early or delayed.
Figure 4.16 – Distribution of groups across conditions – Study 2
For losses (refer to the left panel), there were more high negative discounters and
negative discounters in the early services condition compared to the delayed one (for
the high negative discounters: NE = 92 vs ND = 54, χ2 (1, 146) = 9.89, p = .002; for the
negative discounters: NE = 68 vs ND = 39, χ2 (1, 107) = 7.86, p = .005). In contrast,
there were more high positive discounter and positive discounters in the delayed
services condition compared to the early one (for the high positive discounters: NE =
38 vs ND = 83; χ2 (1, 121) = 16.7, p < .001); for the positive discounters: NE = 62 vs
ND = 114; χ2 (1, 176) = 15.3, p < .001).
For gains (refer to the right panel), there were more high negative discounters in the
delayed services condition compared to the early one (NE = 49 vs ND = 118; χ2 (1, 167)
= 28.5, p < .001). There were also more high positive discounters and contrarians in
the delayed services condition compared to the early one (for the high positive
discounters: NE = 53 vs ND = 58; χ2 (1, 167) = .225, p = .635; for the contrarians: NE
= 40 vs ND = 44; χ2 (1, 84) = .190, p = .663). However, neither difference was
significant. Conversely, there were more positive discounters in the early services
condition compared to the delayed one (NE = 134 vs ND = 70; χ2 (1, 204) = 20.0, p <
.001).
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5 CHAPTER FIVE
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 explored preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes (gains and losses)
in exchange for communal services that were either exchanged in the near or distant
future (a two-period framework). The results revealed a preference for the earlier
outcomes when the exchange took place in the near future, and the later outcomes
when the exchange was further delayed. These preferences were triggered by a desire
to temporally align the monetary outcomes with the period of communal services. The
idea being that temporal alignment facilitates the mental association30 of monetary
losses with the consumption of services, thereby offsetting the disutility from these
losses; and the monetary gains with the provision of services, thereby offsetting the
disutility from having to provide these services. However, establishing a mental
association between the costs and benefits of consumption / provision of a service is
not preconditioned by temporal alignment. For instance, both Thaler and Johnson
(1990) and Linville and Fischer (1991) argue that events occurring within a short
period are likely to be mentally integrated (a form of mental association), while those
which are temporally distanced are likely to be segregated (a form of mental
disassociation). This is consistent with Gourville and Soman’s (1998) theory of
payment / benefit depreciation – that temporally separating costs from benefits (e.g.
prepaying for consumption), and benefits from costs (e.g. getting paid in advance for
work) is likely to lead to the depreciation of these costs / benefits over time; and as a
consequence to their disassociation.
Accordingly, this chapter explores preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes
by extending the two-period framework used in Chapter 4 into five periods, such that
the timing of goods or services (hereafter, products) either : a) preceded the earlier and
later monetary outcomes, b) was aligned with the earlier outcome, c) was in-between
the earlier and later outcomes, d) was aligned with the later outcome, or e) followed
the earlier and later outcomes (see section 5.2 for further details).
30 Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) used the term coupling
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This is a novel setup which enables the examination of timing preferences for all
possible combinations of cost-benefit sequences. To my knowledge no studies have
utilised such a setup before. Additionally, the chapter investigates whether individuals
with different attitudes towards debt – elicited using a new diagnostic tool developed
by Scholten et al. (2016) – would have divergent preferences for the timing of
monetary outcomes. Specifically, whether their attitude towards debt (i.e. being debt-
tolerant or debt-averse) is predictive of their preferences for the timing of monetary
payments (losses).
These preferences were examined in three studies each pertaining to a different
context. Study 1 manipulated the timing of sale or purchase of a personal product. To
minimise product-specific effects (e.g. durability, hedonicity, whether the product is
perceived favourably by the decision maker) it was referred to as item X.
Study 2 explored these preferences in a trading context whereby individuals buy or
sell Green Energy (GE) credits to offset carbon emissions31. To some extent, this study
mimics the futures market for trading commodities and financial instruments in which
traders enter into binding contracts today to buy or sell an asset for an agreed price,
with delivery and payment occurring at some point in the future.
Study 3 replicated Study 2 in a communal setting whereby UK counties buy or sell GE
credits to offset their carbon emissions from non-green energy consumption.
5.2 Experimental framework
Intertemporal choice tasks
All three studies included a standard intertemporal choice task and a scenario-based
task that consisted of a series of binary choices involving earlier and later sums of
money (either monetary gains or losses), with a fixed time delay at t = 3 and 9 months.
31 There already exists a market for trading certificates that offset carbon emissions often referred to as
“carbon credits”. However, because of some negative press in the UK about trading carbon credits, I
refer to these certificates as green energy credits http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24828797
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Figure 5.1 – Standard intertemporal choice task
The standard task (refer to Figure 5.1) served as neutral baseline condition (a reference
point) to compare between the scenario conditions.
The scenario-based task tested the effect of temporally distancing the timing of a given
product from the earlier or later monetary outcomes. Accordingly, the task consisted
of five periods spread evenly over the length of one year, such that the product was
traded at t = 0, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months (see Figure 5.2). Therefore, at t = 0, the trade
took place at the beginning of the year, before paying or receiving any money. At t =
3 months, it was aligned with the earlier monetary outcome. At t = 6 months, it was
in-between the two monetary outcomes. At t = 9 months, it was aligned with the later
outcome. Finally, at t = 12 months, the trade took place at the end of the year, following
the payment or receipt of money.
t = 3 months t = 9 months
Amount
paid
[received]
Amount
paid
[received]OR
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Figure 5.2 – Scenario-based task
The debt battery
In addition to the two tasks, all three studies administered Scholten et al.’s (2016) debt
battery, a diagnostic tool developed to identify different attitudes towards acquiring
and/or prolonging debt – such that debt is construed as an obligation to pay a sum of
money in the near or distant future.
The debt battery consists of seven pairs of payments. Each pair is a choice between a
payment of £100 sooner or £100 later32. The first four pairs involve an immediate
payment (t = today) and a delayed payment at t = 1, 2, 3 or 4 years. These choices
measure the tendency to acquire debt. The remaining three pairs consist of an earlier
32 The amount was set at £100 because it was neither too small to be considered trivial nor too large to
introduce concerns about liquidity constraints.
Condition 1 - trade preceded the monetary outcomes
Condition 2 - trade temporally aligned with the earlier outcome
Condition 3 - trade took place in-between the monetary outcomes
Condition 4 -  trade temporally aligned with the later outcome
Condition 5 -  trade followed the monetary outcomes
t = 3 months t = 9 months
Amount
paid
[received]
Amount
paid
[received]OR
t = 0 t = 3 months t = 6 months t = 9 months t = 12 months
Product
traded
t = 0 t = 3 months t = 6 months t = 9 months t = 12 months
Product
traded
t = 0 t = 3 months t = 6 months t = 9 months t = 12 months
Product
traded
t = 0 t = 3 months t = 6 months t = 9 months t = 12 months
Product
traded
t = 0 t = 3 months t = 6 months t = 9 months t = 12 months
Product
traded
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payment at t = 1, 2 or 3 years and a later one at t = 4 years. These measure the tendency
to prolong debt (refer to Table 5.1 for further details).
Table 5.1 – Debt battery – as depicted in Scholten et al.
t (years)
Decision Choice task 0 (today) 1 2 3 4
Acquire
debt
{0, 1} $100 $100
{0, 2} $100 $100
{0, 3} $100 $100
{0, 4} $100 $100
Prolong
debt
{1, 4} $100 $100
{2, 4} $100 $100
{3, 4} $100 $100
Accordingly, the debt battery distinguishes between four types of individuals. The
debt-tolerant, both acquire and prolong debt, and so always prefer to make the later
payment. The debt-averse, neither acquire nor prolong debt, and so always prefer the
earlier payment. The debt-takers, acquire but do not prolong debt. Therefore, prefer to
pay later when faced with a choice between an immediate and a delayed outcome, and
sooner when both outcomes are delayed. Finally, the debt-holders, dislike acquiring
debt but once in debt they tend to prolong it. As a result, prefer to pay sooner rather
than later when faced with a choice between an immediate and a delayed outcome,
and later when both outcomes are delayed.
The debt battery has two major advantages in comparison with other scales developed
to measure attitudes towards debt (e.g. Callender & Jackson, 2005; Caetano et al.,
2011; Davies & Lea, 1995; Lea et al., 1993; Livingston & Lunt, 1992; Walters et al.,
2016). One, it is a two-dimensional measure that evaluates the attitude to acquire and
prolong debt. A feature that is particularly useful for intertemporal choice studies
which typically consist of choices between an immediate and a delayed outcome, or
two delayed outcomes. Two, it makes no reference to the origin of the payment
obligation (e.g. consumption, fine, taxes, loan), and avoids labelling the future
payment as “debt” – thereby minimising any frame-related biases.
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It is likely that people with different attitudes towards debt have different preferences
for the timing of payments in exchange for consumption. For instance, the debt-averse
might have a strong preference to prepay for consumption because they want to enjoy
this consumption debt-free. In contrast, the debt-tolerant are probably not too
concerned about the timing of consumption in relation to the payments, and may in
fact prefer situations in which they consume now and pay later. These considerations
are addressed in this chapter, with formal hypotheses derived in the following section.
5.3 Predictions
Temporal contiguity (proximity) of costs and benefits
The experienced disutility from the costs of a trade (i.e. the sale or purchase of a
product) is reduced when these costs are mentally associated with the benefits. This
mental association is strengthened when the costs and benefits are temporally
contiguous (Hirst et al., 1994; Soman & Gourville, 2001; Linville & Fischer, 1991;
Kamleitner & Hoelzl, 2009; Thaler & Johnson, 1990)33.
Therefore, preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes should be highly
influenced by their proximity to the trading period, such that deferring the trade from
t = 0 to t = 12 months (as shown in Figure 5.2) will elicit a stronger preference for the
later outcomes. This proposition is elaborated in the following subsections.
A. Monetary losses
Irrespective of the trading period, from a financially rational perspective, it would be
more sensible to pay at t = 9 months as opposed to t = 3 months, unless the cost of
deferring the payment exceeds the marginal cost of money (Fisher, 1931). However,
paying at t = 9 months when the trade precedes the earlier and later outcomes
(Condition 1 in Figure 5.2) weakens the mental association between the costs and
33 Temporal contiguity is not explicitly addressed by the double-entry model since it approximates the
impact of past and future outcomes using a step function [0, 1]. Therefore, from a modelling perspective,
the later monetary loss in Condition 1 of Figure 5.2 should not attenuate the benefits of consumption
more than the sooner loss. Likewise, the earlier monetary gain in Condition 5 should not buffer the cost
of consumption less than the later gain. However, the theory implicitly assumes that the costs and
benefits of consumption will gradually depreciate as hypothesised by Gourville and Soman (1998), and
as depicted in Figure 2.1 for monetary losses, and Figure 4.1 for monetary gains.
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benefits, and prolongs the anxiety of having to pay for a product that have already
been received. Especially since the benefits from the product will depreciate over time
(e.g. Gourville & Soman, 1998). Therefore, all else being equal, hedonically it would
be more painful to pay at t = 9 months than t = 3 months. Likewise, it would be more
painful to pay at t = 9 months when the trade and the earlier outcome are temporally
aligned (Condition 2).
In contrast, paying at t = 9 months when the trade is either aligned with the later
outcome (Condition 4), or follows the earlier and later outcomes (i.e. Condition 5)
entails little hedonic costs since the mental association between the monetary losses
and the benefits is high. Therefore, under these circumstances people will generally
be in favour of the later outcomes.
H1a: receiving the product at t = 9 or 12 months will elicit a stronger preference
for the later losses compared to t = 0 or 3 months.
B. Monetary gains
For gains, financially rationality prescribes that it would be more sensible to get paid
at t = 3 months as opposed to t = 9 months. However, getting paid at t = 3 months
when the trade follows the earlier and later outcomes (Condition 5 in Figure 5.2),
weakens the mental association between the benefits and costs, and prolongs the
anxiety from the obligation to provide a product in exchange for earnings that have
already been received. Especially that the experienced utility from the earnings are
likely to depreciate over time (e.g. Gourville & Soman, 1998). Therefore, all else being
equal, hedonically it would be more appealing to collect the earnings at t = 9 months
as opposed to t = 3 months. Likewise, it would be more appealing to collect the
earnings at t = 9 months when the trade and the later outcome are temporally aligned
(Condition 4).
In contrast, getting paid at t = 3 months when the trade is aligned with the earlier
outcome (Condition 2), or precedes the earlier and later outcomes (Condition 1) entails
little hedonic costs since the mental association between the monetary gains and the
trade is high. As a result, most would be in favour of collecting the earlier gains.
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H1b: providing the product at t = 0 or 3 months will elicit a stronger preference
for the earlier gains compared to t = 9 or 12 months.
Throughout this chapter, the term temporal contiguity effect will be used to denote the
preference to experience the costs and benefits of a trade in close proximity. In
principle, this effect is less restrictive than temporal alignment, which requires the
costs and benefits to be perfectly aligned.
Cost-benefit sequence
In addition to the effect of temporal contiguity, preferences for the timing of outcomes
are also influenced by the desire for costs to precede benefits (Loewenstein & Prelec,
1991; 1993). This preference has been observed using mixed sequences of monetary
outcomes (e.g. Ross & Simonson, 1991), mixed sequences of nonmonetary outcomes
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), and mixed sequences of monetary and nonmonetary
outcomes (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). For instance, most participants in Ross and
Simonson (1991) preferred monetary sequences that ended with a gain (e.g. lose $15
then win $85 as opposed to win $85 then lose $15). Likewise, most participants in
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) preferred spending a weekend with an abrasive aunt
first and friends later as opposed to friends first and aunt later. Most importantly,
participants in Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) preferred to prepay for nondurable
consumption, and to collect earnings following the completion of a brief task.
The experimental framework described in section 5.2 disentangles the effects of
temporal contiguity and preference for improvement, particularly when comparing the
choices at t = 6 month (Condition 3 in Figure 5.2) with the baseline condition. The
following explains why.
Recall that Condition 3 is a choice between an earlier outcome at t = 3 months and a
later one at t = 9 months, whereby the product is traded at t = 6 months. Therefore, the
trade is temporally equidistant from the earlier and later outcomes. In other words, the
costs and benefits are equally contiguous irrespective of the timing of monetary
outcomes.
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In addition, Condition 3 can be viewed as a decision between two sequences: a) an
improving sequence, in which the product is either paid for prior to being delivered,
or sold before getting paid; and b) a declining sequence, in which the product is paid
for after being delivered, or sold post getting paid. In contrast, the baseline condition
is a choice between two simple outcomes (i.e. pure monetary gains or losses).
Therefore, in comparison, there should be a stronger preference for the earlier losses
and later gains at t = 6 months.
H2: Exchanging the product at t = 6 months will elicit a stronger preference for
the earlier losses and later gains relative to the baseline condition.
Debt attitude
Evidence from several studies administered by Scholten et al. (2016) suggest that the
debt-tolerant and the debt-averse make up the two largest groups (~ 80% to 85%) with
varying proportion between the two depending on the given sample. Therefore, I will
focus on these groups when deriving hypotheses and analysing the data34.
The debt-tolerant are positive discounters who discount future losses, and more so the
longer these losses are delayed. As a result, they tend to acquire and prolong debt. In
contrast, the debt-averse are negative discounters who amplify the disutility from
future losses, and more so for longer delays. As a result, they neither acquire nor hold
on to debt. In one study from Scholten et al., participants diagnosed as debt-tolerant
were more likely than the debt-averse to choose sequences with a deferred payment
£y (pay £0 today and pay £y in 1 year) than sequences with an immediate payment £x
(pay £x today and pay £0 in 1 year), in which > . In other words, the debt-tolerant
discounted the future payments more than the debt-averse. In another study, Scholten
et al. observed positive discounting among the debt-tolerant but negative discounting
among the debt-averse - using price lists with single dated losses and discount rates
that ranged between -45% and 40%. This was true irrespective of magnitude (£20,
£100 or £500) and time delay (t = 1 or 2 years).
34 The samples used in the three studies are relatively small, and were split between gains and losses.
Therefore, it is unlikely to have enough debt-takers or debt-holders to derive meaningful results.
108
In contrast, the evidence from Scholten et al. for monetary gains is mixed. For
instance, the debt-tolerant and debt-averse were equally likely to prefer sequences with
an immediate outcome £x (receive £x today and receive £0 in 1 year) to sequences
with a deferred outcome £y (receive £0 today and receive £y in 1 year), even when y
> x. Accordingly, they were equally likely to reveal impatience for gains. However,
the debt-averse revealed slightly higher discount rates for the single dated monetary
gains (using the same setup as above). That is, they were slightly more impatient than
the debt-tolerant for single dated gains.
In light of these findings, it is expected that the debt-averse would reveal a stronger
preference for the earlier losses than the debt-tolerant. However, this preference will
be moderated as the trade period of the underlying product is deferred. This is because
the disutility associated with the deferred payments should be buffered by the
consumption benefits. In other words, the temporal contiguity effect will be more
robust for the debt-averse than debt-tolerant, in the context of losses.
In contrast, given the evidence from Scholten et al., it is unlikely to observe extreme
differences between the two groups in the context of gains.
H3: The debt-averse are likely to exhibit a stronger temporal contiguity effect
than the debt-tolerant, for losses but not for gains.
5.4 Study 1
Study 1 explored preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes (gains and losses)
when the sales [purchase] period of an item X varied according to the framework
developed in section 5.2.
For exploratory purposes, the study included an additional “gift/charity” condition.
Consequently, one group of participants were told that they will be receiving item X
as a gift instead of having to buy it (monetary losses condition), while another group
were told that they will be donating item X to charity instead of selling it (monetary
gains condition). These manipulations were implemented at t = 6 months because it
presents the most explicit test for the double-entry model.
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Recall that from the perspective of the double-entry model the preference to prepay
for consumption is triggered by the desire to buffer the disutility from monetary losses,
and enjoy consumption as if it were free. Likewise, for gains, the preference to collect
earnings in arrears is triggered by the desire to buffer the disutility from the obligation
to provide some product in the future, and to enjoy the earnings debt-free.
Since the gift is a free product, and the donation is voluntary, then there should be no
reason for these events to have an impact on the timing of monetary outcomes. In other
words, there should be no difference between the gift / charity conditions and their
respective baseline conditions. Therefore, by extension, there should be a stronger
preference for the later gains and earlier losses when item X is sold / purchased at t =
6 months as opposed to being received as gift / donated it to charity.
Participants
A sample of 199 UK residents recruited through Prolific Academic35 completed the
online survey. Participants averaged 33 years of age, with 57% holding a university
degree, 65% in full-time or part-time employment and 54% being females. The median
completion time was a little over 3 minutes. Participants who successfully completed
the survey were paid £0.5 upon completion.
Design and procedure
The survey comprised of three parts. Part one consisted of seven intertemporal
choices, each pertaining to a different condition. Half the participants were randomly
assigned to the monetary gains conditions, while the other half were assigned to the
monetary losses.
First, participants were presented with the standard intertemporal choice task.
Accordingly, they indicated whether they prefer to pay [receive] £100 in 3 or 9
months. The choices were presented graphically as shown in Figure 5.3.
35 A UK-based company that helps researchers to recruit online participants - https://prolific.ac/
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Figure 5.3 – Visual illustration of the standard task
Then, they were presented with the gift/charity condition. Participants were told that
they will be receiving item X as a gift [donating item X to charity] in 6 months. After
which they indicated whether they prefer to pay [receive] £100 in 3 or 9 months. The
choices were also presented graphically as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4 – Visual illustration of the gift / donation scenario
Finally, they were presented with the five purchase/sale conditions from Figure 5.2.
Participants were told that they will be buying [selling] an item X in t = 0, 3, 6, 9 or 12
months from today. After which they indicated whether they prefer to pay [receive]
£100 in exchange for X in 3 or 9 months. In line with other conditions, the choices
were also presented graphically. Figure 5.5 provides an example in which the purchase
[sale] of item X always preceded the monetary outcomes. Conditions 3 to 7 were
randomly presented to minimise carry over effects.
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Figure 5.5 – Visual illustration of a purchase [sale] condition
In part two, participants completed Scholten et al.’s 7-item debt battery. Following
their instructions, the choices were presented in order of increasing or decreasing
delay. Therefore, half the participants were randomly assigned to the increasing order
(i.e. choices presented sequentially from {0, 1} to {3, 4} – refer to Table 5.1), while
the other half were assigned to the decreasing one (i.e. from {3, 4} to {0, 1}).
Finally, in part three, participants self-reported their attitude towards debt using a 4-
item questionnaire developed by Walters et al. (2016), then provided some personal
information including their gender, age, education, employment and household
income.
The questionnaire consisted of the following: a) “I prefer to pay my debts as soon as
possible”, b) “I prefer to delay paying my debts if possible”, c) “having debt makes
me feel uncomfortable”, and d) “having debt doesn’t bother me”. Responses were
given on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, and
were reverse-coded for items b and d, such that a higher score on the scale refers to a
more positive, or less negative, attitude toward debt.
Scholten et al. used the questionnaire to examine the relation between the exhibited
debt attitude (using the debt battery), and the expressed one. Their findings revealed a
strong convergence between exhibited and expressed attitudes, with the debt-tolerant
and debt-averse expressing the least and most negative attitudes towards debt,
respectively. While those diagnosed as debt-takers fell somewhere in-between. It is
used in this study for the same purpose.
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Results
An analysis of the effect of manipulating the trade period of item X on the timing of
outcomes is presented first. Then, the classification results of the debt battery. The
section concludes with a comparative analysis of the preferences revealed by the debt-
tolerant and the debt-averse. To help the reader navigate through this study (and the
chapter in general) a summary of the key results is provided at the end of each
subsection.
A. Trade period of item X
The analysis in this section was carried out using a GEE model with a logit link
function, with the sign of monetary outcomes (gains or losses) and seven conditions
as predictors of the timing of monetary outcomes (earlier or later). The results were
analysed by calculating the proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains, and
later losses.
Table 5.2 presents the observed proportions along with the results of the pairwise
comparisons between the seven conditions.
Table 5.2 – Mean proportion choosing the earlier gains and later losses
Baseline Gift /charity Today 3-months 6-months 9-months 12-months
Gains .97a .89b .94a,b .90b .79c .48d .55d
Losses .36a,b .38a,b .35a .44b,c .47c .59d .57d
Note: Values not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05.
For gains, almost all the participants preferred the earlier outcomes in the baseline
condition, thereby revealing a robust positive time preference. However, this
preference diminished as the sales period of item X was deferred.
In comparison with the baseline condition, participants were 3%, 7%, 18%, 49% and
42% less likely to choose the earlier outcomes when item X was sold at t = 0, 3, 6, 9,
and 12 months, respectively. Therefore, most preferred the earlier outcomes when the
sale took place immediately or in the near future, but nearly half switched to the later
outcomes when the sale took place later.
113
Likewise, for losses, most preferred to pay earlier in the baseline condition, thereby
revealing a negative time preference. However, this preference diminished as the
purchase of item X was deferred.
Compared to the baseline condition, participants were 8%, 11%, 23% and 21% more
likely to choose the later losses when item Xwas purchased at t = 3, 6, 9 and 12 months
respectively, but 1% less likely to do so when Xwas purchased at t = 0. In other words,
like gains, participants revealed a strong preference for the earlier outcomes, but this
preference reversed when the purchase of item X was later.
A.1. Temporal contiguity effect
Figure 5.6 displays the mean proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains (left
panel) and later losses (right panel) for t = 0 vs. t = 12 months and t = 3 months vs. t
= 9 months. The results show that participants were more likely to choose the earlier
outcomes (gains and losses) for t = 0 and 3 months compared to t = 9 and 12 months
(all p’s < .05, see Table 5.2 above for details), thereby revealing a robust temporal
contiguity effect. Interestingly, this effect was stronger for gains than losses.
Figure 5.6 – Temporal contiguity effect
A.2. Cost-benefit sequence
For gains, participants were less likely to choose the earlier outcomes at t = 6 months
compared to the baseline condition (Mt=6 = .79 vs. MBaseline = .97). Therefore, there
was a significant preference for improvement in addition to the temporal contiguity
effect – i.e. some participants opted for item X to be delivered before collecting their
earnings. Conversely, for losses, participants were more likely to choose the later
outcomes at t = 6 months in comparison with the baseline condition (Mt=6 = .47 vs.
MBaseline = .36). Therefore, contrary to hypothesis H2 (and the predictions of the
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double-entry model), preferences for the timing of losses were not influenced by the
sequence of costs and benefits, but by the proximity of the purchase period to these
losses.
A.3. Gift / charity conditions
A comparison of the charity condition with the baseline condition revealed a small but
significantly stronger preference for the later gains when Xwas voluntarily given away
(MCharity = .89 vs. MBaseline = .97). Despite that, participants were less likely to choose
the later gains when X was donated as opposed to sold at t = 6 months ((MCharity = .89
vs. Mt=6 = .79). That is, there was a preference for improvement when item X was
given away to charity, but this preference was not as robust as the one observed when
X was sold. Therefore, supporting the predictions of the double-entry model.
For losses, participants showed no difference between the gift condition and the
baseline condition (MGift = .38 vs. MBaseline = .36). However, they were more likely to
choose the later losses when X was purchased at t = 6 months as opposed to being
offered as a gift (MGift = .38 vs. MBaseline = .47). While the former result supports the
double-entry model, the direction of the latter contradicts it.
Results 1: In summary, there was a robust temporal contiguity effect that was stronger
for gains than losses. There was also a preference for improvement for gains, but not
for losses.
B. Debt battery
Following Scholten et al. (2016), a k-means clustering algorithm was used to group
participants according to their choices on the debt battery36. Four groups emerged.
These groups correspond to the debt-tolerant, debt-averse, debt-takers and debt-
holders that were identified by the original study.
Figure 5.7 displays the choices made by these groups for each of the seven debt battery
items. The vertical axis displays the proportion of participants choosing the later
36 Recall that the algorithm uses an iterative process to group the input data into k clusters so as to
minimise the within-cluster variability and maximise the between-cluster one. To identify the optimal
k, we used Ketchen and Shook’s (1996) elbow method – see Appendix [A] in Chapter 4 for details.
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payments, while the horizontal one displays the seven items in increasing order of
delay. For example, the item (0, 1) refers to the choice between paying £100 today or
£100 in one year, while the item (2, 4) refers to the choice between paying £100 in
two or £100 in four years. Recall that the first four questions were designed to measure
the tendency to acquire debt, while the latter three to prolong it.
Figure 5.7 – Debt battery groups
Accordingly, the debt-averse were predominantly choosing the earlier payments.
Therefore, they neither wanted to acquire nor prolong the debt. In contrast, the debt-
tolerant were predominantly choosing the later payments, revealing a strong tendency
to acquire and hold on to debt. The debt-takers were highly inclined to pay later when
choosing between the immediate and the deferred payments (for t = 1, 2, 3 and 4
years), and to pay sooner when choosing between the two deferred payments.
Therefore, revealing a tendency to acquire but not to prolong debt. Conversely, the
debt-holders were more inclined to pay sooner when choosing between the immediate
and the deferred payments (particularly for t = 1, 2 and 3 years), and to pay later when
choosing between the two deferred payments. Thereby, revealing an aversion to the
acquisition of debt. However, once in debt, they would hold on to it.
In line with Scholten et al., the debt-averse scored the least on the self-reported attitude
towards debt (M = 1.56, SD = .52), followed by the debt-takers (M = 1.82, SD = .67),
the debt-holders (M = 2.21, SD = .80) and finally the debt-tolerant (M = 2.75, SD =
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.83). A Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons test confirmed that all the observed
differences were significant at the 5% level.
Table 5.3 presents the number of participants across the four debt battery group, split
by the condition they were assigned to in part one. Combined, the debt-tolerant and
debt-averse made up around 80% of the sample (N = 157 out of 199).
Table 5.3 – Distribution of the debt battery group split by gain-loss conditions
Debt-tolerant Debt-averse Debt-takers Debt-holders
Gains 36 37 11 15
Losses 34 50 3 13
Total 70 87 14 28
Percentage 35% 44% 7% 14%
C. Debt attitude by trade period interaction
Figure 5.8 displays the mean proportion of the debt-tolerant and debt-averse choosing
the earlier gains (left panel) and later losses (right panel) for the seven conditions.
Figure 5.8 – Debt attitude x Trade period interaction
As expected, for gains, the debt-averse and debt-tolerant were equally likely to choose
the earlier outcomes. This was true for each of the seven conditions (none of the
observed differences, if any, reached levels of significance). Accordingly, both groups
revealed a robust temporal contiguity effect, as well as a strong preference for
improvement.
This, however, was not the case for losses. First, as expected, the debt-averse were in
general less likely to choose the later outcomes than the debt-tolerant. In fact, most of
the debt-averse preferred the earlier outcomes, while most of the debt-tolerant
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preferred the later ones (MDA = .23 vs. MDT = .71). Second, the debt-averse were
significantly more likely to be influenced by the timing of item X. In fact, in
comparison with the baseline condition, they were 6%, 12%, 18%, 40% and 46% more
likely to choose the later losses at t = 0, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively. That is,
they revealed a strong temporal contiguity effect. In contrast, apart from t = 0, none of
the observed differences for the debt-tolerant group reached levels of significance (see
Table 5.4 for the pairwise comparisons).
Table 5.4 – Proportion of the debt-tolerant and debt-averse choosing the later losses
Baseline Gift /charity Today 3-months 6-months 9-months 12-months
Debt-
tolerant .74a .74a, .59b .68a,b .71a .79a .71a
Debt-
averse .04a .12a,b .10a,b .16b .22 b .44d .50d
Note: Values not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05.
In general, the debt-averse disliked the idea of paying later (as evidenced by the
baseline condition), but they disliked it less when the losses were in close proximity
with item X (nearly half the participants preferred the later payments when X was
purchased at t = 9 or 12 months). This indicates that the disutility experienced from
the deferred monetary losses was buffered by the proximity of the consumption
benefits to these losses.
Results 2: For gains, the debt-averse and debt-tolerant had similar preferences for the
timing of monetary outcomes. That is, both revealed a robust temporal contiguity
effect and a preference for improvement. For losses, the debt-tolerant showed little
variation across the seven condition, predominantly choosing the later outcomes. In
contrast, the debt-averse revealed a strong temporal contiguity effect.
Discussion
In general, preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes (gains and losses) were
strongly influenced by the timing of item X. This was evidenced by a gradually
increasing tendency to choose the later outcomes as the sale / purchase period of item
X was deferred. In other words, deferring the sale / purchase of item X diminished the
preference for the earlier gains, and strengthened the preference for the later losses.
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Essentially making participants more patient for gains, and less so for losses. These
results strongly support the temporal contiguity hypothesis, that people prefer to
experience the costs of a trade in close proximity to the benefits.
In addition, framing the choice as a decision between an improving and a declining
mixed sequence (as opposed to a choice between two simple outcomes) elicited a
stronger preference for the later gains and later losses. That is, there was a stronger
preference for the improving sequence for gains, and the declining sequence for losses.
The latter challenges the predictions of the double-entry model, and the literature
regarding preferences for sequences of outcomes (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993).
However, given the small number of participants assigned to the losses condition (N
= 100) and the size of this effect ~ 9%, it would be difficult to draw any meaningful
conclusions from this observation (this pattern, for instance, was not observed in
Studies 2 and 3).
Finally, as expected, there was no evidence that having different attitudes towards debt
(the obligation to make future payments) was predictive of preferences for the timing
of monetary gains. However, it was highly predictive of preferences for the timing of
losses. Participants who were diagnosed as debt-tolerant (i.e. those who generally
discount the disutility of delayed payments) were highly inclined to pay later
regardless of the timing of item X. Accordingly, their debt-tolerance was neither
moderated nor strengthened by expediting or deferring the purchase period of item X.
In contrast, those who were classified as debt-averse (i.e. those who generally amplify
the disutility of delayed payments) were less likely to choose the earlier losses as the
purchase period of X was deferred. Thereby providing strong evidence that the
disutility from the deferred losses was buffered by the benefits from consumption.
5.5 Study 2
This study differs from Study 1 in three ways. One, it explored preferences for the
timing of monetary outcomes when buying or selling a specific product, Green Energy
(“GE”) credits. Two, it introduced some variability between the monetary outcomes
to test the robustness of the contiguity effect. Therefore, some choices had smaller
later outcomes, some were equal, and some larger later (i.e. three levels of interest
rates: negative, zero and positive). Finally, the order of the standard task and scenario-
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based task were manipulated to counterbalance any presentation order effects.
Accordingly, for some participants the standard task preceded the scenario-based task,
and vice versa for others.
Participants
A sample of 199 UK residents recruited through Bilendi completed the online survey.
The data from 6 participants were excluded because of missing responses. Participants
averaged 47 years of age with 36% holding a university degree, 55% in full-time or
part-time employment and 42% being females. The median completion time was 10
minutes. Participants who successfully completed the survey were rewarded with
loyalty points that could be exchanged for products of their liking.
Design and procedure
Following a brief introduction, participants were randomly assigned to a monetary
gains or losses condition. Thereafter, half the participants completed the standard
intertemporal choice task, while the other half completed the scenario-based task.
Those who completed the standard task first, proceeded to complete the scenario task,
and vice versa. Table 5.5 summarises the four between-participants design.
Table 5.5 – Between-participants design for Study 2
Order of tasks presentation
Standard task Scenario task
Sign of the
monetary
outcomes
Gains Monetary gains with thestandard task presented first
Monetary gains with the scenario
task presented first
Losses Monetary losses with thestandard task presented first
Monetary losses with the
scenario task presented first
A. The standard task
Participants read the following instructions: “In the following questions you will be
asked to choose between paying [receiving] an earlier or a later sum of money. For
each question please select the payment you prefer to make [receive]. The payments
will change from one question to the next”.
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Following the instructions, participants responded to three randomised questions
corresponding to the subsequent levels of interest rates: -10%, 0% and 10% (see
subsection C below for details concerning the monetary amounts and interest rates).
Figure 5.9 provides an example. Note that the timeline was modified from Study 1 to
fit the context of the scenario.
Figure 5.9 – Graphical illustration of the standard task
B. The scenario task
Participants read the following scenario: “Imagine that individuals in the UK can now
buy or sell green energy credits in a regulated market to offset carbon emitted from
non-green energy consumption. In the following questions, you will be asked to
imagine that you have entered into a binding contract today to buy [sell] a number of
green energy credits in 2016. Each question is a choice between an earlier or a later
payment. Please select the payment you prefer to make [receive]. The payments, and
the timing of the green credits exchange will vary from one question to the next”.
Each participant was then randomly presented with five blocks of questions matching
the five periods from Figure 5.2 (refer to Table 5.6 for details). For instance, one block
consisted of the green energy credits being received [delivered] in March 2016 (i.e.
Condition 2 in Figure 5.2). In line with the standard task, each block consisted of three
randomised questions corresponding to the following levels of interest rates: -10%,
0% and 10%. Once participants responded to the three questions, they moved on to
the next block.
You can choose to make [receive] the payment in March 2016 or September 2016.
Please click on the BLUE box to select the payment you prefer to make [receive]. Once
selected, the box will turn GREEN.
Dec-15 Jan-16 Feb-16 Mar-16 Apr-16 May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16 Nov-16 Dec-16
Pay
[Receive]
£214
Pay
[Receive]
£225
OR
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Table 5.6 – Within-participants design for Study 2
GE credits
exchange date Description of condition
t = 0 December 2015 Credits delivered prior to the monetary outcomes
t = 3 months March 2016 Credits aligned with the earlier monetary outcomes
t = 6 months June 2016 Credits delivered in-between the monetary outcomes
t = 9 months September 2016 Credits aligned with the later monetary outcomes
t = 12 months December 2016 Credits delivered following the monetary outcomes
Figure 5.10 provides an example of the GE credits being received [delivered] in March
2016.
Figure 5.10 – Visual illustration of the scenario-based task
C. Monetary amounts
In total, each participant saw 18 pairs of choices, split across the six conditions and
three levels of interest rates (negative, zero and positive). To avoid repeating the same
monetary amounts across trials, 18 amounts ranging between £200 and £400 were
randomly generated (the “early amounts”). The three levels of interest rates (-10%,
0% and 10%) were then applied to the 18 early amounts to compute the delayed ones.
Nine amounts ranged between £200 and £300, while the other nine ranged between
£300 and £400. For each trial, one of the 18 pairs was randomly selected. Table 5.7
displays the earlier and later amounts for each level of interest rates.
Imagine that you have entered into a binding contract to sell [buy] green credits in March 2016.
You can choose to make [receive] the payment for these credits in March 2016 or September 2016.
Please click on the BLUE box to select the payment you prefer to make [receive]. Once selected,
the box will turn GREEN.
Dec-15 Jan-16 Feb-16 Mar-16 Apr-16 May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16 Nov-16 Dec-16
Pay
[Receive]
£320
Pay
[Receive]
£304
OR
Dec-15 Jan-16 Feb-16 Mar-16 Apr-16 May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16 Nov-16 Dec-16
GEC
received
[delivered]
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Table 5.7 – Price list for Study 2
Early amounts Delayed amounts
-10% 0% 10%
1 £214 £204 £214 £225
2 £221 £210 £221 £232
3 £237 £225 £237 £249
4 £241 £229 £241 £253
5 £249 £237 £249 £262
6 £252 £240 £252 £265
7 £258 £245 £258 £271
8 £269 £256 £269 £283
9 £273 £260 £273 £287
10 £316 £301 £316 £332
11 £320 £304 £320 £336
12 £327 £311 £327 £344
13 £338 £322 £338 £355
14 £343 £326 £343 £361
15 £347 £330 £347 £365
16 £353 £336 £353 £371
17 £360 £342 £360 £378
18 £371 £353 £371 £390
D. Other survey questions
Following the experimental tasks, participants self-reported their attitude towards
carbon offsetting and the environment. Specifically, towards: a) carbon offsetting as a
tool to reduce emissions and tackle climate change, b) buying carbon offsets, and c)
the environment in general. The purpose was to examine whether having a positive or
negative attitude towards the environment in general, and carbon offsetting in
particular had an impact on the timing of outcomes.
The items were adapted from a scale developed by Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010) to
measure people’s pro-environmental self-identity and pro-environmental behaviour.
These consisted of the following: a) “carbon off-setting can help reduce unavoidable
emissions”, b) “carbon offsetting can help tackle climate change”, c) “I am the type of
person who would buy carbon offsets”, d) “carbon offsetting is just another form of
taxation”, and e) “I think of myself as an environmentally-friendly consumer”.
Responses were given on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree,’ and were reverse-coded for item (d), such that a higher score on the
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scale refers to a more positive, or less negative, attitude toward carbon offsetting. The
5-items achieved an internal consistency Cronbach’s α of 0.8 with corrected item-total
correlations of .67, .69, .60, .36 and .36 for items (a) to (e), respectively. Accordingly,
I group items (a) to (c) together in a pro-carbon offsets index. The readjusted index
achieved an internal consistency Cronbach’s α of 0.85 with corrected item-total
correlations of .78, .78 and .61 for items (a) to (c), respectively.
Participants also completed Scholten et al.’s 7-item debt battery and Frederick’s
(2002) 3-item cognitive reflection test, before providing some personal information
including gender, age, education, employment status and household income.
Results
An analysis of the effect of manipulating the timing of GE credits exchange on
preferences for the timing of outcomes is presented first. This is followed by an
examination of these effects across the three levels of interest rates, and for the groups
identified by the debt battery. Particularly, the debt-tolerant and debt-averse.
In addition, analysis of the effect of task order, and whether having different attitudes
towards the environment and carbon offsetting had any influence on the timing of
outcomes are reproduced in Appendix A.
The statistical analysis in subsections A and B was carried out using a GEE model
with a logit link function, with the sign of the outcomes, presentation order, interest
rates and six conditions as predictors of the timing of monetary outcomes (earlier or
later). The results were analysed by calculating the proportion of participants choosing
the earlier gains, and later losses.
A. Trade period of GE credits
Table 5.8 presents the observed proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains
and later losses, for each of the six conditions. The table also reports the results of the
pairwise comparisons between these conditions.
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Table 5.8 – Mean proportion choosing the earlier gains and later losses
Baseline Dec-15 Mar-16 Jun-16 Sep-16 Dec-16
t =0 t =3 months t =6 months t =9 months t =12 months
Gains 0.68a 0.66a 0.67a 0.64a,b 0.60b,c 0.56c
Losses 0.54a 0.54a 0.57a,b 0.57a,b 0.61b 0.61b
Note: Values not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05.
In comparison with the baseline condition, participants were 2%, 1%, 4%, 8% and
11% less likely to choose the earlier gains for t = 0, 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively.
Therefore, indicating that preferences for the earlier gains declined (albeit moderately)
as the trade period of GE credits was deferred.
For losses, participants were 0%, 3%, 3%, 7% and 7% more likely to choose the later
outcomes for t = 0, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months relative to the baseline condition. Therefore,
as for gains, they revealed a moderate but significantly stronger preference for the later
outcomes when the GE credits were traded later.
A.1. Temporal contiguity effect
Figure 5.11 compares the choices for t = 0 and 3 months versus t = 9 and 12 months.
Unlike Study 1, these results reveal a weak preference for temporal contiguity between
the monetary outcomes and the timing of green credits delivery, for both gains and
losses. Despite that, for gains, the observed differences between the earlier periods (t
= 0 or 3 months) and the later periods (t = 9 or 12 months) were all statistically
significant (see Table 5.8 above for the pairwise comparisons). This, however, was
not the case for losses. Specifically, the differences between t = 3 months and t = 9 or
12 months did not reach levels of statistical significance.
Figure 5.11 – Temporal contiguity effect
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A.2. Cost-benefit sequence
There was no evidence of a preference for improvement for either gains or losses.
Participants were in general as likely to choose the earlier gains or later losses at t = 6
months and the baseline condition (refer to Table 5.8 above for details).
Results 3: Overall, there was a weak temporal contiguity effect for both gains and
losses, and no evidence of a preference for improvement.
B. Trade period by Interest rates interaction
Figure 5.12 displays the mean proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains
(left panel) and later losses (right panel) for the six conditions across the three levels
of interest rates (-10%, 0% and 10%).
Figure 5.12 – Trade period x Interest rates interaction
Overall, there was a diminishing preference for the earlier gains and later losses as the
interest rates increased from negative (MG = .90, ML = .91) to zero (MG = .72, ML =
.67) to positive (MG = .28, ML = .14). There was also very little variation observed
across the six conditions when the interest rates were either negative or positive,
indicating that participants were unaffected by the timing of GE exchange. Instead,
they were making choices that in general maximised their gains and minimised their
losses.
However, there was a robust temporal contiguity effect for both gains and losses when
the interest rates were zero. This was evidenced with a stronger preference for the
earlier outcomes at t = 0 and 3 months compared to t = 9 and 12 months (prop.
choosing the earlier gains: Mt = 0 = .76 vs. Mt = 12 = .61, p = .002, d = .15; Mt = 3 = .79
vs. Mt = 9 = .67, p = .008, d = .12; prop. choosing the later losses: Mt = 0 = .58 vs. Mt =
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12 = .76, p < .001, d = .18; Mt = 3 = .64 vs. Mt = 9 = .77, p = .008, d = .13). In addition,
there was no evidence of any significant differences between t = 0 and t = 3 months or
between t = 9 and 12 months.
Result 4: There was robust temporal contiguity effect onlywhen the interest rates were
zero.
C. Debt attitude
As in Study 1, a k-means clustering algorithm was used to group participants according
to their choices on the debt battery. Three groups emerged: the debt-tolerant, debt-
averse and debt-takers. Unlike Study 1, the debt-tolerant were by far the most
dominant group (68%), followed by the debt-averse (20%) and then the debt-takers
(9%) – see Table 5.9 below37. The pattern of choices revealed by each group was
similar to the ones observed in Figure 5.7 (refer to Study 1). That is, the debt-tolerant
preferred the later payments; the debt-averse preferred the earlier payments; the debt-
takers preferred the earlier payments when both payments were delayed, but the later
ones when the earlier payments were immediate.
Table 5.9 – Distribution of the debt battery group split by gain-loss conditions
Debt-tolerant Debt-averse Debt-takers
Gains 71 19 7
Losses 64 20 10
Total 135 39 17
Percentage 68% 20% 9%
Like Study 1, the following analysis was restricted to the debt-tolerant and debt-
averse. Statistical analysis was carried out using a GEE model with a logit link
function, with the sign of the outcomes, interest rates, six conditions and two debt
groups as predictors of the timing of monetary outcomes.
37 Nine participants exhibited multiple switching, therefore could not be assigned to any of the three
group.
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C.1. Debt attitude x Sign Interaction
In general, the debt-tolerant were more likely to choose the earlier gains and later
losses than the debt-averse (prop. choosing the earlier gains: MDT = .67 vs. MDA = .57;
prop. choosing the later losses: MDT = .63 vs. MDA = .37). However, these results
were qualified with a sign by debt group interaction (χ2 (2, 172) = 4.50, p = .034).
According to a pairwise comparisons test, the observed difference between the debt-
tolerant and debt-averse was not significant for gains (p = .10), but highly significant
for losses (p < .001). Therefore, as expected the debt-tolerant preferred the later losses,
while the debt-averse preferred the earlier ones.
C.2. Debt attitude x Interest rates interaction
These results were further qualified with an interaction between the sign, interest rates
and debt groups (χ2 (2, 172) = 11.46, p = .003). Figure 5.13 plots this interaction. The
left panel displays the choices for gains, while the right panel displays these choices
for losses.
Figure 5.13 – Debt attitude x Interest rates interaction
For gains, both the debt-tolerant and debt-averse revealed a stronger preference for the
earlier outcomes as the interest rates increased. However, the debt-tolerant were more
likely to choose the earlier outcomes when the interest rates were positive (p = .011)
– i.e. they were slightly more impatient.
For losses, the debt-tolerant preferred the later outcomes when the interest rates were
negative or zero, and the earlier ones when the rates were positive. Therefore, revealed
a strong desire to minimise costs (i.e. were sensitive to the increase in interest rates).
The debt-averse, on the other hand, were sensitive to the increase in interest rates (as
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evidenced by their declining preference for the later losses), and to the timing of these
losses as evidenced by their lower likelihood to choose the later outcomes when the
interest rates were negative (p < .001) or zero (p < .001). That is, they amplified the
disutility of the deferred losses to an extent that some of them were willing to pay
more money sooner than less money later.
C.3. Debt attitude by trade period interaction
As expected, there was a significant interaction between the sign of the outcomes, the
two debt groups and the six conditions (χ2 (5, 172) = 15.0, p = .010). Figure 5.14 plots
this interaction. The left panel displays the proportion of the debt-tolerant and debt-
averse choosing the earlier gains, while the right panel displays these proportions for
losses.
Figure 5.14 – Debt attitude x Trade period interaction
Monetary gains
Contrary to hypothesis H3, the debt-tolerant and debt-averse revealed different
preferences for the timing of monetary gains as the trade period of GE credits was
deferred. According to Figure 5.14 (refer to the left panel), the debt-tolerant were
equally inclined to choose the earlier outcomes for all six conditions (all p’s > .05).
Therefore, were generally unaffected by the timing of GE credits (this was true
irrespective of the level of interest rates).
Conversely, the debt-averse were 5% and 4% more likely to choose the earlier
outcomes at t = 0 and 3 months, but 4%, 12% and 16% less likely to do so at t = 6, 9
and 12 months relative to the baseline condition. In other words, they revealed a
stronger preference for the earlier gains when the period of GE credits exchange was
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early, and the later ones when the exchange was delayed (i.e. at t = 9 and 12 months).
These effects were even more robust when the interest rates were zero. In comparison
with the baseline condition, the debt-averse were 10% and 5% more likely to choose
the earlier outcomes at t = 0 and 3 months, but 15%, 40% and 40% less likely to do so
at t = 6, 9 and 12 months. Therefore, the debt-averse revealed both a strong temporal
contiguity effect, and a strong preference for improvement.
Monetary losses
For losses, the debt-tolerant were equally inclined to choose the later outcomes for all
six conditions (all p’s > .05). Therefore, were also unaffected by the timing of GE
credits exchange. Like gains, this was true irrespective of the level of interest rates. In
contrast, the debt-avers were 5% less likely to choose the later outcomes at t = 0, and
10%more likely to do so at t = 3, 6, 9 and 12 months relative to the baseline condition.
As with gains, these effects were more robust when the interest rates were zero. That
is, the debt-averse were 5% less likely to choose the later outcomes at t = 0, 16% more
likely to do so at t = 3 and 6 months, and 26% more likely to do so at t = 9 and 12
months.
In line with Study 1, these results suggest that the debt-averse disliked the deferred
losses in general. However, they disliked them less when these losses were strongly
associated with consumption. Interestingly, buying the GE credits before paying for
them (t = 0) further amplified the disutility of the deferred payments in comparison
with the baseline condition.
Result 5: The debt-averse revealed a strong temporal contiguity effect for both gains
and losses, especially when the interest rates were zero. In contrast, the debt-tolerant
were unaffected by the timing of GE credits, predominantly choosing to maximise their
gains and minimise their losses.
Discussion
Study 2 explored preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes (gains and losses)
in a trading context, whereby individuals buy and sell a commodity (GE credits) that
can be used to offset carbon emissions. Specifically, when the exchange period
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(periods t = 0 to t = 12 months) and future price (levels of interest rates) of this
commodity varied.
Overall, there was a robust temporal contiguity effect for both gains and losses, but
only when the price of GE credits was the same in the earlier and later periods –
thereby replicating the results of Study 1. However, when prices varied, participants
generally opted for the larger gains and smaller losses. That is, they were more likely
to choose the earlier gains and later losses when the interest rates were negative rates,
and vice versa when the rates were positive rates. These results suggest that people
care more about their financial welfare as opposed to their hedonic welfare when
contiguity is financially costly.
This was particularly true for participants diagnosed as debt-tolerant as they were in
general unaffected by the timing of GE credits, but strongly inclined to choose the
later gains and earlier losses as the interest rates increased. In contrast, the debt-averse
revealed a stronger preference for the later gains and losses when the exchange period
was deferred. This effect, however, was more robust when the earlier and later
outcomes were the same.
Studies 1 and 2 were designed to test the temporal contiguity effect when making
financial decisions on an individual level. However, Chapters 3 and 4 provided
evidence that people use similar mental accounting rules to make financial decisions
on a communal level. Accordingly, the aim of the following study is to test the
temporal contiguity effect using the same setup from Study 2, but with a modified
scenario to reflect the communal nature of the GE credits exchange. Specifically,
participants were told that the UK government is launching a green energy scheme in
which counties consuming more non-green energy than the national per person
average will have to buy GE credits to offset their excess carbon emissions, while
counties consuming less than the national average can sell these GE credits.
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5.6 Study 3
Participants
A sample of 410 UK residents were recruited through Bilendi. They averaged 53 years
of age, with 40% holding a university degree, 57% in full-time or part-time
employment, 60% earning a household income between £20k and £60k, and 37%
being females. The median completion time of the survey was 11 minutes. Participants
who successfully completed the survey were rewarded with loyalty points that could
be exchanged for products of their liking.
Design and procedure
Following a brief introduction, participants were randomly assigned to a monetary
gains or losses condition. As in Study 2, half the participants completed the standard
task first and the scenario task afterwards, while the other half completed the scenario
task first and the standard task afterwards.
A. The standard task
The instruction to the task read as follows: “Imagine a UK county that has a choice
between paying [receiving] an earlier or a later sum of money to [from] the
government. For each of the following questions, please select the amount you think
the county should pay [receive]. The amounts will change from one question to the
next.”
Participants then responded to three randomised questions corresponding to the
following levels of interest rates: -10%, 0% and 10%. Figure 5.15 provides an
example.
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Figure 5.15 – Visual illustration of the standard task
B. The scenario task
The instructions to the scenario task read as follows: “Imagine that the UK government
is launching a green energy scheme to combat the looming threat of climate change.
As a result, counties consuming more non-green energy than the national per person
average will have to buy green energy credits to offset the excess greenhouse gases
emitted. Meanwhile, counties consuming less than the national average can sell these
green energy credits.”
In addition to the written instructions, they were provided with the following diagram
to explain how the green energy credits scheme would work.
Figure 5.16 – Visual illustration of the green energy credits scheme
Participants assigned to the losses conditions were then told that the county in question
was consuming more non-green energy than the national per person average. As a
result, the county will be entering into a binding contract today to buy a number of
green energy credits. Conversely, those assigned to the gains conditions were told
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that the county was consuming less non-green energy than the national per person
average. As a result, the county will be entering into a binding contract today to sell
a number of green energy credits. In both cases, participants were told that the sale
and purchase of these energy credits will take place through a centralised market
regulated by the government.
Following these instructions, each participant was randomly presented with five
blocks identical to the ones used in Study 2. Each block consisted of three randomised
questions corresponding to the following levels of interest rates: -10%, 0% and 10%.
Figure 5.17 provides an example a county purchasing green energy credits in June
2016.
Figure 5.17 – Visual illustration of the scenario-based task
C. Monetary amounts
As in Study 2, 18 amounts ranging between £50 and £90 were randomly generated
(the “early amounts”), then compounded using the three levels of interest rates (-10%,
0% and 10%) to compute the delayed amounts. Only one of the 18 pairs was randomly
selected for each trial (choice). Table 5.10 displays the amounts used.
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Table 5.10 – Price list for Study 3
Early amounts Delayed amounts
-10% 0% 10%
1 £53 £50 £53 £56
2 £57 £54 £57 £60
3 £59 £56 £59 £62
4 £60 £57 £60 £63
5 £61 £58 £61 £64
6 £63 £60 £63 £66
7 £65 £62 £65 £68
8 £66 £63 £66 £69
9 £71 £68 £71 £75
10 £73 £69 £73 £77
11 £75 £71 £75 £79
12 £76 £72 £76 £80
13 £77 £73 £77 £81
14 £78 £74 £78 £82
15 £81 £77 £81 £85
16 £84 £80 £84 £88
17 £89 £85 £89 £94
18 £94 £89 £94 £99
Participants also completed Scholten et al.’s 7-item debt battery, Walters et al.’s
(2016) 4-item self-reported attitude towards debt, and Frederick’s (2002) 3-item
cognitive reflection test, before providing some personal information including their
gender, age, education, employment status and household income.
Results
The overall effect of manipulating the timing of GE credits exchange on preferences
for the timing of outcomes is analysed first. This is followed by an examination of
these effects across the three levels of interest rates, and for the groups identified by
the debt battery. Particularly, the debt-tolerant and debt-averse. As in Study 2, the
analysis of the task order is reproduced in Appendix B.
All reported statistical results in subsection A were carried out using a GEE model
with a logit link function, with the sign of the outcomes, presentation order, interest
rates and six conditions as predictors of the timing of monetary outcomes (earlier or
later). The results were analysed by calculating the proportion of participants choosing
the earlier gains and later losses.
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A. Trade period of GE credits
Table 5.11 presents the proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains and later
losses, along with the results of the pairwise comparisons tests between the six
conditions.
Table 5.11 – Mean proportion choosing the earlier gains and later losses
Baseline Dec-15 Mar-16 Jun-16 Sep-16 Dec-16
t = 0 t = 3 months t = 6 months t = 9 months t = 12 months
Gains 0.63a 0.70b 0.68b 0.50c 0.40d 0.44d
Losses 0.57a 0.53a,b 0.51b 0.56a 0.66c 0.64c
Note: Values not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05.
Preferences for the timing of monetary outcomes were strongly influenced by the
timing of GE credits trade, for both gains and losses. In comparison with the baseline
condition, participants were 7% and 5% more likely to choose the earlier gains when
the credits were traded at t = 0 and 3 months, but 13%, 23% and 19% less likely to do
so when the trade was scheduled for t = 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively.
For losses, participants were 4%, 7% and 1% less likely to choose the later outcomes
when the trade was scheduled for t = 0, 3 and 6 months, but 9% and 7% more likely
to do so for t = 9 and 12 months, respectively. Therefore, like Studies 1 and 2 there
was a diminishing preference for the earlier gains and an increasing preference for the
later losses, as the period of benefits (GE credits) was deferred.
A.1. Temporal contiguity effect
Figure 5.18 compares the choices at t = 0 and 3 months with t = 9 and 12 months. It
reveals a robust preference for temporal contiguity between the monetary outcomes
and the period of GE credits exchange. That is, participants were more likely to choose
the earlier outcomes for t = 0 and 3 months, and the later ones for t = 9 and 12 months
(refer to Table 5.11 for the pairwise comparisons). As in Study 1, this effect was
stronger for gains than losses.
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Figure 5.18 – Temporal contiguity effect
A.2. Cost-benefit sequence
For gains, participants were more likely to choose the later outcomes when the
exchange was scheduled for t = 6 months relative to the baseline condition. Therefore,
as in Study 1, they revealed a preference for having costs (the sale of GE credits)
precede benefits (monetary earnings) – i.e. a preference for improvement.
In contrast, for losses, participants were equally likely to choose the later outcomes at
t = 6 months and the baseline condition. Therefore, as in Studies 1 and 2, there was no
evidence of a preference for improvement, indicating that preferences for the timing
of losses were mostly driven by the desire for temporal contiguity.
Result 6: There was a robust temporal contiguity effect that was stronger for gains
than losses. In addition, for gains there was also evidence of a preference for
improvement.
A.3. Trade period of GE credits x Interest rates interaction
Figure 5.19 displays the mean proportion of participants choosing the earlier gains
(left panel) and later losses (right panel) for the six conditions across the three levels
of interest rates (-10%, 0% and 10%).
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t = 0 t = 12 t = 3 t = 9
Pro
por
tio
n 
cho
osi
ng 
the
 ea
rlie
r
out
com
es
Gains
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t = 0 t = 12 t = 3 t = 9
Pro
por
tio
n 
cho
osi
ng 
the
 lat
er
out
com
es
Losses
137
Figure 5.19 – Trade period x Interest rates interaction
Overall, there was a declining preference for the early gains and later losses as the
interest rates increased from negative (MG = .74, ML = .81) to zero (MG = .59, ML =
.66) to positive (MG = .34, ML = .26).
However, unlike Study 2 deferring the period of GE credits exchange elicited a
stronger preference for the later outcomes, regardless of sign or level of interest rates.
In fact, there was no evidence of an interaction between the sign, interest rates and six
conditions (χ2 (10, 410) = 11.25, p = .338).
Accordingly, there was a significant temporal contiguity effect for both gains and loss
across all levels of interest rates, as well as a strong preference for improvement in the
case of monetary gains. These effects were highly robust when the interest rates were
zero, and were stronger for gains than losses at every level of interest rates.
Result 7: there was a significant temporal contiguity effect irrespective of the sign or
level of interest rates.
B. Debt battery
As in Studies 1 and 2, we use a k-means clustering algorithm to group participants
according to their debt battery choices. Four groups emerged: the debt-tolerant (68%),
debt-averse (19%), debt-takers (8%) and debt-holders (5%). Coincidentally, the
observed proportions for the first three groups were identical to the ones from Study
2.
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Table 5.12 – Distribution of the debt battery group split by gain-loss conditions
Debt-tolerant Debt-averse Debt-takers Debt-holders
Gains 128 40 22 13
Losses 152 36 11 8
Total 280 76 33 21
Percentage 68% 19% 8% 5%
The pattern of choices revealed by each group was similar to the ones observed in
Figure 5.7 (refer to subsection B in Study 1). That is, the debt-tolerant preferred the
later payments; the debt-averse preferred the earlier payments; the debt-takers
preferred the earlier payments when both payments were delayed, but the later ones
when the earlier payments were immediate; and finally the debt-holders preferred the
later payments when both payments were delayed, but the earlier ones when the earlier
payments were immediate.
As expected, the debt-averse scored the least on the self-reported attitude towards debt
(M = 1.65, SD = .60), followed by the debt-takers (M = 1.92, SD = .65), the debt-
tolerant (M = 2.01, SD = .86) and finally the debt-holders (M = 2.18, SD = .90).
However, according to a Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons test only the difference
between the debt-averse and debt-tolerant, and between the debt-averse and debt-
holders reached levels of significance.
Like Studies 1 and 2, the following analysis was restricted to the debt-tolerant and
debt-averse.
B.1. Debt attitude by Sign interaction
On average, the debt-tolerant were more likely to choose the earlier gains and later
losses than the debt-averse. However, this difference was much more evident for
losses than gains (prop. choosing the later losses: MDT = .63 vs. MDA = .39, p < .001;
prop. choosing the earlier gains: MDT = .58 vs. MDA = .47, p = .003).
B.2. Debt attitude by Interest rates interaction
Figure 5.20 plots the sign, debt groups and interest rates interaction. Interestingly, the
observed patterns are similar to the ones from Study 2, for both gains and losses.
However, for gains, the main difference between the debt-tolerant and debt-averse was
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observed when the interest rates were zero (p = .002) as opposed to when the rates
were positive (as in Study 2). This was mainly because the debt-averse were more
likely to be influenced by the timing of GE credits exchange when the earlier and later
outcomes were equal.
Figure 5.20 – Debt attitude x Interest rates interaction
B.3. Debt attitude by Trade period interaction
Contrary to Studies 1 and 2, there was no evidence of an interaction between the sign,
debt groups and six conditions (χ2 (5, 356) = 8.12, p = .149) – see Figure 5.21 below.
Figure 5.21 – Debt attitude x Trade period interaction
In general, both the debt-tolerant and debt-averse in the gains and losses conditions
were significantly influenced by the timing of GE credits exchange. Relative to the
baseline condition, the debt-tolerant were 6% and 2% more likely to choose the earlier
gains for t = 0 and 3 months, but 10%, 24% and 20% less likely to do so for t = 6, 9
and 12 months, respectively. Likewise, the debt-averse were 8% and 10% more likely
to choose the earlier gains for t = 0 and 3 months, and 19%, 19% and 17% less likely
to do so for t = 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively. Therefore, both groups revealed a
diminishing preference for the earlier gains as the period of GE credits exchange was
deferred. Specifically, both groups revealed a strong contiguity effect (as evidenced
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by their choice at t = 0 and 3 months compared to t = 9 and 12 months), and both
groups revealed a preference for having costs precede the benefits (as evidenced by
their choices at t = 6 months relative to the baseline condition). Although, the latter
effect was stronger for the debt-averse.
Result 8: For gains, there was no evidence that the timing of GE credits exchange
influenced the choices of the debt-tolerant and debt-averse differently, which is
consistent with Study 1 but not Study 2.
For losses, the debt-tolerant were 2%, 7% and 3% less likely to choose the later
outcomes for t = 0, 3 and 6 months, but 7% and 5% more likely to do so for t = 9 and
12 months, respectively. While the debt-averse were 18%, 6% and 3% less likely to
choose the later outcomes for t = 0, 3 and 6 months, but 13% and 8% more likely to
do so for t = 9 and 12 months, respectively. Particularly interesting is the large drop
observed at t = 0 for the debt-averse. It indicates (as in Study 2) that buying the GE
credits before paying for them further amplified the disutility of the deferred payments.
Apart from that, the timing of GE credits exchange had a similar effect on the choices
of the two debt groups. That is, both groups revealed a stronger preference for the later
losses as the period of GE credits exchange was deferred. Specifically, both groups
revealed a significant contiguity effect. Albeit, this effect was stronger for the debt-
averse.
Result 9: The debt-tolerant preferred the later losses, and this preference strengthened
when the GE credits were exchanged later (t = 9 or 12 months). In contrast, the debt-
averse preferred the earlier losses, and more so when the GE credits were exchanged
sooner (t = 0 or 3 months). However, this preference was moderated by the benefits
when the exchange period was deferred (t = 9 or 12 months).
Discussion
In general, the results of Study 3 replicated the temporal contiguity effect observed in
Studies 1 and 2. However, unlike Study 2, this effect persisted for the negative and
positive interest rates. That is, participants in Study 3 were more susceptible to the
timing of GE credits manipulation, and overall less likely to maximise gains and
minimise losses relative to Study 2 (i.e. less patient for gains and losses). Two
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explanations are offered. One, the range of monetary outcomes was significantly
smaller in study 3 (£50 to £90) than Study 2 (£200 to £400), thereby triggering a
magnitude effect – such that small outcomes are discounted more than large ones (e.g.
Benzoin et al., 1989; Shelly, 1993). Two, participants in Study 3 were making choices
on behalf of a UK county (i.e. communal decision) as opposed to themselves (personal
decision). As a result, they may have been more inclined to make decisions from a
hedonic perspective as opposed to a financial one.
As in Study 1, there was a stronger contiguity effect for gains than losses, and a
stronger preference for costs to precede the benefits (i.e. a preference for
improvement) for gains but not for losses. It is not entirely clear why participants made
choices in such a manner. It could be that non-monetary benefits depreciate at a lower
rate than monetary ones. Therefore, there is more residual utility from nonmonetary
benefits to offset the outstanding payment. It could also be that there is a stronger
incentive to enjoy money rather than consumption debt-free because people are more
accustomed to the idea of consumption on credit, and to receive earnings following
the completion of  a job or a task. Finally, it could be that the absence of information
about the duration of consumption induced some participants to perceive the
nonmonetary benefit as a durable good.
Finally, in line with Studies 1 and 2, the debt-averse and debt-tolerant differed in their
preferences for the timing of losses. The debt-averse preferred the earlier losses in
general. This preference was accentuatedwhen GE credits were received before being
paid for, andmoderatedwhen the period of GE credits was deferred. The debt-tolerant,
on the other hand, preferred the later losses, and more so when the GE credits were
exchanged later.
5.7 General discussion
The research in this chapter was motivated by three objectives. One, to test the
consistency of the preferences observed in Chapter 2 using a multi-period framework.
Two, to test the consistency of these preferences across domains: personal (Studies 1
and 2) and communal (Study 3). Three, to gain an understanding of how people with
different attitudes towards debt evaluate cost-benefit trade-offs.
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Temporal contiguity – In general, all three studies revealed a robust temporal
contiguity effect for both gains and losses – i.e. a preference to experience the costs
and benefits of a trade in close proximity. This evidence has two implications. One,
the preference to temporally align the costs and benefits is not a matter of a default
option bias, but the product of a mental accounting process whereby temporal
separation results in the disassociation of costs from benefits. An event that can be
hedonically costly if benefits precede costs (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). Two,
people reveal the same biases when making financial decisions on a personal and
communal level – this, in fact, may be more robust for communal decisions, as
evidence by Study 3. These findings suggest that people in general dislike borrowing
from the future to consume more today, both on a personal (e.g. borrowing from a
pension plan) and a communal level (e.g. borrowing against future shale gas revenues).
This is consistent with the findings of Meissner (2014) who observed significant
under-consumption when borrowing is necessary in order to consume optimally.
Sequence of outcomes – Both Studies 1 and 3 revealed a preference for improvement
in the case of monetary gains, but not losses. The latter appears to be inconsistent with
the predictions of the double-entry model, that people prefer to prepay for
consumption. One possible explanation for this inconsistency (and asymmetry
between gains and losses) is the (intended) absence of any explicit information about
the duration of consumption. Prior research that reported a preference for prepayment
provided explicit information about the consumption interval (e.g. Hirst et al., 1994;
Patrick and Park, 2006, Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). Accordingly, it would be
worthwhile in the future to test whether providing explicit information about the
duration of consumption would trigger a stronger preference for prepayment.
Attitude towards debt – There were systematic differences between the debt-tolerant
and debt-averse for losses, but not for gains. The debt-tolerant were in general making
sensible financial decisions that are consistent with the predictions of the standard
economic model. Especially when they were making personal decisions.
Consequently, their choices were not strongly influenced by the trade period of
consumption. In contrast, the debt-averse disliked the idea of paying later, and more
so when the consumption benefits preceded the costs. However, this aversion was
moderated when the consumption benefits were deferred. In other words, they disliked
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the later losses less when these were strongly associated (coupled) with the benefits.
This evidence suggests that the debt-averse are highly prone to experience the pain of
paying, but this pain could be diminished by situational factors that strongly couple
the costs to the benefits.
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5.8 Appendix A - Study 2
Presentation order
On average, participants were more likely to choose the earlier gains and later losses
when the standard intertemporal choice task preceded the scenario-based task (prop.
choosing earlier gains: Mstandard_task = .67 vs. Mscenario_task = .61; prop. choosing later
losses: Mstandard_task = .56 vs. Mscenario_task = .58). Despite that, there was no evidence of
a significant presentation order effect (χ2 (1, 199) = 2.48, p = .115) and no evidence of
a sign by presentation order interaction (χ2 (1, 199) = .389, p = .533). These results,
however, were qualified with a significant interaction between the presentation order,
the sign of the outcomes and the six condition (χ2 (5, 199) = 25.5, p < .001).
Figure 5.22 compares the choices at t = 0 versus t = 12 months and t = 3 months versus
t = 9 months, for gains (top panels) and losses (bottom panels), when the standard task
either preceded or followed the scenario-based task. Note that the labels on the
horizontal axis refer to the presentation order. Therefore, the label “standard task”
means that it was presented before the scenario-based task, and vice versa.
Figure 5.22 – Presentation order – Study 2
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I analyse the data of the gains conditions first. According to the top left panel, there
was a stronger preference for the earlier gains at t = 0 than t = 12 months, regardless
of the presentation order (standard task: Mt = 0 = .69 vs. Mt = 12 = .60, p = .002; scenario-
based task: Mt = 0 = .64 vs. Mt = 12 = .54, p = .002). In contrast, the top right panel
revealed a stronger preference for the earlier gains at t = 3 months than t = 9 months
when the standard task preceded the scenario-based task (Mt = 3 = .72 vs. Mt = 9 = .59,
p = .003), but not when the scenario-based task was presented first.
For losses, both panels revealed an interaction between the timing of GE credits
exchange and the presentation order. According to the bottom left panel, there was no
difference between t = 0 and t = 12 months when the standard task was presented first.
However, there was a stronger preference for the later losses at t = 12 months when
the scenario-based task was presented first (Mt = 0 = .51 vs. Mt = 12 = .64, p = .027).
Conversely, the bottom right panel revealed a marginally stronger preference for the
later losses at t = 9 months compared to t = 3 months, when the standard task preceded
the scenario-based task (Mt = 3 = .56 vs. Mt = 9 = .64, p = .074), but no difference
between the two timings when the scenario-based task was presented first.
Despite these interactions, the lack of consistency in the observed patterns suggests
that these effects were not systematic. Moreover, there was no evidence of a significant
interaction between the sign, timing of GE credits trade, and presentation order in
Study 3.
Self-reported attitude towards the environment and carbon offsetting
Participants self-reported their attitude towards carbon offsetting and the environment
on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Error!
Reference source not found. presents the proportion of participants who self-reported
a negative (rating < 3), neutral (rating = 3) and positive (rating > 3) attitude.
In general, participants viewed themselves as environmentally friendly consumers
(item e, avg. rating > 3). They also believed that carbon offsetting can help reduce
harmful emissions and tackle problems of climate changes (items a and b, avg. rating
> 3). However, they were not strongly inclined to buy carbon offsets (item c, avg.
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rating < 3), and some even perceived carbon offsetting as another form of taxation
(item d, avg. rating < 3).
Table 5.13 – Self-reported attitude towards carbon offsetting and the environment
Negative
(rating < 3)
Neutral
(rating = 3)
Positive
(rating > 3)
Average rating
Pro-carbon index* .32 .26 .42 3.00
Item (a) .22 .37 .41 3.17
Item (b) .21 .36 .43 3.20
Item (c) .38 .43 .19 2.65
Item (d)** .13 .49 .38 2.62
Item (e) .08 .32 .60 3.61
* The index consisted of items (a), (b) and (c)
** Item (d) was reverse coded such that a higher score on the scale refers to a more positive, or less
negative, attitude toward carbon offsetting
For losses, participants who revealed a positive attitude towards carbon offsetting (i.e.
scored more than the average on the pro-carbon index) were more likely to choose the
later outcomes than those who were neutral or negative (MPos = .60 vs. MNeutral = .54
vs. MNeg = .57). In contrast, for gains, these participants were less likely to choose the
earlier outcomes compared to those who were neutral or negative (MPos = .68 vs.
MNeutral = .64 vs. MNeg = .60). Therefore, having a positive attitude towards carbon
offsetting elicited a stronger preference for the later losses and earlier gains. However,
these differences were not statistically significant.
In addition, for losses, participants who viewed themselves as environmentally
friendly were less likely to choose the later outcomes than those who were neutral or
negative (MPos = .60 vs. MNeutral = .54 vs. MNeg = .44). On the other hand, for gains,
participants were equally inclined to choose the earlier outcomes, irrespective of their
perceived friendliness towards the environmental (MPos = .63 vs. MNeutral = .65 vs. MNeg
= .64). Therefore, being environmentally friendly elicited a stronger preference for the
earlier losses. However, there was no evidence of sign by item (e) interaction (χ2 (2,
199) = 3.76, p = .152), possibly because of the small proportion of participants who
self-reported a negative attitude (~ 8%).
Finally, for losses, participants who viewed carbon offsets as another form of taxation
(i.e. viewed them negatively), were more likely to choose the later outcomes compared
to those who did not. In particular, when the interest rates were zero (MPos = .69 vs.
147
MNeutral = .62 vs. MNeg = .95) – refer to the right panel of Error! Reference source
not found. below. In contrast, there was no evidence of any significant differences
between the three groups for gains. These results were confirmed with a significant
interaction between the sign of the outcomes, level of interest rates and item (d) (χ2 (2,
199) = 16.44, p = .036).
Overall, these results suggest that having a negative attitude towards the environment
in general, and towards carbon offsetting in particular, might have elicited a stronger
preference for the later losses.
Figure 5.23 – Sign x Interest rates x Item (d) interaction
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5.9 Appendix B - Study 3
Presentation order
As in Study 2, participants were, on average, more likely to choose the earlier gains
and the later losses when the standard intertemporal choice task was presented before
the scenario-based task (prop. choosing the earlier gains: Mstandard_task = .58 vs
Mscenario_task = .52; prop. choosing the later losses: Mstandard_task = .62 vs Mscenario_task =
.55). This was evidenced with a significant presentation order effect (χ2 (1, 410) = 10.0,
p = .001).
Unlike Study 2, there was no evidence of a significant interaction between the sign,
timing of GE credits trade, and presentation order (χ2 (5, 410) = 10.4, p = .063). Figure
5.24 compares the choices at t = 0 versus t = 12 months and t = 3 months versus t = 9
months, for gains (top panels) and losses (bottom panels), when the standard task
either preceded or followed the scenario-based task.
Figure 5.24 – Presentation order – Study 3
As shown by Figure 5.24, the presentation order had no impact on the choices made
by participants assigned to the gains conditions, and a marginal impact on the choices
made by those assigned to the losses conditions. For gains, preferences for the timing
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Standard task Scenario taskPro
por
tio
n 
cho
osi
ng 
the
 ea
rlie
r
out
com
es
Gains t = 0
t = 12
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Standard task Scenario taskPr
opo
rtio
n 
cho
osi
ng 
the
 lat
er
out
com
es
Losses t = 0
t = 12
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Standard task Scenario taskPro
por
tio
n 
cho
osi
ng 
the
 ea
rlie
r
out
com
es
Gains t = 3
t = 9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Standard task Scenario taskPr
opo
rtio
n 
cho
osi
ng 
the
 lat
er
out
com
es
Losses t = 3
t = 9
149
of outcomes were determined solely by the timing of GE credits exchange. On the
other hand, for losses, the observed difference between t = 0 and t = 12 months
diminished slightly when the scenario-based was presented first. Despite that, this
difference was still significant (Mt = 0 = .51 vs. Mt = 12 = .59, p = .003). Conversely, the
observed difference between t = 3 and t = 9 months diminished slightly when the
standard task was presented first. However, this difference was still highly significant
(Mt = 3 = .55 vs. Mt = 12 = .67, p < .001). Therefore, manipulating the presentation order
did not influence the preferences for the timing of outcomes in a substantial way.
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6 CHAPTER SIX
Ordinary citizens in different parts of the world have been taking active roles in
deciding how and (possibly when) their taxes are spent, and government benefits
distributed. Despite that, there is a significant lack of understating in the literature (and
possibly among policy makers) how such decisions are made. To that end, this thesis
presented a series of studies examining how ordinary citizens make (or want to make)
communal financial decisions. The aim was to learn whether their communal
preferences are similar to the ones they would have when making decisions for
themselves as individuals. Moreover, the thesis asked if the double-entry model, a
well-supported theory of individual preferences, can also explain communal
preferences.
More specifically, this thesis examined people’s preferences for the timing of
monetary outcomes (gain and losses) in social and personal contexts, across several
domains, and under different conditions. For instance, Chapter 3 investigated whether
the type and duration of communal projects, and whether the consumption period of
benefits from these projects has an impact on the preferred timing of monetary losses.
While several studies have already addressed the first question in the domain of private
consumption (e.g. Hirst et al., 1994; Patrick & Park, 2006; Prelec & Loewenstein,
1998), none have done so in the domain of communal consumption. Furthermore,
none have yet explicitly examined the impact of manipulating the period of
consumption on the timing of payments. In general, the evidence suggested that
people dislike post-consumption payments even when it is economically preferable to
do so. Instead, they prefer to prepay for short-lived projects (a duration effect), and to
align the timing of payments to the period of consumption of long-lived ones (an
alignment effect). Therefore, supporting the evidence from the private goods literature,
and the predictions of the double-entry model in the domain of losses.
Chapter 4, extended the investigation of the alignment effect to the domain of
monetary gains. That is, the chapter explored preferences for the timing of monetary
gains and losses in exchange for communal services that were either exchanged in the
near or distant future. It also evaluated the divergence in preferences when individuals
make decisions on behalf of their own community and other people’s communities.
The studies in this chapter are unique in two ways. One, preferences for the timing of
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monetary gains and losses were examined using the same context and framework.
Two, these preferences were assessed for decisions that people make for themselves
and for others. Overall, the results revealed a robust temporal alignment effect for both
gains and losses; and for people making decisions on behalf of their own counties and
the counties of others. Interestingly, there were no qualitative differences among
participants making choices for themselves and others in the losses condition. This,
however, was not the case for gains. One group, the contrarians, were more likely to
be present among participants making decisions on behalf of other counties. This
group of participants preferred to receive the smaller monetary gains irrespective of
the timing of these outcomes. At first, the choices of the contrarians appeared to be
the result of misconception among participants. However, further analysis revealed
that these participants were in fact “altruists” making choices that they perceived to be
socially equitable – i.e. choosing to minimise the costs to the county buying the
communal services, but maintaining an acceptable payoff to the county selling these
services. These findings are consistent with those from De Dreu et al. (1994) and De
Vries (1991).
Finally, Chapter 5 studied the timing preferences for monetary outcomes in a
multiperiod setup that considered all possible combinations of cost-benefit sequences.
The main purpose was to test whether the mental association of costs with benefits is
facilitated by the temporal proximity (contiguity) of these costs and benefits. In
addition, the chapter examined whether attitude towards debt (debt tolerance vs. debt
aversion) – elicited using a novel diagnostic tool developed by Scholten et al. (2016)
– is predictive of preferences for the timing of losses. Two major results emerged.
One, there was a robust contiguity effect evidenced by a preference to experience the
costs and benefits of a trade in close proximity. Two, this effect was much more robust
for the debt-averse than the debt-tolerant.
Taken together, the studies from the three chapters suggest that people prefer
communal costs to either precede or occur at the same time as the benefits; and when
either is not possible, to minimise the temporal distance between the two. These
preferences were observed for both gains and losses; for decisions that have a direct
impact on the decision maker, or no impact at all; and for choices made between and
within participants. These findings suggest that communal financial decisions are, in
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general, motivated by the same mental accounting rules that people use to make
personal ones. In particular, the rules prescribed by the double-entry model (e.g.
prospective accounting / coupling).
Directions for future research
The evidence from Study 1 in Chapter 3 concerning the type of benefits effect (hedonic
vs utilitarian) on the timing of payments was inconclusive due to the lack of control
for the ratings of hedonic / utilitarian attributes of the projects. Future research should
investigate this issue further, and possibly use stimuli that are clearly hedonic (e.g. a
fireworks display or a funfair) and utilitarian (e.g. first aid training course).
Appropriate stimuli can be identified using a pre-test in which an independent group
of participants are asked to rate how pleasurable/useful certain products/projects are.
In addition, any prospective study should investigate the effects of duration and type
of benefits for personal and communal consumption using a single framework /
experiment. As well as, administer Scholten et al. (2016) debt-battery to identify
differences in preferences (if any) between the debt-tolerant and debt-averse.
Chapter 4 suggested that the contrarians were predominantly altruists, however it did
not completely rule out the possibility that some of the contrarians were participants
who did not interpret the experiment instructions properly. Therefore, prospective
studies should eliminate any potential misinterpretation by simplifying the
instructions, and employing appropriate manipulation checks. For instance,
participants could be informed prior to the main experimental task about the condition
they will be assigned to, then asked to identify whether it was a monetary gains or
losses condition pre and post task. Those who misidentify the condition they were
assigned to would be excluded from the study.
Finally, Chapter 5 implied that people use similar mental accounting rules to make
personal and communal financial decisions. However, the two domains were tested
separately. Future research should examine the two effects using the same framework
and under identical conditions. Two possible studies are proposed. One, to extend
Study 1 from Chapter 5 such that one group of participants would indicate their
preferences for the timing of payments in exchange for a personal product X, while
the other group would indicate the same in exchange for a communal project X.
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Participants could also be asked to identify what in their opinion Xwould be. The latter
information can be used to run a mediation analysis to test whether the type or
durability of benefits could explain the observed patterns. Two, run a variant of Study
3 from Chapter 5 in which participants trade green energy credits for personal and
communal consumption.
Chapter 5 also revealed a stronger contiguity effect for gains than losses, suggesting
that non-monetary benefits might mentally depreciate at a lower rate than monetary
ones. Past research revealed that monetary benefits can start to mentally depreciate as
early as three days following its receipt, with the rate increasing as a function of delay
(Siemens, 2007). However, no such research has been undertaken to determine the
depreciation rate of nonmonetary benefits. Consequently, future research should
determine if the two depreciate at the same rate.
Future research should also determine whether the length of the interval between the
monetary outcomes and the trade period matters, especially when the trade takes place
in-between the outcomes. For instance, will people be more likely to prepay for
consumption if it was temporally closer to the earlier payments than the later ones, and
vice versa? The answer according to the evidence in this chapter is yes. However,
further tests are required to confirm this. Furthermore, would it make a difference if
the intervals were in days or years instead of months?
Lastly, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) suggested that “tightwads” are more likely to
experience the pain of paying than “spendthrifts”, which prompted Rick et al. (2008)
to develop a 4-item “spendthrift-tightwad” scale to measure individual differences in
the pain of paying. Their findings suggest that spending differences are more likely in
situations that amplify the pain of paying, such that tightwads are more likely, for
instance, to prepay than postpay for short-lived consumption. They also find that
tightwads are in general more likely to pay off their credit card balance on time, and
are less likely to carry debt in general. Future research could explore the overlap (if
any) between the “spendthrift-tightwad” scale and the debt-battery. Specifically, for
similarities in behaviour between the debt-averse and tightwads; and the debt-tolerant
and spendthrifts. In addition, future research could also examine the cost-benefit trade-
off preferences of the debt-takers and debt-holders.
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